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There is probably no more abused a term in the history of philosophy 
than “representation”.   
- John Searle  
 
We, as cognitive psychologists, do not really understand our concepts of representation. We 
propose them, and talk about them, argue about them, and try to obtain evidence in support 
of them, but we do not understand them in any fundamental sense. 





















This thesis develops a teleological theory of mental representation to naturalise intentionality. 
Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functions. The thesis 
addresses a number of foundational problems that threats the viability of teleosemantics. The 
first chapter, “The metaphysics of mental representation”, develops a basic conception of 
mental representation that is designed to satisfy certain intuitive requirements 
(misrepresentation and original intentionality) and methodological requirements (explanatory 
power and ontological parsimony). The second chapter, “Naturalising intentionality”, defends 
the thesis that mental representation is naturalistically reducible and in particular that it should 
be explained teleosemantically. After that, it addresses some of Tyler Burge’s objections to 
reductionist naturalism in general and teleosemantics in particular. The third chapter, “The 
minimal conditions for intentionality: the problem of demarcation”, considers the problem of 
demarcating the limits of intentionality and the objection that teleosemantics and other 
naturalist theories are too liberal. It adopts the method of reflective equilibrium to develop 
minimal conditions for intentionality based on mutual adjustments between intuitive and 
explanatory constraints. Finally, it rejects alternative proposals for demarcating intentionality 
in terms of causal independence or constancy mechanisms. The fourth chapter, “The minimal 
conditions for intentionality: the dual proposal”, develops a specific solution to the problem of 
demarcation – the dual proposal for the minimal conditions for intentionality. The fifth chapter, 
“The content problem: in defence of producer-based teleosemantics”, defends a producer-based 
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  Intentionality is a fundamental feature of mind. Consider mental representations like 
the belief that Herne Hill is in south London or some dog’s memory of where the bone was 
buried. These are mental representations, i.e., mental states that have semantic properties. They 
represent the world in a certain way. But how is it possible for a given mental state to represent 
certain state? What is it for a state to be about another state? This is the problem of 
intentionality. Some philosophers claim that the problems of consciousness and intentionality 
are the two fundamental problems in philosophy of mind. The subject matter of this thesis is 
the problem of intentionality.  
   This thesis defends a naturalist view of intentionality. Mental representations are 
natural states. They are part of the natural order. However, paradigmatic natural states do not 
look representational at all. For instance, the atoms that constitute a given molecule or the 
leaves blowing in the Ruskin Park are natural states that do not represent anything. The task 
facing a naturalist theory of intentionality is to explain how, even so, some natural states are 
genuinely representational.  
  In this thesis, I defend a specific naturalist approach to intentionality – teleosemantics. 
According to it, mental representations are natural states with specific biological functions. The 
representational status of a given mental representation is explainable in terms of its specific 
biological function and it is in virtue of its biological function that it represents a given state. 
Teleosemantics is threaten by several foundational problems. The goal of this thesis is to defend 
teleosemantics from some of these.  
   The focus of this thesis is non-conceptual and sub-personal representational states. I 
assume hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, that I am dealing with simple non-conceptual 
representational states. For example, the frog that represents the presence of flies and the 
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representation of nearby predators by the vervet monkey. It is my hope that the teleological 
approach that I develop here one day may be developed in some way to more complex and 
sophisticated representational states like beliefs, desires and other conceptual representations, 
but carrying out this project lies outside the scope of this thesis.  
  Let me finish this introduction with an overview of what is to come in the following 
chapters. In the first chapter, I initially introduce the problem of intentionality. After that, I 
propose a basic conception of mental representation constituted by four requirements that a 
mental state should satisfy in order to be a mental representation. I propose two intuitive 
requirements – the misrepresentation and original intentionality – and two methodological 
requirements – the explanatory and ontological parsimony requirements. Finally, I reject a third 
methodological requirement – the radical error requirement. My strategy is to use the resulting 
basic conception of mental representations as a basis for the development of a more robust 
conception in the next chapters.   
  In the second chapter, I defend the viability of reductionist naturalism – the view that 
mental representations are reducible to natural states – and present my favoured reductionist 
approach – teleosemantics. First, I present and defend some motivations for reductionist 
naturalism. After that, I introduce teleosemantics which tries to establish a naturalist reduction 
of representational states in terms of biological functions. I finish the chapter with the 
assessment and rejection of some attacks by Tyler Burge on the orthodoxy of reductionism 
among contemporary naturalists.   
  The third chapter is dedicated to the problem of demarcation: what are the minimal 
conditions for a state to qualify as a mental representation? In other words, what are the limits 
of intentionality? The relevance of this problem for the debate on naturalist theories of mental 
representation is that they are often criticized for being too liberal. The objection is that 
teleosemantics and other naturalist theories consider certain states that are clearly not 
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representational as representational states. In this chapter, I propose a variation of the method 
of reflective equilibrium to develop and assess proposals for minimal conditions for 
intentionality. After that, I assess and reject two proposals for minimal conditions for 
intentionality, the causal independence proposal developed by Jerry Fodor and Ansgar 
Beckermann and the constancy mechanism proposal developed by Tyler Burge and Kim 
Sterelny.   
  The fourth chapter is dedicated to the positive stage of my investigation of the limits of 
intentionality. I develop the dual proposal which establishes two minimal conditions for a given 
state to represent a certain external feature – the success pattern and the constancy mechanism 
conditions. I argue that this proposal draws the genuine limits of intentionality in light of both 
intuitive and explanatory considerations.     
  The fifth and final chapter is dedicated to the content problem: in virtue of what does a 
mental representation represent a given state rather than another state? Teleosemantics tries to 
determine the representational content of a given mental representation in terms of its 
biological function. However, this core thesis is threatened by several problems, especially 
functional indeterminacy problems. My goal in this chapter is to develop a producer-based 
teleological theory of content to deal with these problems. I develop general defence of 
producer-based teleosemantics and defend this approach from the objection that it fails to keep 
the room open for enough misrepresentation cases. I propose a solution for two functional 
indeterminacy problems – the concertina and the distality problems. The latter is especially 
problematic for producer-based teleosemantics, while the former is equally problematic for 
other teleosemantic theories. Finally, I defend producer-based teleosemantics from one final 





CHAPTER 1. THE METAPHYSICS OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
 
1.1   A basic conception of mental representation 
1.2   Intuitive requirements  
1.3   Methodological requirements 
 
  John believes that Brazil is a big country. Anna told her mother that London is a 
wonderful city. A sentence in a book says that Romeo loves Juliet. These are cases of 
representations of the world in some way or another: John’s belief represents Brazil as a big 
country; Anna’s utterance represents London as a wonderful city; and the sentence represents 
Romeo as loving Juliet. Although beliefs, utterances and sentences are entirely different things, 
they all have representational power, i.e., they all have semantic properties. But they differ in 
the way in which they represent the world. So, John’s belief represents the world in a different 
way from Anna’s utterance since the former represents the state of affairs that Brazil is a big 
country, while the latter represents the state of affairs that London is a wonderful city. There 
are many kinds of representations. Some of them are mental states (beliefs, desires, perceptions, 
hopes, subpersonal representations, etc.), some are linguistic states (utterances, sentences, 
signs, etc.), while others are neither mental nor linguistic, like pictures or photographs.   
  Every representation has a representational content, that is, the way in which it 
represents the world. The representation draws a line in logical space between the states of 
affairs that it represents and those states of affairs that it does not represent. The content of 
John’s belief is Brazil is a big country, so this mental state represents the state of affairs that 
Brazil is a big country, but no other state of affairs. In the case of beliefs and other indicative 
representations, the content is the truth conditions of the representation: John’s belief is true if 
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and only if it is the case that Brazil is a big country and it is false if and only if it is not the case 
that Brazil is a big country. On the other hand, desires and other imperative representations do 
not have truth conditions, but satisfaction conditions. The content is the satisfaction conditions 
of the representation: Paul’s desire for a pint of beer is satisfied if and only if he gets a pint of 
beer and it is not satisfied otherwise.  
  Representations give rise to a variety of puzzles, but the fundamental philosophical 
problem can be stated in a very simple way made famous by Franz Brentano. Representations 
have intentionality, they represent other states. But how can a state stand for another? That is, 
how is it possible for a state to be about another state? That is the problem of representation.1 
So, how can a state in John’s mind represent that Brazil is a big country even if Brazil is very 
far away and John actually was never there? How can some marks in a book represent that 
Romeo loves Juliet, while some other marks in the same book represents other things or maybe 
don’t represent at all? Representations can be about nonexistent or existent things, close or far 
away, abstract or concrete, etc. Indeed, it seems that they can be about everything. On the other 
hand, representations come in a variety of forms: utterances, marks on a sheet of paper, mental 
states, pictures, photographs, etc. Indeed, it appears that they can come in every conceivable 
form. That is the deep mystery of representation: how representational states of very different 
kinds can be about states of very different kinds? How is representation possible at all?   
 The focus of this thesis is on one specific kind of representation, the one that pertains 
to the mental reality: mental representation. Evidently, in order to investigate the nature of 
mental representations, the investigation of other representations are helpful and welcome, but 
only in an auxiliary way. This first chapter is on the metaphysics of mental representation: what 
is a mental representation and what constitutes it? In virtue of what is a given mental state a 
                                                             
1 Brentano formulated this problem specifically on mental states (Cf. BRENTANO, 1874 [1995]), but since then 
this way of presenting the problem was generalized to all kinds of representational states. 
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mental representation? That is, what grounds the fact that a given mental state has 
representational powers? These are problems in the metaphysics of mental representation since 
they deal with what constitutes a mental representation and with what grounds the 
representation status of a given mental state (i.e., the property in virtue of which a given mental 
state is a mental representation). The investigation of the nature of the mental representation, 
of what constitutes it, aims to understand the deepest facts about mental representations and 
the role they play in grounding intentional explanations. This is a metaphysical matter.   
 
1.1 A basic conception of mental representation  
  The first step in the investigation of the nature of mental representation is to specify 
what is meant by “mental representation”. Notice that this is a term of art, it is not used in 
everyday life – the same goes for “mental content”. Rather, the notion of mental representation 
is highly theoretical and varies from theory to theory, in such a way that there are different and 
incompatible notions of mental representation available. As John Searle has acutely remarked, 
“there is probably no more abused a term in the history of philosophy than ‘representation’” 
(SEARLE, 1983, p. 11). In light of this fact, someone could propose that one should look for 
an umbrella term capable of covering all different notions of mental representation assumed by 
different theories of mental representation present in the literature. The goal of this strategy is 
to enable talk on mental representations that is capable of covering all notions of mental 
representation in order to specify what is common between all of them. Prima facie, that seems 
to be a good strategy, but the fact is that there is no substantial umbrella notion capable of 
covering all different notions of mental representation.   
  There is one candidate for this umbrella notion capable of covering all available notions 
of mental representation – the minimalist notion. According to it, a mental representation is 
just a mental state with semantic properties. Nothing else is required for a mental state to be a 
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mental representation. However, the minimalist notion is not substantial. It is a trivial fact that, 
for a given mental state to be a mental representation, it is a required condition that this state 
have semantic properties. But to say that a mental state should have semantic properties in 
order to be a mental representation is only a different way of saying that a mental state should 
represent in order to be a mental representation. It adds nothing more on the nature of mental 
representations. It is obvious that every mental representation should have semantic properties 
and since the minimalist notion requires nothing more than that for a mental state to be a mental 
representation, it follows that it says nothing substantial on the nature of mental representations. 
Thus, the minimalist notion is not a substantial notion of mental representation and one should 
look for a more substantial one.  
  It seems that the ultimate goal of this investigation would be to develop a definition of 
mental representation which establishes a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
mental state to be a mental representation. Thus, a mental state would be a mental 
representation in virtue of the satisfaction of these conditions. However, I am quite sceptical 
about the prospects of developing a straight definition of mental representation that would 
provide these necessary and sufficient conditions. I think that any investigation which purports 
to establish sufficient and necessary conditions for a mental state to constitute a mental 
representation is doomed to fail. There are at least two reasons that support this sceptical 
conclusion.2   
  First, “mental representation” is used in a variety of conflicting ways such that it is hard 
to conceive a definition that would be able to embrace all of them. Second, there is always the 
possibility that the proposed definition will give rise to several intuitive counter-examples, 
either because it is too inclusive (i.e., it treats states that clearly are not mental representations 
                                                             




as mental representations) or too exclusive (i.e., it treats states that clearly are mental 
representations as non-representational). Thus, the search for a strict definition of mental 
representation is not a promising strategy. But if so, how should we proceed?  
  I think that the best strategy is to start with the minimalist notion and then make it more 
substantial by adding intuitive and methodological requirements for a mental state with 
semantic properties to be a mental representation. In the end, this strategy will not deliver a 
definition of mental representation and not even a robust conception of it, but it will deliver a 
more substantial notion than the minimalist one and it will serve a different purpose. We can 
take the delivered conception as the basic one and then refine it by adding other requirements 
in order to deal with specific cases of mental representation. That is, to improve the delivered 
basic conception of mental representations with requirements that are required for specific 
kinds of mental representation, but not for other kinds. For instance, you can provide more 
specific requirements in order for a mental state to be a belief, a desire, a subpersonal 
representation, a perception, etc. Thus, the basic conception may serve later developments of 
robust conceptions of specific kinds of mental representation.  
 That said, how might one develop the basic notion? A good starting point is to look for 
requirements that a mental state should satisfy in order to be a mental representation on which 
basically everyone would agree. Evidently, it would be better to look for a requirement that 
literally everyone in this debate would agree on, but this is not a promising idea since if there 
is a lesson to be taken from the history of philosophy it is that everything is questionable under 
philosophical scrutiny. So, instead of looking for uncontentious requirements for a mental state 
to be a mental representation, my proposal is to focus on requirements for mental 
representations that are as uncontentious as possible. Thus, I will look for two kinds of 
requirements for mental representation. The intuitive ones which arise from our intuitive or 
commonsense view of what it is for a mental state to represent the world, and the 
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methodological requirements that arise from methodological considerations of scientific 
theories that posit mental representations in order to explain how cognitive systems work (e.g., 
cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, etc.). The result of the establishment of intuitive 
and methodological requirements is what I will call a basic conception of mental 
representation.  
  But why can one not take this basic conception of mental representation as a definition 
of mental representation? After all, one can take the established conditions for a state to be a 
mental representation as defining what a mental representation is. The problem with such a 
move is that a definition of a state requires necessary and sufficient conditions for something 
to be that state and therefore necessitates the exclusion of any borderline case in which it is not 
clear whether something is a mental representation or not. However, that is not the case with 
the basic conception. It will not exclude every borderline case. There will be cases in which 
even though the state satisfies these conditions, it is not clear if it is a mental representation 
and, conversely, there will be cases in which even though the state does not satisfy these 
conditions, it is not clear that it is not a mental representation. So, the delivered basic 
conception is not definitional.   
 
1.2. Intuitive requirements  
  I will state and defend two intuitive requirements for a mental state to be a mental 
representation, the misrepresentation and original intentionality requirements. But before doing 
that, it is necessary to solve the following problem. It is plainly plausible to claim that the 
positing of mental representation assumed by folk psychology should satisfy our intuitive 
requirements of what it is for a mental state to represent. After all, folk psychology is precisely 
our common sense view of how the mind works. Why should a scientific theory, that posits a 
mental representation to explain the behavior of a cognitive system, satisfy intuitive 
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requirements (i.e., intuitive requirements for a for a state to constitute a mental representation)? 
Is it not the case that since this is a theoretical posit by a scientific theory, it makes no difference 
if it is in accordance or it is not with our commonsense view of representation? All that matters 
is the unique set of properties that provided the relevant scientific positing – the mental 
representation – with the explanatory role that it plays in the theory. That seems to be the case 
in theories of natural science, so why would be things different in the case of the positing of 
mental representations? For instance, it makes no difference to physics whether the positing of 
atom or mass is in accordance or not with our intuitive views of what atoms or masses are, all 
that matters are the explanatory roles that the notions of atom and mass play in physics.   
  The difference is that the notion of representation is pre-scientific. It already has a 
place in our commonsense view of the world before we start to develop scientific theories and 
so this non-theoretical understanding of what it is for a state to represent another state 
constrains the sort of things that qualifies as representational states, even in the context of a 
scientific theory. After all, if a state is posited as a representational state by a scientific theory 
and it has absolutely nothing to do with what we ordinarily call a representation, why should it 
be called a representation at all? If the theory still calls it a representation, then one should 
conclude that this is just a case of homonym – two completely different states are just being 
called by the same name, “representation”. Hence, the theoretical notions of representation 
should be in some way rooted or connected to some degree with our commonsense conception 
of representation for them to qualify as representational states.3 That said, let’s move to what I 
take to be two intuitive requirements for a mental state to be a mental representation.  
 
The misrepresentation requirement  
  Suppose that on a dark night you are on a farm and see an animal on the horizon and 
                                                             
3 William Ramsey has also highlighted this point, cf. RAMSEY, 2007, p. 24-5. 
19 
 
then you believe that it is a horse. As a result, you acquire the belief that this is a horse. 
However, as it happens this animal is not really a horse, but a cow – you have misrepresented 
it as a horse because it is too far away and the surrounding environment is not properly lit. Now 
contrast it with the following case. Suppose that there is a great amount of smoke in the middle 
of a forest and since smoke means fire, surely there is fire somewhere. But how literal is “smoke 
means fire”? Is smoke a genuine representation of fire? No. Among other reasons, smoke is 
not a genuine representation of fire because it cannot misrepresent fire. Natural law supports 
the claim that it can never be the case that you can have smoke but no fire which originated it.4 
The lesson to be drawn from the contrast between the smoke and the belief is that for a state to 
represent another, it is required that it has the power to misrepresent the other state.  
  The first intuitive requirement for a mental state to be a mental representation is that it 
should be possible not only for it to represent, but also for it to misrepresent. No representation 
without the possibility of misrepresentation – that is the motto of philosophers of mental 
representation. So, if the mental state is not capable of misrepresenting, then it is not a genuine 
mental representation. That is the misrepresentation requirement. As expected, it turns to be a 
restriction for the viability of theories of mental representation: if a theory is not capable of 
explaining how a given mental representation can misrepresent, then this theory should be 
summarily ruled out. This requirement implies that one can say that a mental state that seems 
to represent something but that lacks misrepresentation power is not a genuine mental 
representation at all.  
  Notice that the misrepresentation requirement is not only stating that there is a 
distinction between representation and misrepresentation. This requirement doesn’t follow 
directly from the fact that representations make a distinction between those conditions that it 
represents and those that it doesn’t represent. Rather, the misrepresentation requirement states 
                                                             
4 For the sake of the argument, I am assuming here that natural laws are necessary.  
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that it should be possible for a representational state to misrepresent. Even if there is a 
distinction between those conditions that a state supposedly represents and those that it doesn’t, 
if there is no room for it to misrepresent, then it is not a genuine representation. Or, to put in 
another way, if it is necessary that the state will not mispresent, then it is not a representation. 
But what about the possibility of a cognitive system that generates so precise and accurate 
representational states that they will never misrepresent? Here a distinction should be made 
between two cases. It is plainly possible that by chance a given cognitive system always 
produces representational states that don’t ever misrepresent. That is plainly compatible with 
the misrepresentation requirement. What is not compatible is that it is impossible for this 
system to produce supposedly representational states that misrepresent. It would not be a 
representation at all. It is precisely this case that the misrepresentation requirement excludes.
 Finally, consider the sentence “smoke means fire” again. Why can one not hold that it 
literally says that smoke represents fire? Why can one not hold that this is not a façon de parler? 
Under abnormal situations, it is possible to have smoke but no fire. For instance, suppose that 
someone puts a certain amount of smoke inside a box, transports it to another place and then 
opens it in order to fool everyone around: after seeing the smoke in the air, people start to look 
for fire. In that case, it could be claimed that smoke misrepresents fire since there is no fire 
around and thus smoke satisfies the misrepresentation requirement. Then, what is problematic 
in claiming that smoke genuinely represents fire? I think that there are at least three problems 
that together constitute a strong reason to reject this move.  
  The first one is that in this counter-example the source of the supposed 
misrepresentation is not the violation of the natural law that supports the correlation between 
smoke and fire. Rather, the source is the transport of smoke to another place to fool everyone. 
In that sense, smoke would only be capable of misrepresenting in abnormal situations and so 
the result is that ceteris paribus, it is not possible for smoke to misrepresent fire. Then, if one 
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wants to claim that smoke means fire and yet that smoke satisfies the misrepresentation 
requirement, one will have to claim that smoke means fire only in abnormal situations, i.e., 
those situations in which there is the possibility of the violation in the correlation between 
smoke and fire. But does it make sense?  
  No. Without strong principled reasons, it is not possible to hold that smoke represents 
fire in abnormal situations, but not under normal situations. That would be plainly arbitrary: 
why would smoke represent fire in certain situations but not in others? Under ceteris paribus 
conditions it is not possible for smoke to not be correlated with fire and thus it is not possible 
for smoke to misrepresent fire. The abnormal situations are precisely those situations in which 
the ceteris paribus conditions are violated and so it is possible for smoke to supposedly 
misrepresent fire. But it makes no sense in constructing a notion of representation for those 
situations in which the ceteris paribus conditions are violated – it only makes sense in 
constructing it for ceteris paribus situations. Notice that ceteris paribus conditions constitute 
a reason for claiming that a given state is a representation in certain situations, namely, those 
which satisfy the ceteris paribus conditions. But what is at stake here is precisely the opposite 
of it: the thesis that smoke represents fire only under situations in which the ceteris paribus 
conditions are violated (since in those situations smoke would supposedly have 
misrepresentational power). Therefore, smoke does not represent fire even under abnormal 
situations and hence that smoke does not represent fire at all.  
 The second problem in claiming that smoke is a genuine representation of fire is that if 
one accepts smoke as a genuine representation of fire, then one is forced to accept that several 
other natural states are also genuine representational states – rain means cloudy sky, snow 
means cold weather, the height of the mercury in the thermometer means temperature, etc. In 
fact, you are forced to accept that every state that has a correlation supported by natural law 
with another state genuinely represents the latter. But this conclusion is highly counterintuitive 
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– just because there is a strong natural correlation between two states, can it be inferred that 
one state represents the other? For instance, just because there is a strong correlation between 
snow and cold weather, can it be inferred that snow represents cold weather? This is certainly 
highly implausible.   
  Finally, the third problem is that since there are correlations almost everywhere between 
states that are supported by natural law, it follows that there are representations almost 
everywhere. But if that is the case, then the notion of representation loses its utility and 
distinctiveness. On one hand, it would imply that the notion of representation is almost 
everywhere in physical, chemical, biological explanations, etc. Thus, the notion of 
representation would lose its distinctiveness because it would be almost universally applicable 
to physical, chemical, biological states, etc. On the other hand, why would psychology and 
other sciences of mind that make use of intentional explanations still appeal to the notion of 
representation to explain a given phenomenon? This notion would be so weak that almost every 
system would constitute a representational system. The loss of utility is evident. In conclusion, 
smoke does not genuinely represent fire because otherwise the very notion of representation 
would lose its utility and distinctiveness.5   
  I think that the strongest reason that some people share the intuition that smoke 
genuinely represents fire originates in a failure to distinguish the question of whether smoke 
itself represents fire from the question of whether people use the presence of smoke as medium 
to represent the presence of fire. These are completely different questions. The first one is about 
the smoke in itself as being the representational vehicle of the representation of fire, while the 
second question is about the mental or linguistic representation harboured by people as being 
the vehicle of the representation of fire. On one side, if smoke itself is a genuine representation 
of fire, then it represents fire no matter whether there is someone (or something) that uses it as 
                                                             
5 I thank Prof. Matthew Parrott for valuable suggestions on this third problem. 
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a representation of fire or not. On the other side, people can use the presence of smoke as a 
representation of fire by appealing to the natural correlation between them – but here it is clear 
that what is representing fire is not the smoke in itself, but people that make use of the presence 
of smoke in order to represent the presence of fire. Notice that the mental or linguistic 
representation can represent fire via the perception of smoke simply by using the correlation 
between fire and smoke as a medium to represent the presence of fire. Therefore, in light of the 
distinction between these two questions, the intuition that could provide a basis for the 
judgment that smoke represents fire vanishes in the air – smoke in itself does not represent 
anything; rather, it is people that represent fire by making use of the natural correlation between 
smoke and fire.   
 
The original intentionality requirement  
   The second requirement for a mental state to be a mental representation is the original 
or underived intentionality requirement: the state should have underived or original 
intentionality. It is based on the distinction, made famous by John Searle, between original and 
derived intentionality (SEARLE, 1992).6 Consider the following sentences:  
 
 (1) The president believes that it will rain tomorrow.  
  (2) In Portuguese, “vai chover amanhã” means it will rain tomorrow.   
 
Sentence (1) is used literally to ascribe a representational state to the president, namely, a belief. 
If this is a true sentence, then the president has a state with the representational content it will 
                                                             
6 Sometimes underived or original intentionality is also called “intrinsic intentionality”. I will avoid using this term 
because it may be misleading in the sense of being interpreted as implying semantic internalism: to have mental 
representations depends solely on the intrinsic properties of the subject; the semantic properties of mental 
states are non-relational. However, the distinction between derived and original intentionality is completely 
independent of the debate between semantic internalism and externalism.  
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rain tomorrow. On the other hand, sentence (2) is used to ascribe a representational content to 
the Portuguese sentence “vai chover amanhã”, namely, it will rain tomorrow. What is the 
difference between the president’s belief and the Portuguese sentence? Although they have the 
same representational content, the belief represents that it will rain tomorrow in virtue of its 
own features, because it is a representational state by itself, while the Portuguese sentence 
represents that it will rain tomorrow not in virtue of its own features, but in virtue of something 
else – our ascription of this representational content to it. This sentence represents in virtue of 
conventions and interpretations followed by cognitive agents. If no ascription of content to the 
president’s belief or to the Portuguese sentence had been done, then the belief would still 
represent that it will rain tomorrow, while the sentence would not represent anything at all. So, 
the belief has original intentionality because it represents what it actually represents in a non-
derivative way, while the sentence has derived intentionality because its representational power 
is derived from something else.  
  The cases above illustrate not only the distinction between derived and original 
intentionality, but also the thesis that beliefs, desires, subpersonal representations and other 
mental states have original intentionality, while sentences, utterances, maps and other public 
states have derived intentionality. But can one infer that all public representations have derived 
intentionality, while only mental representations have original intentionality? Not at all. The 
fact is that there are several cases of public representations that represent what they do in virtue 
of their own features, not in virtue of the assignment of representational powers to them by 
cognitive agents. Let’s illustrate this with the honeybee dance.    
  Honeybees perform a certain dance to sign the direction of the source of nectar to other 
honeybees. Variations in the tempo of the dance and in the axis correspond to variations in the 
distance and direction of the source of the nectar. The watching bees notice the performance of 
the dance and goes in the signaled direction to bring nectar to the hive. So, it is clear that the 
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honeybee dance represents the location of the source of nectar and that it is a public 
representation in such a way that it signals the location of nectar. But its representational power 
is not derived from any other representation, rather it represents what it does in virtue of its 
own features – there is no assignment of representational powers to it by any cognitive agent. 
So, this is a public representational state with original intentionality. The distinction between 
derived and original intentionality is widely popular, but not uncontentious. Daniel Dennett, 
for instance, challenges the thesis that there are states with original intentionality and thus the 
thesis that mental representations have original intentionality (DENNETT, 1990). However, it 
is not my goal here to assess Dennett’s objection or any other objection to this distinction. 
Rather, I shall now argue that the onus of argument is on those claiming that there is only 
derived intentionality. Even though this will not constitute a definitive proof that this thesis is 
false, the conclusion will be that prima facie the balance leans to the acceptance of original 
intentionality, not to its rejection.   
  Suppose that there is no original intentionality, only the derived kind. So, intentional 
state A derived its intentionality from intentional state B which by its turn derived its 
intentionality from intentional state C and so on – this is the derivation chain. Ex hypothesi, it 
has no state with original intentionality that constitutes the source of intentionality, i.e., the 
source of all intentionality that passes through the chain. Pick one state in the chain – since it 
has derived intentionality, there will always be another state(s) from which its intentionality is 
derived. Furthermore, since there is no infinite number of intentional states in the natural world, 
it follows that this chain is finite. Thus, intentional states are connected in a myriad of ways 
via finite derivation chains and there are no states which constitute the sources of intentionality 
of these chains. But is there something problematic in this characterization of the derivation 
chain?  
  I think that there is one fundamental problem: how is it possible for a finite derivation 
26 
 
chain to derive its intentional properties from one intentional state to another if there is no state 
which is the source of its intentionality? Note that if you have an infinite derivation chain this 
is not so problematic, since for any element that you pick in the chain, there will always be a 
previous state from which its intentionality is derived. There will be a previous state from 
which the intentionality is derived for every intentional state in the infinite chain. However, 
such a move is simply not possible in a finite chain because even though there will always be 
a state which is the first element in the chain (no matter how long it is), even this state has 
derived intentionality. But from which state did this other state in the chain derive its 
intentionality given that it is precisely its first element?7 The challenge to whoever holds that 
there is only derived intentionality consists in explaining how the intentional state which is the 
first element of the chain has derived intentionality given that there is no previous state in the 
chain (precisely because it is finite). Here two observations are necessary. The first one is that 
it is of no help to appeal to another finite chain to explain the derivation of intentionality of this 
first element since such a move would only postpone the problem to the first element of the 
new derivation chain: if it is also finite, how did its first element derive its intentionality? The 
second observation is that it is of no help either to appeal to other derivation chains to explain 
the derivation of the intentionality of the first element (in the sense that it was derived from 
several states that are the last elements in these chains) because such a move would again only 
postpone the problem to the first elements of these new derivation chains.     
  How can this problem be solved? A possible response is to claim that the derivation 
chain is not linear, but circular: state A derived its intentionality from state B, that derived its 
                                                             
7 Here it could be complained that there is no way of determining which states are the first and last elements of 
the chain because it is plainly arbitrary to maintain that a given state is the first and another state is the last 
element but not the inverse. That is, it is arbitrary to choose one direction of the chain as the one in which it 
begins and therefore that it ends on the opposite direction because you could invert this claim and maintain 
that it begins in the opposite direction and ends in the first direction. However, this objection is flawed. There is 
one criterion that shows that this is not arbitrary: the last element is the only state in the chain which derives its 
intentionality but do not transmit it to any state. Based on this criterion, one can determine where the chain 
begins and therefore where it ends.    
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intentionality from state C, …, that derived its intentionality from state N, …., that derived its 
intentionality from A. Thus, it is not possible to tell which state is the first element in this 
circular chain since every element in it can be arbitrarily taken to be the first element. 
Moreover, no state in the chain is its source of intentionality because every state in this circular 
chain derives its intentionality from the previous state and transmits its intentionality to the 
next state.8   
  However, the same problem arises for the circular derivation chain. How is it possible 
for a state in the circular chain to derive its intentionality from the previous state if the 
transmission of its intentionality to the next state will ultimately reach the state from which this 
state originally derived its intentionality? After all, derivation (and transmission) of 
intentionality is transitive: if A derived its intentionality from B and B derived its intentionality 
from C, then A derived its intentionality from C. In the end, a state that derives its intentionality 
from a previous state in the circular chain also transmits its intentionality to this state via the 
transmission of its intentionality to the intermediate states between them. But how is it possible 
for two states in the circular chain to simultaneously derive and transmit their intentionality to 
each other?9   
  A possible objection to this argument is to deny the transitive character of the 
intentionality derivation. In order for the derivation of intentionality to not be transitive, it 
would be the case that if A derived its intentionality from B and B derived its intentionality 
from C, then there is some aspect of the intentionality of A that is not present in the 
intentionality of C. But how is that possible given that B derived the totality of its intentionality 
                                                             
8 I assume here that the transmission of intentionality is just the converse of the derivation of intentionality, in 
the sense that if A derived its intentionality from B, then B transmitted its intentionality to A. 
9 In the formulation of this objection, I have appealed to the relations of derivation and transmission of 
intentionality and I have assumed that both relations are transitive. But if for whatever reason it is doubtful 
whether the transmission of intentionality is a transitive relation or not, it should be highlighted that this 
objection is plainly formulable in terms only of the relation of derivation of intentionality. The intentionality 
derivation is the fundamental relation here, the transmission of intentionality is secondary.   
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from C and A in turn derived the totality of its intentionality from B? Given that by hypothesis 
all intentionality is derived, there is no other state from which A derived the totality of its 
intentionality except from C. So, the derivation of intentionality is a transitive relation.  
  Finally, the last response to this problem would be to state that intentionality is a holistic 
phenomenon in the sense that no state in isolation has intentional properties because 
intentionality emerges out of a collection of appropriately related states. In fact, the regression 
of the derivation of intentionality only gives rise to the above problem because it presupposes 
that internationality is not holistic. But once you realize that intentionality emerges out of a 
collection of appropriately related states, the regression vanishes in the air. However, this 
response is also problematic. If one wants to hold it, one must explain how it is possible for a 
completely new and distinct property, intentionality, to emerge out of states that in isolation 
have no intentional property. Furthermore, one must explain what kind of relation should hold 
between theses state in order for the emergence of intentionality to be possible, what is the 
minimum amount of states that enables the emergence of intentionality, etc. Prima facie this is 
not an impossible task, but it constitutes a serious challenge for whoever wants to take this 
route to solve the above problem.    
  This is a hard problem for the thesis that there is only derived intentionality. But as 
previously observed, I am not concluding from the above argumentation that this thesis is false. 
After all, there is still the possibility of the development of a theory of derived intentionality 
committed to the thesis that there is no original intentionality but nevertheless not threatened 
by this hard problem. Rather, my conclusion is that the argumentation above shows that the 
overall balance leans to the acceptance of original intentionality precisely because that position 
avoids this problem. Evidently, this position has its own problem – the explanation of how a 
state may have original intentionality – but it is not as problematic. Thus, in light of the hard 
problem which threats the viability of the thesis that there is only derived intentionality, the 
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overall balance leans in favour of the acceptance of original intentionality, and not its rejection. 
Prima facie we should be inclined to accept the existence of original intentionality rather than 
rejecting it and whoever wants to deny it has a serious challenge to overcome, i.e., to solve this 
hard problem.   
 
1.3. Methodological requirements  
  Now let’s move to methodological requirements which have a very different nature 
from the intuitive ones. They are in force only for theories that posit mental representations in 
order to explain cognition – cognitive science, psychology, neuroscience, philosophical 
theories, etc. I will here defend two distinct but related methodological requirements – the 
explanatory and the ontological parsimony requirements. After that, I will assess and reject a 
third methodological requirement, the radical error one.  
 
The explanatory requirement  
  The first methodological requirement is that for a mental state to be a mental 
representation, the representational status of this state should have some explanatory role. The 
positing of the mental representation by a cognitive theory must earn its explanatory keep. 
Otherwise, the state should not be recognized as a mental representation. If the positing of a 
given state as a mental representation plays no explanatory role whatsoever, then it makes no 
explanatory difference to the cognitive system which harbours it whether it is a representational 
state or not and thus this state shouldn’t qualify as a representation. So, it is a requirement for 
a given mental state to be a representation that the positing of this state as representing plays 
an explanatory role in the theory. This is the explanatory requirement.10 But what kind of 
                                                             
10 Explanatory requirements for the positing of mental representation have been proposed by several 
philosophers of mental representation, cf. RAMSEY, 2007, p. 24-34; SHEA, 2007; RESCORLA, 2013. 
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explanatory role justifies the positing of a mental representation by a given theory?  
  Let’s start with a case in which evidently the positing of a mental representation by a 
theory does not earn its explanatory role. Consider a lectern in the center of the lecture room 
that just remains stationary there. One can provide the following intentional explanation for 
why the lectern remains there: it believes that the center of the lecture room is the center of the 
universe and it desires above all to stay at the center of the universe. But everyone would agree 
that it makes no sense to provide an intentional explanation for the fact that the lectern remains 
in the center of the room and they would further agree that the lectern harbours no 
representational state. Why? Simply because the attribution of representational states to the 
lectern does not earn its explanatory keep. It makes no explanatory difference for the 
explanation of the supposed behavior of the lectern. For instance, assignments of 
representational states in this case play no role either in explanatory generalizations that 
subsume the lectern and they have no predictive power of any kind. So, we should accept the 
conclusion that the positing of a mental representation should be rejected.11   
  Contrast the above example with a case in which it is clear that the positing of 
representational states plays a crucial explanatory role that deliver generality and predictive 
powers: the intentional explanation of human behaviour provided by folk psychology. Suppose 
that Matthew goes to the kitchen and get himself a beer whenever he plays with his lovely 
daughter. But why does he behave in this way? There are different kinds of available 
explanations. A non-intentional explanation will appeal only to physical properties, states and 
laws in order to explain why Matthew went to kitchen and got himself a beer. That is a good 
explanation as it stands, but it is not good enough for our explanatory purposes. Why do we 
need to appeal to representational states in order to explain Matthew’s behaviour in a further 
way?    
                                                             
11 This example was originally proposed by Daniel Dennett, cf. DENETT, 1987, p. 23. 
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  One compelling reason is that the intentional explanation of behaviour has a generality 
that is simply absent in the non-intentional explanation. For instance, the non-intentional 
explanation is not capable of explaining why Matthew gets himself a beer whenever he plays 
with his daughter. It can explain why in a certain period of time Matthew goes to the kitchen 
and gets a beer, but it cannot explain why it happens on every occasion that he plays with his 
daughter; why he gets a beer but not a water, etc. On the other hand, the physical explanation 
cannot predict that ceteris paribus, Matthew will drink the only beer available in the kitchen 
the next time that he plays with his daughter. It is precisely here that an intentional explanation 
is required, and the positing of a representational state earns its explanatory keep.   
  Now suppose that Matthew has a desire to drink a beer whenever he plays with his 
daughter and that he believes that the best way to do it is to go to the kitchen and get himself a 
beer. Therefore, because of his belief and desire, Matthew goes to the kitchen, gets a beer and 
drinks it. The match between his belief and desire explains why Matthew drinks a beer 
whenever he is playing with his daughter and predicts that he will do it in the next time that he 
plays with his daughter. The intentional explanation has a generality and a predictive element 
which is absent in the non-intentional explanation of his behaviour. At most, the non-
intentional explanation will provide individual explanations of Matthew’s behaviour at 
different periods of time, but it is not able to establish connections between the examples and 
provide a unifying explanation that embraces all these different events together. By contrast, 
the intentional explanation is provided with powers of generalization and predictions that 
explain why Matthew gets himself a beer on every occasion that he plays with his daughter. In 
fact, this pattern generalizes in folk psychology to even higher levels. If the cognitive agent 
desires X and believes that the best way to get X is by doing Y, then, barring other conflicting 
desires, that agent will do Y. This is the golden rule of belief-desire psychology. It predicts that 
we can substitute X and Y for respectively whatever desire and belief we want and provided 
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that they match with each other, then the agent will do Y. Such belief-desire match gives rise 
to the intentional explanation of the agent’s behaviour. So, mental representations give rise to 
intentional explanations that predict and generalize behaviour and so the explanatory 
requirement is satisfied in folk psychology cases.   
  Here it should be highlighted that I am not committing myself to the stronger thesis that 
mental representations participate in causal relations that generate behaviour in virtue of their 
contents, i.e., in virtue of what they are representing. Many philosophers, following the 
cognitivist revolution, deny this thesis and hold that mental representations interact causally in 
virtue of their syntactic properties, not in virtue of their semantic properties. But this causal 
interaction is faithful to the contents of mental representations, notwithstanding the fact that 
content is causally inert. By contrast, other philosophers have claimed that mental 
representations not only interact in a variety of ways but participate in these causal relations in 
virtue of their content. This is a very controversial issue and it is not my goal here to enter into 
this debate. What I am claiming is the weaker thesis that the causal roles of representations 
merely correspond to their contents, not that representations generate behaviors in virtue of 
what they represent. So, if you believe that if P then Q and you also come to believe that P, 
then these two beliefs will cause you to believe Q, but it is contentious whether these two 
beliefs cause your belief Q in virtue of their representational contents.  
  But assuming the weaker thesis that the causal roles of representations merely 
correspond to their contents, what kind of explanatory role would the positing of mental 
representations have in a cognitive theory? If there is no guarantee that content is not causally 
inert, there is the possibility that there is a complete causal description of the behavior of the 
system that does not appeal to any semantic notion. In that case, what would be the explanatory 
role of positing mental representations? That is to say, what explanatory role would mental 
representations play in a theory in which there is a complete causal description of the behavior 
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of the cognitive system?   
  This is a fundamental problem that I will assess in detail only in the third and fourth 
chapters when I will assess the deep nature of intentional explanations of behavior in contrast 
with non-intentional ones. But let me highlight here just one point. Mental representations earn 
their explanatory keep in a way that is independent of non-intentional explanations of behavior. 
The explanatory role of mental representation goes further than that. Intentional explanations 
earn their explanatory keep because they show how the cognitive system is related to the 
surrounding environment, establishing how mental representations are connected with distal 
states of affairs in the environment (SHEA, 2013, p. 498). This is what is peculiar to intentional 
explanations, what distinguishes them from non-intentional explanations. Intentional 
explanations state how the cognitive system is connected with objects and properties of the 
environment with which it interacts. By contrast, the non-intentional explanation of the system 
may be true irrespective of the way that it is related or connected with the environment. Content 
assignments explain how this interaction occurs by establishing a connection between the 
system and the environment in which it is embedded. It is precisely in virtue of the 
establishment of this connection that intentional explanations have generality and predictive 
powers that are absent in non-intentional explanations. Thus, the golden rule of belief-desire 
psychology connects the agent with the environment via its beliefs and desires (an intentional 
explanation of Matthew’s behaviour connects him with his daughter, the kitchen and the beer), 
but such connection is absent in non-semantic explanations of the agent’s behaviour (a 
syntactic explanation of Matthew’s behaviour establishes no connection between him and his 
daughter or the beer). Evidently, this feature is not exclusive of intentional explanations in folk 
psychology, it is also the case with intentional explanations of non-human behaviour, as well 
as intentional explanations that posit mental representations at the subpersonal level.   
  It is the establishment of connections between the cognitive system and the external 
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environment by intentional explanations that is the source of their generalization and predictive 
powers which justify the claim that the positing of mental representations earns its explanatory 
keep. Evidently, it is plainly possible that an intentional explanation of a given cognitive system 
does not earn its explanatory keep because it is not relevant to explain how the system interacts 
with the environment or simply because what is explanatorily relevant is completely fulfilled 
by the non-intentional explanation. However, in those cases in which the system-environment 
connection is relevant, intentional explanations earn their explanatory keep and thus the 
positing of mental representations satisfies the explanatory requirement.   
  Finally, the following question remains: to what extent does the aforementioned 
intentional explanation (that is justified in the case of human behaviour) generalize to 
subpersonal representations and non-human organisms? That is a fundamental question, but it 
is not my goal to assess it in this section since my goal here is to argue that generalization and 
predictive power justifies the positing of representational states by an intentional explanation 
and folk psychology is a paradigmatic case of it. To what extent the positing of mental 
representation earns its explanatory keep in domains outside folk psychology is a question that 
I will only address later. The goal of the third and fourth chapters is to assess the demarcation 
problem: what are the minimal conditions that a given system should satisfy in order to be an 
intentional system? That said, let’s move to the second methodological requirement.   
 
The ontological parsimony requirement  
  If two theories have the same explanatory power over the behavior of a cognitive 
system with the only difference that one theory posits that the system harbours a mental 
representation while the other doesn’t posit it, then the first theory should be favoured on 
grounds of ontological parsimony. The same goes on for rival theories which have the same 
explanatory power but differ over the amount of kinds of posited mental representation – the 
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theory that posits less kinds of mental representation should be favoured. Generalizing, the 
result is that other things being equal, if theory T1 is ontologically more parsimonious in the 
positing of mental representations than theory T2, then T1 should be preferred to T2. That is 
the ontological parsimony requirement. It is a methodological requirement for the assignment 
of representational status to mental states, an application of the principle of ontological 
parsimony to the case of mental representations. Its motivation is Ockham’s razor: one’s 
ontological commitments should be driven by the principle that entities are not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity.   
 Here the following objection may be raised against the explanatory power and the 
ontological parsimony requirements. Neither is as valid as the intuitive requirements because 
they are based on methodological considerations of theories that assign representational status 
to a given mental state, not on the nature of the state itself. That is true, but notice that theories 
of mind from psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, etc. purport to explain cognition by 
positing mental representations. In light of this fact, it follows that methodological 
considerations apply to the positing of mental representations by these theories. Accordingly, 
these postulations should be assessed in terms of methodological requirements. It is also 
important to highlight the difference between the explanatory role and the ontological 
parsimony requirements. On one hand, the ontological parsimony requirement dictates that 
parsimony is a criterion with which to assess rival theories of cognitive systems with equal 
explanatory power and thus to accept or reject the positing of mental representations. On the 
other hand, the explanatory role requirement establishes nothing about the assessment of rival 
theories of mind. Rather, it establishes that the positing of a mental state by a given theory 
should play some explanatory role that warrants such postulation. Therefore, what they have 
in common is that both appeal to methodological considerations, but they differ in the 
methodological considerations that they appeal to in order to assess the assignments of 
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representational statuses to mental states by theories of cognition.  
  The literature on mental representation is full of defences of the explanatory role 
requirement, in contrast with defenses of the parsimony requirement (as far as I know, there is 
indeed no defence of it in the literature). It strikes me that the reason for this is that philosophers 
who defend the explanatory role requirement usually think that once the explanatory role of 
positing mental representations is justified, everything is settled and the posited mental 
representations should be accepted in one’s ontology. That is, they usually think that the only 
methodological requirement necessary for the assessment of theories that posit mental 
representation is the explanatory one. However, that is not the case. The explanatory 
requirement acts locally, it assesses a theory in isolation; but another requirement that acts 
globally is also necessary, one that crosses rival theories in order to assess them. It is here that 
the parsimony role requirement comes into play. Once it is settled that the positing of mental 
representations by a given theory is justified in light of the explanatory role requirement, it is 
still necessary to check whether there is a rival theory which has the same explanatory power 
but doesn’t posit any mental representation. If that is not the case, then the mental 
representations posited by the first theory should be accepted. But if that is the case, then the 
latter theory should be preferred on behalf of ontological parsimony and thus one should get 
rid of the mental representations posited by the first theory. In sum, in order to accept the 
positing of mental representations it is necessary to assume not only a local point of view, but 
also a global one.  
 
Rejecting the radical error requirement    
  Finally, there is the third methodological requirement, the radical error requirement. It 
establishes that a theory of mental representation ought to not have the consequence that we 
are usually radically mistaken (a) about the representational contents of our own mental states 
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and (b) about the contents of the mental states of others. Here is an argument in favour of the 
radical error requirement proposed by Dan Ryder (RYDER, 2009, p. 252-3).   
 His starting point is to argue that a naturalist philosopher is not committed to an a priori 
grasp of mental content. That is, the naturalist is not committed to the task of elucidating 
aprioristically what we have in mind when we talk about mental content by coming up with 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to have a particular content. Rather, the 
naturalist inclined philosopher is committed to an a posteriori grasp of mental representation 
which is empirically informed by the results of cognitive science and other sciences of mind. 
But how does such an a posteriori approach supports the radical error requirement? Consider 
the case of water. We have no a priori definition of water, but we should get rid of any theory 
which implies that the majority of things that we think are water actually are not water (e.g., 
the liquid in rivers, oceans, lakes, etc.). In the absence of a reason strong enough to justify such 
massive error, we should conclude that this theory changes the subject matter – it is not talking 
about water anymore. In the same vain, we should get rid of any theory which entails that the 
majority of mental contents that we ascribe to ours and others mental states are radically wrong. 
In the absence of a reason strong enough to justify such a massive error of content assignment, 
the conclusion is that the relevant theory is changing the subject matter – it is not talking about 
mental contents at all. Thus, a theory of mental representation ought not entail that we are 
usually radically mistaken about the contents of our own (and others) mental states.    
  How plausible is this requirement? First of all, we should assess its validity by 
distinguishing two cases. (i) the content ascriptions that we make to our own mental states; and 
(ii) the content ascriptions that me make to others’ mental states. I think that this is a valid 
requirement in relation to the content ascriptions that we make to our own mental states. After 
all, it is hard to defend the view that we are usually radically mistaken about the contents of 
our own mental states, especially because it seems that we have privileged access to our own 
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mental states and so to their contents. However, the validity of the radical error requirement to 
the content of others’ mental states is problematic; its validity is at most restricted to some 
kinds of mental states, but not to others. Let me explain why (from now on, when talking about 
the radical error requirement I will restrict myself to its application to the contents of the mental 
state of others).  
  The validity of the radical error requirement is restricted to some kinds of mental 
representation, namely, the ones that pertain to the domain of folk psychology. It loses the 
justification for its validity when applied to mental representations that lie outside the folk-
psychology domain, like the mental representations harboured by non-human organisms. That 
is the case because our practices of assigning representational contents are restricted to the 
domain of folk psychology, when in our everyday life we assign contents to the mental states 
of others. However, there is no genuine practice of assignment contents in the context of 
cognitive science and other sciences of mind, so the practices of content assignment cannot 
support the validity of the radical error requirement for mental representations that inhabit 
domains outside folk psychology. There are at least two strong reasons for this conclusion. 
 The first reason is that the scientist posits that the cognitive system harbours a mental 
representation and assigns to it a given content in order to explain the system’s behaviour. 
However, we cannot call it a practice of content assignment just like it happens in folk 
psychology. A genuine practice presupposes that the whole community or part of it agree on 
the standards and criteria for content assignment, but that is not the case in cognitive science 
and other theories in which scientists disagree on the validity of different standards and criteria 
for content assignment. The second reason for the conclusion that there is no practice of content 
assignment in the context of sciences of mind is that the scientist’s content ascriptions to 
subpersonal representations are made in a highly theory-dependent way, in contrast with 
content ascriptions in the domain of folk psychology. In light of this second reason, someone 
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could object that it presupposes the rejection of the theory-theory view of folk psychology 
which claims that folk psychology is a theory of human behaviour and that mindreading is 
basically an exercise in theoretical reason. But the theory-theory view makes no difference to 
this debate. Even assuming this view, the point is that folk psychology is not a scientific theory 
in any relevant sense, while content attributions to subpersonal representations are made in the 
context of sciences of mind.  
  It should be clear, however, that by developing these objections to the universal validity 
of the radical error requirement, I am not committing myself to the conclusion that massive 
error is possible in the case of content attributions to subpersonal representations. Rather, I am 
just highlighting the fact that the reason which supports the validity of the radical error 
requirement in the case of representation in folk psychology – the practices of content 
assignment – is not valid for representations that lie outside this domain. Maybe there are 
reasons that support the applicability of this requirement to representations outside the domain 
of folk psychology, but they are not certainly based on practices of contents assignment (or, to 
defend an even weaker view, they are not based on practices of contents assignment similar to 
the ones that happens in the domain of folk psychology). Therefore, my conclusion is that one 
cannot take for granted that the radical error requirement is universally valid for the mental 
states of others. At most, its validity is restricted to mental representations in the domain of 
folk psychology. If one wants to apply this requirement to representations outside this domain, 
a further justification is required.  
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I have proposed four requirements for a mental state to be a mental 
representation: the intuitive requirements of misrepresentation and original intentionality and 
the methodological requirements of explanatory role and ontological parsimony. They 
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constitute a basic conception of mental representation which serves as a basis from which a 
robust conception of mental representation may be developed. Putting them together, the result 
is the following basic conception of mental representation: 
Mental Representation: a mental state with semantic properties such that it (I) has the 
power to misrepresent; (II) has original intentionality; (III) is posited by a theory to play 





















CHAPTER 2. NATURALISING INTENTIONALITY  
 
2.1 Intentional naturalism  
2.2 Reductionist naturalism  
2.3 Teleosemantics: the basic framework 
2.4 The challenge of primitivist naturalism  
 
 In the first chapter, I have proposed a basic conception of mental representation 
constituted by four requirements that a given mental state should satisfy in order to be a mental 
representation – the misrepresentation, original intentionality, explanatory and ontological 
parsimony requirements. This basic conception is not the end of the philosophical debate on 
mental representations, but the beginning of it. The goal of this chapter is to defend the viability 
of reductionist naturalism – the view that mental representations are reducible to natural states12 
– and to present my favoured reductionist approach – teleosemantics. I will assess some 
foundational problems for reductionist naturalism. The first one concerns its viability, and I 
will establish some motivations for carrying on with it. After that, I will present teleosemantics 
which tries to establish a reduction of representational states to natural states in terms of the 
notion of biological function. Finally, I will address some objections to the orthodoxy of 
reductionist naturalism in contemporary philosophy of mind. There is a growing challenge to 
reductionist naturalism from primitivist naturalists that claim that mental representations are 
primitive and so irreducible natural states. I will assess and reject the attacks of Tyler Burge, 
the most prominent primitivist naturalist, who attacks the motivations behind reductionist 
                                                             
12 Reductionist naturalism is assumed by the majority of contemporary philosophers of mental representation, 
cf. DRETSKE, 1981, 1988; BLOCK, 1986; FODOR, 1987b, 1990; MILLIKAN, 1984, 2004; PAPINEAU, 1984, 1993.  
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naturalism and the viability of teleosemantics as a reductionist theory (BURGE, 2010). That 
said, let’s start by introducing the naturalist view of intentionality.  
 
2.1 Intentional naturalism   
  The years between late 1970’s and mid 1990’s were the heydays of intentional 
naturalism in contemporary philosophy of mind. The problem of mental representation was in 
fashion and there was a contagious optimism that sooner or later a successful naturalist 
reduction of mental representation would be developed. The problem of intentionality seemed 
to be a fundamental philosophical problem that finally would be solved. The days of deep 
mystery of intentionality were about to end – philosophers would finally settle their account 
with Brentano.13 However, since then things have changed. The times of inveterate naturalist 
optimism are gone. It is true that naturalism is still the orthodoxy among philosophers of mental 
representation, but the optimism that marked its heydays are gone.14 So, what are the current 
prospects of the naturalist enterprise? Was it just the product of a momentary enthusiasm or is 
it still viable? I will defend the viability of the naturalist enterprise from the attacks of those 
who oppose it and argue why it is still necessary to develop a naturalistic reduction of mental 
content and representation. But first, it is necessary to explain what intentional naturalism is. 
 The first thing to notice on any investigation of philosophical naturalism is that 
“naturalism” has no precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Rather, it is used in several 
and sometimes incompatible ways. Furthermore, depending on how the term is used, the notion 
of naturalism will have stricter or looser senses. In what follows, I will restrict myself to two 
                                                             
13 For instance, Stephen Schiffer defended that it is an “urgent question” how the semantic and the psychological 
are related to the physical since “we should not be prepared to maintain that there are semantic or psychological 
facts unless we are prepared to maintain that such facts are completely determined by, are nothing over and 
above, physical facts” (SCHIFFER, 1982, p. 119). 
14 For instance, Jerry Fodor that once was an inveterate optimist, later adopted a more pessimistic position: “I 
don’t want to pursue […] the question just which causal-cum-nomological relations are content-making. Those 
of you who have followed the literature on the metaphysics of meaning that Fred Dretske’s book Knowledge 
and the Flow of Information inspired will be aware that that question is (ahem!) mootish.” (FODOR, 2013, p. 12). 
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different and incompatible notions of naturalism.   
  The first one is methodological naturalism: the metaphilosophical thesis that 
philosophy and natural science are engaged in essentially the same practice and enterprise, 
pursuing similar goals and using similar methods. W.V.O. Quine is the paradigmatic 
methodological naturalist of contemporary philosophy, claiming that the difference between 
philosophy and science is not a distinction of kind, but of degree (QUINE, 1960). There is no 
distinctively philosophical standpoint from which philosophers can do their jobs, the 
philosophical and scientific enterprises are similar and often overlap. However, my focus here 
is not on naturalism as a metaphilosophical thesis, but with the second notion – ontological 
naturalism. From now on, by “naturalism” I will just mean ontological naturalism.   
  Ontological naturalism is the thesis that everything is natural, there is nothing outside 
the natural order. There is no non-natural entity, there are only natural states, objects, 
properties, events, etc. A complete description of reality requires only the appeal to natural 
things, nothing else is required. Natural properties are ontologically fundamental, there is 
nothing non-natural at the most fundamental level of reality. Every instantiated ontologically 
higher property is derived from primitive natural properties. In short, naturalism is the view 
that ontology – the complete inventory of reality – is exhausted by natural states and properties. 
Evidently, such a characterization of naturalism depends on the relevant conception of natural 
properties. So, what are natural properties?    
  There are distinct conceptions of natural properties that lead to distinct characterizations 
of ontological naturalism. The weakest conception is that natural properties are the ones that 
are not supernatural and hence that there are no supernatural entities like deities, demons or 
spirits. The problem with this conception is that it makes naturalism an uninformative view, 
after all the great majority of contemporary philosophers reject supernatural entities and so they 
would all count as naturalist philosophers (even though several rejects this label). A stronger 
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conception of naturalism is hence required. In what follows, I will present two such 
conceptions.   
  The first one is the scientific conception. According to it, natural properties are the ones 
which constitute the subject matter of natural sciences; i.e., the properties recognized by natural 
sciences. The natural order is precisely the scientific order. Supernatural properties like 
spirituality and divinity are not invoked by natural sciences and hence spirits and deities do not 
exist. By contrast, the properties of electric charge and organic matter are natural since they are 
invoked by natural sciences. However, such a characterization of naturalism strikes many as 
unsatisfactory unless it is specified what is distinctive of natural sciences – in virtue of what is 
a given domain of investigation a natural science? Are physics, biology and chemistry the only 
natural sciences or are psychology, sociology and history also natural sciences? It is not my 
goal to enter into this debate here, I will just highlight that the most popular view is that physics, 
chemistry and biology are the paradigmatic natural sciences, which shows that for the scientific 
conception thus conceived, natural properties are the ones recognized by these sciences.15  
  The second conception is the causal one. It claims that natural properties are the ones 
instantiated by entities that that have causal powers in space and time. That is, entities that 
constitute the causal order of causes and effects. The causal conception of natural properties 
identifies the natural order with the causal order and then claims that there is nothing outside 
the natural order thus understood. Hence, there are no numbers or sets since they are abstract 
entities and so lack causal powers. By contrast, properties like weight or roughness are natural 
since they are instantiated by entities with causal powers.16   
  Here I will remain neutral on the dispute about which of these two conceptions of 
natural properties is the appropriate one. The following description of intentional naturalism 
                                                             
15 G.E. Moore is famous for assuming this scientific conception (even though he was not a naturalist): “By 
'nature', then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject matter of the natural sciences and also of 
psychology. It may be said to include all that has existed, does exist, or will exist in time.” (MOORE, 1903, p. 92). 
16 Several philosophers have embraced the causal conception, cf. CRANE, 2016, p. 113.  
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and the motivations that I will defend for reductionist naturalism in the next section are 
compatible with both conceptions, so my commitment to either conception is not required. 
 Intentional or semantic naturalism consists in the view that semantic properties are 
natural properties. It is well characterized in light of the problem of intentionality: in virtue of 
the instantiation of which property does a given state represent another state? How is it possible 
for a state to be about another state? According to intentional naturalism, states represent other 
states in virtue of the instantiation of natural properties; in order for a state to be a 
representational state, it should have certain natural properties. The explanation of 
intentionality is purely natural, it appeals only to natural properties.17     
  Intentional naturalism is committed to realism about semantic properties – the view that 
there are states in the world that instantiate semantic properties. There is a semantic fact in 
virtue of which a sentence that assigns a semantic property to a given state has truth-conditions. 
For instance, the sentence “the representational state R represents x” is true if and only if it is 
a semantic fact that R represents x. In other words, it is true if and only if R instantiates the 
relevant semantic property in virtue of which R represents x. By contrast, intentional irrealism 
claims that there is nothing in the world that instantiates semantic properties and hence there 
are no semantic facts. Intentional irrealism strikes many as highly implausible. Words were not 
spared to alarm for the urgency of vindicating intentional realism. So, Jerry Fodor insisted that 
“if commonsense intentional psychology were to collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, 
the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species” (FODOR, 1987b, p. xii). In 
the same vein, Dretske defended that the truth of intentional irrealism entails that we would 
have “to relinquish a conception of ourselves as human agents” (DRETSKE, 1988, p. x). 
However, once again, it is not my goal to enter into the debate between intentional realism and 
                                                             
17 Notice that ontological naturalism implies intentional naturalism but not the other way around. It is perfectly 
possible to hold that semantic properties are natural while denying that everything that exists is natural (e.g., 
maybe mathematical entities are abstract and hence non-natural).  
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irrealism. Here I am just highlighting that intentional naturalism thus conceived is a realist view 
about intentionality, since it is committed to the theses that there are states that instantiate 
semantic properties and that semantic properties are natural properties.18   
  Intentional naturalism comes in two different versions depending on which level they 
locate intentional states in the ontological hierarchy of natural states. Primitive natural states 
are at the bottom level of the hierarchy and higher levels natural states at the top. According to 
reductionist naturalism, semantic states are higher natural states that are reducible to more 
primitive natural states. Hence, semantic states are fully explainable, at their most fundamental, 
in terms of non-semantic states and properties, with the proviso that the relevant non-semantic 
states and properties are natural. By contrast, primitivist naturalism maintains that semantic 
states are primitive natural states. There is no sense in carrying on with the reductionist 
enterprise of trying to reduce semantic states to more fundamental natural states because 
semantic states are primitive natural states. They are not reducible to any other states. Primitive 
natural properties are basic features of reality, they cannot be further explained by other 
features of reality. For instance, physics establishes that energy is primitive; it cannot be further 
explained by other physical notions. Primitivists claims that the same goes on with 
representational states. So, reductionist and primitivist naturalisms diverge on the ontological 
level of representational states. The former holds that they are higher natural states reducible 
to more primitive natural states, while the latter holds that they are not reducible to any other 
natural state. That is the fundamental divergence between primitivist and reductionist 
intentional naturalisms.   
   The naturalist enterprise consists in the endeavour of explaining semantic properties 
                                                             
18 In principle, it is possible to coherently claim that semantic properties are natural but there are no semantic 
facts since nothing instantiates semantic properties. For instance, by claiming that semantic properties are 
uninstantiated primitive natural properties. However, as far as I know there is no philosopher of mental 
representation that defends this bizarre view. So, intentional naturalism as here conceived is committed to the 
thesis that there are states that instantiate semantic properties and thus is it is an intentional realist view.  
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and states in fully naturalist terms, i.e., without appealing to any non-natural notion. In its 
heyday, there was a quasi-consensus on the urgency of naturalizing intentionality.19 But what 
are the motivations behind it? In the next section, I will present the motivations for the 
intentional naturalist version that I will develop in this thesis, namely, reductionist naturalism. 
After that, I will introduce the reductionist approach that I will develop in this thesis – 
teleosemantics. Finally, in the last section I will reject the motivations for adopting primitivist 
naturalism and also defend reductionist naturalism from the primitivist attack against the 
motivations for reductionism and against teleosemantics as a viable reductionist approach. 
 
2.2 Reductionist naturalism  
  The core thesis of reductionist naturalism is that semantic properties are reducible to 
ontologically more fundamental natural properties. Representational states are fully explained 
in non-intentional terms. This is well illustrated by Fodor:  
“sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of 
the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, 
and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; 
intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in face of this consideration, 
how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or 
other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it 
must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience on?) properties 
that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real it must be really 
something else.” (FODOR, 1987b, p. 97). 
The idea is that when physics finishes its ontological inventory of fundamental physical 
properties, we will face the following dilemma: either to show that semantic properties are 
reducible (or at least supervene) on fundamental physical properties or to exclude semantic 
                                                             
19 Daniel Dennett, Stephen Stich and Paul Churchland were the most prominent philosophers of mental 
representation to oppose the reductionist program, cf. DENNETT, 1987; STICH, 1983; CHURCHLAND, P. M., 1981.  
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properties from our ontology, tertium non datur. Intentional irrealism is the high price to pay 
for the failure of the reductionist enterprise. Things, however, are more complicated. As 
Stephen Stich and Stephen Laurence have pointed out, it is problematic to claim that the failure 
of the program of naturalizing intentionality entails the truth of intentional irrealism (STICH 
& LAURENCE, 1994). Furthermore, the above motivation keeps the room open for the realist 
view that semantic properties are real not because they are instantiated natural properties, but 
because they are instantiated non-natural properties. Here I will take a different route to 
establish three motivations for reductionist naturalism that are also motivations against 
primitivist naturalism. But first it is required to explain what the reduction of one state to 
another state consists in.  
 Paradigmatic successful theoretical reductions come from natural sciences. When 
physics establishes that light is a certain electromagnetic radiation, it reduces light to 
electromagnetic radiation. That is, there is nothing more for there to be a light than for there to 
be an electromagnetic radiation within a certain portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Likewise, chemistry establishes that water is the chemical substance H2O and gold is the 
chemical element Au. Such scientific reductions reveal the fundamental nature of light, water 
and gold. They tell us what these things really are. They establish an identification between the 
reduced state and the state to which it is reduced. Hence, water is identified with H2O, light is 
identified with a certain electromagnetic radiation, etc.   
  In scientific reductions, the reduction of X to Y explains the nature of X without 
appealing to any term that involves or presuppose X. For instance, the reduction of water to 
H2O is done without appealing to the notion of water. To reduce one state to another state is to 
define it in other terms, i.e., terms that do not involve the reduced state. So, the reduction of 
representational states to natural states cannot appeal to any intentional notion – aboutness, 
representation, content, etc. That is, to reduce semantic properties is to define intentionality 
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appealing only to natural properties, without appealing to any intentional term.    
  But if semantic properties are reducible to natural properties and paradigmatic scientific 
reductions consist in the identification of the reduced property with another property, which 
natural properties are the ones identical with semantic properties? Are semantic properties 
identical with physical properties? The identification in the aforementioned scientific 
reductions is type-identification, i.e., the strict identity of the reduced properties or states with 
the properties or states to which they are reduced (e.g., water is H2O). So, the hypothesis is 
whether there is a type-identification of semantic properties with physical properties – exactly 
the same properties comprise the semantic and physical. That is, whether one state – 
representational state – is strictly identical with another state type – physical state. Very few 
naturalists would actually claim that there is a type-identification between them. It is very 
implausible that representational states are type-identical with physical states. Let’s see why. 
 Suppose that you are thinking about flies. Now suppose that frogs and toads also have 
representational states of flies (there is highly supportive scientific evidence for this from 
neuroethology). However, there is no physical state that is tokened in these three organisms in 
virtue of which they represent flies. Humans, frogs and toads have different physiological 
constitutions and hence physical constitutions. So, there is no single physical state that is 
tokened in these three organisms in virtue of which they represent flies. Rather, they token 
distinct physical states that constitute the representational states about flies.20 Representational 
states are not type-identical with physical states because they are multiply realizable by distinct 
physical states. The representational state may be realized by different physical states, that is 
why intentional systems with different physiologies may still share a given representational 
                                                             
20 Notice that it is highly implausible even that all human beings that represents flies share a single physical state 
that is tokened whenever they have this representational state. It is much more likely that distinct physical states 
are tokened throughout these cases. For instance, just think about the distinct physiological constitutions 
involved when a child represents flies than when an old man represents flies. 
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state. Thus, representational states are not type-identical with physical states.21 Rather, it is 
highly plausible that they are token-identical with physical states. Semantic properties 
supervene on physical properties.   
  A-properties supervene on B-properties just in case no two things can differ with 
respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to B-properties. No A-difference 
without a B-difference. So, semantic properties supervene on physical properties in the sense 
that states that are exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ with respect to semantic 
properties. Physical indiscernibility entails semantic indiscernibility. Representational states 
are not type-identical with physical states, but every token of the representational state is 
identical with the token of some physical state since the representational state supervenes on 
some physical state. So, the representational state of flies supervenes upon some physical state, 
no matter that this representational state is realised by different physical states of organisms 
with different physiologies (e.g., humans, frogs, toads, etc.). Physical states metaphysically 
determine representational states. There is no type-identity, only token-identity.22   
  Representational states are hence not reducible to physical states, they merely 
supervene upon them. But to which other natural states are they reducible? It varies from 
reductionist theory to reductionist theory. I don’t think that there is a prima facie motivation 
for the identification of representational states with these or those specific natural states. But 
there are motivations for the identification with natural states in general, such that only the 
further investigation will reveal to which natural states the identification with semantic 
properties is viable. In what follows, I will establish three motivations for carrying on with the 
reductionist naturalist enterprise. They do not hang on the scientific or causal conceptions of 
                                                             
21 This is the classical multiple realization objection to type-identity theories of mental states applied to the type-
identification of representational states with physical states, cf. BICKLE, 2013. It was originally introduced in 
contemporary philosophy of mind by Hilary Putnam, cf. PUTNAM, 1967. 
22 The standard view nowadays is that there is a token-identity based on the supervenience relation between 
representational states and natural states. Cf. MACDONALD & PAPINEAU, 2006; SHEA, 2013.  
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natural properties but apply equally well to both conceptions.    
  The first motivation is based on the causal efficiency of representational states. It is 
common sense that representational states have causal powers – e.g., your belief that this is a 
book matched with your desire to read it causes your reading of the book; the representation of 
the fly by the frog causes the snapping of its tongue in the fly’s direction, etc. There is a great 
motivation for crediting representational states with causal powers. But how is that possible? 
The semantic property of one state being about another state looks so sui generis that it is hard 
to see how semantic properties may have causal powers. They look very different from 
physical, chemical or other natural properties that clearly have causal powers. After all, the 
representational state may represent and misrepresent reality, represent things that no longer 
exist or never existed, close or very far away, microscopic or macroscopic, etc. There is nothing 
remotely similar to these features in standard naturalist properties. For instance, physical and 
chemical states have no relation with things that never existed. So, how should we explain the 
causal efficacy of representational states?   
  It is here that there is a strong motivation for reductionist naturalism. If it could be 
shown that semantic properties are reducible to natural properties that have causal powers, then 
the causal efficacy of representational states is guaranteed – there is a place for them in the 
causal relations of the natural order. It seems that reductionist naturalism is a promising way 
of saving the causal powers of representational states by showing that they are reducible to 
natural properties that perspicuously have causal powers. This is easy to verify in light of 
standard naturalist theories of mental representation like causal and teleological theories. 
   Causal (or informational) theories reduce representational states in terms of the 
conditions under which they are caused. The point of departure is that the content of a given 
representational state is the condition that is causally responsible for its tokening. The 
intentionality of a given state is constituted by the causal relations between the state and the 
52 
 
feature of the world that is represented.23 Evidently, representational states are causally 
efficacious if semantic properties are indeed reducible to causal properties. Teleosemantics, by 
its turn, reduces representational states in terms of the biological function that they serve. The 
starting point is the specification of the representational content in terms of the condition under 
which the resulting behaviour succeeds in achieving a given biological goal. Once again, 
representational states are causally efficacious if semantic properties are indeed reducible in 
terms of biological success. They are causally relevant because the satisfaction of the 
representation’s truth-conditions guarantees biological success via the production of a 
behaviour that achieves a given distal result. Truth-conditions are identified with biological 
success conditions.24  
  What about the prospects for primitivist naturalism in explaining the causal efficacy of 
representational states? Assuming that semantic properties are primitive natural properties, it 
is hard to see how they may have causal powers. In that sense, the road that leads to primitive 
naturalism is more difficult than the one that leads to reductionist naturalism. According to the 
latter, representational states have causal powers since they are reducible to natural states that 
are causally efficient. But what are the reasons for representational states to be causally 
efficient given that they are primitive natural states as defended by primitivist naturalism? Here 
a strong argument is required in order to show that despite the unique nature of semantic 
properties in virtue of which they look so different from physical properties, semantic 
properties are primitive natural properties that are causally efficacious.  
   The explanation of the causal efficacy of representational states is a strong motivation 
                                                             
23 Dretske and Fodor are the main proponents of causal theories, cf. DRETSKE, 1981; FODOR, 1987, 1990.  
24 This is a simplified presentation of the success pattern explanation to illustrate how semantic properties are 
causally relevant according to teleosemantics. Success semantics assumes this success pattern explanation, but 
it is not reductionist since it just presupposes that there is given pursued result without providing a specification 
of it, cf. WHYTE, 1990. I will come back to this issue latter when introducing teleosemantics.  
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for carrying on with the reductionist enterprise.25 The second motivation is the illuminating 
character of the reductionist program. If it could be shown that representational states are 
reducible to natural states, it would be a very illuminating result since it would reveal the 
ultimate metaphysical nature of representational states. The theoretical reduction illuminates 
entities that are still obscure and puzzling – representational states – in terms of familiar and 
known entities – natural states. The idea is that the naturalist reduction elucidates the obscure 
intentional relation of one state representing another in terms of familiar relations. But that is 
not the only good fruit. It also establishes connections between representational states and 
natural states by explaining the former in terms of the latter. If successful, the naturalist 
reduction would explain how representational states are connected with the wider natural order. 
It would be a step towards scientific integration in the sense that it would integrate cognitive 
theories that posit representational states in order to explain the behaviour of cognitive systems 
with paradigmatic natural sciences (physics, chemistry and biology), showing that there is no 
sort of incompatibility between them. Hence, the illuminating character of theoretical reduction 
is certainly a strong reason for carrying on with the reductionist program. Its success would 
yield very valuable fruits from both epistemic and metaphysical points of view.26   
  Finally, the third and last motivation is ontological parsimony. If it could be shown that 
reductionist naturalism is true, this would be highly parsimonious. After all, if a given 
ontological inventory assumes that intentional entities are distinct from natural entities, then it 
has at least two fundamental ontological categories – intentional and natural entities. It greatly 
contrasts with an ontological inventory that is committed to intentional naturalism and so holds 
                                                             
25 This motivation assumes that semantic properties are causally efficient, but this is a contentious matter. That 
is the most popular view (DRETSKE, 1988; BLOCK, 1989; RESCOLAR, 2015), but several philosophers deny it 
(STICH, 1983). So, what is the extent in which this debate weakens this motivation? It is prima facie plausible 
that semantic properties are causally efficacious, this is part of our intuitive conception of representation. Thus, 
I take that there is a motivation for theories that explain this causal efficacy, not for theories that deny it. The 
onus lies on those that deny this causal efficacy, not on those that assume it. 
26 The illuminating character of the naturalist reduction of representational states has been defended as a 
motivation for reductionist naturalism. Cf. SHEA, 2013; PAPINEAU, 2006. 
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that intentional entities are natural. Finally, reductionist naturalism is ontologically more 
parsimonious than primitivist naturalism since it claims that semantic properties are reducible 
to ontologically more fundamental natural properties and hence is not committed to semantic 
properties as a distinctive primitive natural category. So, ceteris paribus, reductionist naturalist 
theories are ontologically more parsimonious than non-reductionist theories.27   
   Together these three motivations constitute a strong reason for carrying on with the 
reductionist naturalist enterprise. Its success would yield very good fruits. However, contrary 
to the aforementioned apocalyptic statements of Fodor and Dretske, I don’t think that the failure 
of the reductionist program would be catastrophic or would represent the collapse of 
commonsense psychology and sciences of mind. Rather, it would be a pity to lose all the 
potential good fruits yielded by at least the partial success of the reductionist program. Let’s 
work to reap at least some of them. In the next section, I will introduce the reductionist 
framework that will be developed in this thesis, namely, teleosemantics.  
 
2.3 Teleosemantics: the basic framework   
  Teleology (from Greek telos, purpose + logia, study) is the explanation of phenomena 
by the purpose they serve. Teleological theories of mental representation, or simply 
teleosemantics, try to explain the nature of mental representations via the purpose or goal they 
serve.28 Teleosemantics is a naturalist theory and hence such explanation should be made in 
naturalistic terms – it has to establish a naturalist specification of the purpose of 
representational states. Teleosemantics is also a reductionist theory and so it should reduce 
representational states to more primitive natural states in terms of the purpose they serve. But 
                                                             
27 Here I am assuming that all these theories are committed to intentional realism. After all, ceteris paribus an 
intentional irrealist theory is not ontologically less parsimonious than reductionist naturalism – both may assume 
that there are only natural entities, but while the reductionist assumes that semantic properties are reducible 
to natural properties, the intentional irrealist excludes semantic properties from their ontology. 
28 Ruth Garrett Millikan and David Papineau are the main proponents of teleosemantics, cf. MILLIKAN, 1984, 
2004; PAPINEAU, 1984, 1993. 
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what is this purpose and how does one make a naturalist specification of it?  
 According to teleosemantics, mental representations have biological purposes. The 
tokening of a representational state aims to achieve a certain biological goal. Teleosemantics 
claims that a representational state’s biological function constitutes its biological purpose. How 
to exactly specify the biological functions of representational states is a contentious matter that 
varies from teleological theory to teleological theory. Nevertheless, they share the core thesis 
that representational states are reducible to more primitive natural states in terms of their 
biological goals and that their biological functions constitute the biological goals they serve. 
 The best way to introduce teleosemantics is by contrasting it with causal theories of 
content. The crude causal theory (CCT) claims that the content of a representational state is 
whatever causes its tokens. Consider COW, the mental representation of a cow. According to 
CCT, COW’s content is cow since its tokens are caused by cows. However, there are situations 
in which the representation is caused by things that it does not represent, i.e., things that are 
not in its extension. For instance, there are situations in which COW is not caused by cows, but 
by horses. So, according to CCT, COW’s content is not really cow, but cow or horse – both 
cows and horses are in COW’s extension. The problem with this move is that it precludes 
misrepresentation, i.e., situations in which the representational state is false since it represents 
a condition that does not obtain. Thus, there is no misrepresentation because situations that are 
candidates for misrepresentation are always transformed into non-misrepresentation situations 
in virtue of their very occurrences. How may causal theories rule out causes that are constitutive 
of content from causes that are not constitutive because they are misrepresentations? That is, 
how are we to include in COW’s content cows that cause its tokens and exclude non-cows that 
also cause its tokens? The problem of misrepresentation is how to explain the very possibility 
of false representations. Sophisticated causal theories try to keep the room open for 
misrepresentation, but it is not clear that they succeed in doing so.   
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  It is in light of the problem of misrepresentation that teleosemantics becomes attractive. 
It identifies the representational state’s truth-conditions with its proper functioning conditions 
and that keeps the room open for misrepresentation – the representation is true if and only if it 
performs its biological function and it is false if and only if it fails to perform its biological 
function. The possibility of false representations is hence guaranteed precisely because 
biological functions are not always performed. That is the teleosemantic strategy to solve the 
problem of misrepresentation. But in order to fully develop it, it is required to introduce the 
basic teleosemantic framework. Since the notion of biological function plays a pivotal role, 
let’s start by introducing it.   
  Biological functions are assigned to biological traits in order to specify their biological 
goals. They may be categorized into aetiological and non-aetiological functions. Let’s contrast 
biological traits with ordinary artefacts. Clocks have the purpose of displaying the right time, 
they will be proper functioning if and only if they display the right time and malfunctioning 
otherwise. When we say that the function of the clock is to display the right time, what we are 
saying is that the clock was designed for this purpose, i.e., that this is its goal. We will say that 
it is malfunctioning in case it fails to display the right time, i.e., because it displays the wrong 
time or no time at all. Note that the clock may also be used to do a lot of other things such as 
interior decoration, but the function of the clock qua clock is to display the right time. Just like 
artefacts, biological traits have functions. The function of the clock is to display the right time 
and not interior decorating; the biological function of the heart is to pump blood and not to 
make a thumping noise. But in virtue of what does a given trait have this or that biological 
function?     
  According to the aetiological conception of biological function, the function of a given 
biological trait is the effect for which it was selected. The function of the trait is determined by 
the history of the selection of traits of this kind. Thus, a trait has a specific function in virtue of 
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the fact that it was designed by some selection process to have this effect. Evidently, there are 
several selection processes and the selection process responsible for designs of artefacts is 
distinct from the selection process responsible for the designs of biological traits. The selection 
process that gives rise to the artefact’s function is intentional – there is always a designer with 
the intention of designing the artefact to serve a given purpose. But the selection process that 
designs the biological trait and gives rise to its function is non-intentional; it is biological. There 
is no intentional agent behind biological selection processes. They give rise to teleonomic 
functions, i.e., mind-independent functions. Since the goal of teleosemantics is to establish a 
naturalist reduction of representational states, its proponents have to specify a natural and 
teleonomic selection process based on which it is possible to achieve such a reduction.29   
  But first of all, what is a selection process? I will assume here that a given process is a 
selection provided that it satisfies the following conditions:30 
  (1) variability in the traits possessed;   
 (2) selection of items with certain traits;  
  (3) heritability of traits selected for; 
There is no selection if there is no initial variation since the same selection forces that 
operate in a homogeneous population will have no discriminatory effect. When there is 
variation, the items will be selected for some trait when this trait interacts with some specific 
environmental feature such that items without that trait will suffer some loss. When the trait is 
transmitted to the offspring of the items that initially had it, the result will be an increase in the 
proportion of items with this trait in the population. The conclusion is that the satisfaction of 
conditions (1)-(3) entails that the selected trait has the function of having the effect that caused 
                                                             
29 Larry Wright was probably the first philosopher to formulate the aetiological conception of function: the 
function of X is Z if and only if (1) Z is a consequence (result) of Xs being there; (2) X is there because it does 
(results in) Z. Cf. WRIGHT, 1973.  
30 This is based on R.C. Lewontin’s characterization of the selection process, cf. LEWONTIN, 1970, p. 1. 
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the differential reproductions of items with this trait.   
 There are several kinds of selection process which generate different kinds of biological 
function. The paradigmatic selection process appealed by teleological theories is evolutionary 
selection. Evolutionary selection (also called “natural selection”) is an intergenerational 
inheritance process. The selected trait is that one which historically has had an effect which 
increased the survival and reproduction of the species. Thus, the selected effect is determined 
through the history of fitness and success of reproduction of the ancestors of the organism. 
More formally, the evolutionary function of a trait is thus defined: 
 
EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTION: some effect E is the biological function of some trait 
X in organism O if and only if the genotype responsible for X was selected for doing E 
because doing E was adaptive for O's ancestors.31    
 
  Accordingly, the biological function of the heart is to pump blood (not to make a 
thumping noise) because the effect that was adaptive for ancestral hearts was to pump blood 
(not to make a thumping noise). Evolutionary functions are well illustrated by the phenomenon 
of convergence evolution – species with different lineages independently having evolved 
similar traits as a result of adaption to similar environments. A notorious example is 
streamlining body shapes in dolphins, ichthyosaur and the great white shark. These marine 
hunters have very similar shapes without inheriting them from a distant common ancestor. The 
similar aerodynamic forms are adaptive in marine environments because they facilitate quick 
movements that increase predatory success. Convergence evolution shows the strong power of 
evolutionary selection of designing different species in very similar ways in order to achieve 
                                                             
31 Cf. NEANDER, 1991; MILLIKAN, 1989a. 
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adaptive effects.   
  Evolutionary selection operates at the genetic level: it is a phylogenetic process.32 
However, there are also ontogenetic selections which operate in the development of organisms, 
i.e., which select traits not in the evolutionary history of the organism, but in its individual 
developmental history ever since the fertilization. There are differentiated reproductions of 
traits during the development of the organism, not only on organisms over generations. For 
instance, there is a differentiated reproduction of behavioural outputs via classical conditioning 
by a learning mechanism during the organism’s own development. As a result, the organism 
acquires the function of producing those behavioural outputs that were favoured during the 
learning period. So, the aetiological conception of function is not restricted to functions 
constituted by phylogenetic selections, it also encompasses ontogenetic ones.   
  The aetiological conception is also enriched by encompassing derived biological 
functions (MILLIKAN, 1984, p. 17-49). A given mechanism has a direct function when it was 
selected to have that effect. In turn, the trait produced by this mechanism has a function that is 
derived from the function of this producer mechanism. A trait has a direct function when it was 
selected to have a given effect; a trait has a derived function when its function was derived 
from its producer mechanism’s direct function. For instance, the chameleon’s camouflage 
mechanism has the direct function of producing camouflage patterns that match the immediate 
environment. Suppose that a given chameleon for the first time camouflaged into the orange 
colour. This particular orange pattern has the derived function of camouflaging because it is 
derived from the mechanism’s direct function of camouflaging, no matter that this is the very 
first time the mechanism produced an orange camouflage.  
  In this thesis, I will assume the aetiological conception of biological function. But how 
                                                             
32 Here I am following the traditional view according to which only genes can be inherited through the 
evolutionary selection process. However, this view has been called into question in recent years by those who 
claim that not all evolutionary selections are at bottom genetic selections, cf. MAMELI, 2004. 
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does teleosemantics appeal to biological functions in order to achieve the reduction of 
representational states to natural states? Here it is necessary to distinguish two philosophical 
problems on the nature of representational states. First, the representational status problem: in 
virtue of what is a given state a representational state? That is, what is the property in virtue of 
which it counts as representational? Second, the content problem: provided that a given state 
is representational, in virtue of what does it represents this state but not another state? That is, 
what determines its representational content? To illustrate this distinction, let’s consider the 
representational state COW again. The representational status problem asks in virtue of what 
is COW a representational state, i.e., which property makes it a representational state. By 
contrast, the content problem asks in virtue of what COW’s content is cow but not horse or 
other non-cow, i.e., which property it instantiates that determines that cow is its content. 
Teleosemantics provides a solution to both problems, claiming that the state is representational 
by appealing to the fact that it has a certain biological function and that it has a specific content 
also by appealing to its biological function.  
  The various teleological theories widely differ with respect to the way in which the 
representational content and status are determined via the biological function of the state, but 
they all appeal to its biological function to determine its representational status and content.33 
I will start with how the basic teleosemantic framework solves the content problem and after 
that I will present its solution to the representational status problem.    
  Consider a representational state produced by a biological mechanism. According to 
teleosemantics, this mechanism is capable of representing in virtue of the fact that it was 
designed to produce representations. However, a mechanism that was designed to do something 
may fail to do it. It is always an open possibility that the mechanism fails to do what it was 
                                                             
33 It should be noted that several philosophers appeal to biological function only to solve the content problem, 
putting aside the representational status problem. It is possible to develop a teleological solution to content 
problem that is not committed to the teleological solution to the representational status problem since they are 
distinct problems. But I will treat teleosemantics here as a theory that offers a solution to both problems. 
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designed to do (e.g., in virtue of an internal defect). But it is precisely this case that leaves open 
the possibility of false representations: biological mechanisms that were selected to produce 
true representations sometimes fail to do it and instead produce false representations. In the 
case of false representations, the mechanism failed to perform its function, i.e., to produce true 
representations. False representations are just representations that failed to properly represent. 
The feature of functions that makes them an attractive source of content is that a mechanism 
may not always perform its function just like a representation may not always accurately 
represent. That is how teleosemantics solves the problem of misrepresentation: it explains 
misrepresentation by appealing to the fact that the producer of mental representations doesn’t 
always perform its function of producing true representations.   
  The teleosemantic core thesis is the identification of a representation’s truth conditions 
with its proper functioning conditions. It provides a powerful distinction between a situation in 
which the biological mechanism is proper functioning and the situation in which it is 
malfunctioning. Based on this, the explanation of how it is possible for representational states 
to misrepresent reality becomes viable. A biological trait is proper functioning when it is doing 
what it was historically selected to do (i.e., it performs its function) and it is malfunctioning 
when it is not doing what was historically selected to do (i.e., it is failing to perform its 
function). The circumstances in which there is proper functioning are those in which the 
mechanism produces true representations and the circumstances in which there is 
malfunctioning are those in which the mechanism produces false representations.  
  That is how teleosemantics explains the possibility of misrepresentations. But how does 




REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT: the biological function of the representational 
state determines its content. The representational state’s truth-conditions are reducible 
to its biological success conditions.  
What all teleosemantic theories have in common is the thesis that content is determined in 
terms of the notion of biological function. However, how to properly develop this basic 
teleosemantic framework is a very contentious matter, for different teleosemantic theories 
determine content in different and conflicting ways. They take as their starting point the thesis 
that the representation’s truth-conditions are reducible to its biological success conditions. But 
then they take different roads with respect to how they fully determine content. So, to illustrate 
how this basic teleosemantic framework may be developed, let’s see how the most 
representative teleosemantic approach – consumer-based teleosemantics – determines content 
(PAPINEAU, 1984, 1993, 2016; MILLIKAN, 1984, 2004).   
  The content of representational state R is the external condition C that should be the 
case for the behavioural output B triggered by R to perform its biological function – to succeed 
in achieving the effect for which the mechanism that produced B was selected. The truth of R, 
i.e., when C obtains, guarantees that B achieves the selected effect, while in case of the 
falsehood of R, i.e., when C does not obtain, B does not achieve the selected effect. So, the 
truth of the representation is required for the performance of the biological function. Evidently, 
here I am assuming that the mechanism that produced B was proper functioning, i.e., produced 
the appropriate behaviour to achieve the selected effect. After all, in case it does not produce 
the right effect, it makes no difference whether C obtains or not since the selected effect will 
not be achieved.34 The representation’s content is thus identified with the condition under 
                                                             
34 What if the mechanism produces the inappropriate behaviour and still achieves the selected effect? That 
would be just a lucky coincidence. This is not a situation in accordance with the selection history in which the 
mechanism was selected. There the mechanism was selected to produce the appropriate behaviour to achieve 
this effect, that is why it was selected. Millikan calls “normal situation” the situation in which the mechanism 
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which the triggered behaviour performs its biological function, achieving the selected effect. 
That is how consumer-based teleosemantics determines content. Let’s illustrate it with some 
real examples of the paradigmatic biological function appealed in teleosemantics, evolutionary 
function.   
  The selected effects that constitute evolutionary functions are the ones which increase 
the fitness and reproduction of the species. Consider a beaver that splashes its tail on the water 
in order to signal to its fellow beavers the presence of some predator. The tail’s splash triggers 
the avoidance behaviour of other beavers and as a result they escape from the predator. The 
token of the representational state is what triggers the avoidance behaviour, but what is its 
content? The tail’s splash is the representational state and it is produced by the visuomotor 
system to signal the fellow beavers about the presence of predators. This is an adaptive effect 
since it triggers the beavers’ avoidance behaviour of escaping from predators. So, the 
representational content is predator (or danger) because its truth – i.e., when there is in fact a 
predator – guarantees the adaptive effect of signalling other beavers to escape from the 
predator. The fellow beavers’ avoidance behaviour as a result achieves the adaptive effect of 
escaping from the predator. Notice that only when the tail’s splash tracks the presence of the 
predator is the avoidance behaviour adaptive. The representation’s truth-conditions are 
identified with its fitness-conditions. The truth of the representation guarantees the 
evolutionary success of the behavioural output (provided that the behaviour is the appropriate 
one). After all, evolutionary selection would not select the visuomotor system to produce false 
representations since they fail to guarantee the evolutionary success of the resulting behaviour 
– there would be no predator around.   
  The producer-consumer mechanisms distinction is useful here.35 The representational 
                                                             
produces the behaviour in accordance with its selection history. She requires that the relevant situation is a 
“normal situation” in her specification of content to rule out lucky coincidence situations. Cf. MILLIKAN, 1984.   
35 The consumer-producer distinction was introduced by Millikan, cf. MILLIKAN, 1984. 
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state – the tail’s splash – lies between the system that produces the representation – the beaver’s 
visuomotor system – and the system that uses or consumes the representation – the fellow 
beavers that respond to the tokening of the representation by having the avoidance behaviour. 
The biological function of the producer system is to produce the representational state 
whenever a certain external condition obtains, and the tokened representational states have the 
derived biological function of being present whenever the external condition obtains. The 
function of the consumer system is to produce the appropriate behaviour, whenever the 
representation is tokened, in order to achieve a given adaptive effect. Such successful behaviour 
requires the obtaining of a given external condition. The representational content is that 
external condition. So, the beaver’s visuomotor system has the function of producing the 
representation whenever there is a predator and a particular token of the representation has the 
derived function of being present when that particular predator is present. The function of the 
consumer’s system – the fellow beavers – is to have an avoidance behaviour in response to the 
token of the representation. In the beaver’s example, the consumer and producer systems are 
different organisms, but they may be part of the same organism. For instance, consider the 
famous case of the frog that represents the presence of the fly and as a result snap its tongue in 
the fly’s direction and eats it. In this case, the frog’s visual system is the producer system that 
tokens the representational state of the fly and the frog’s motor-digestive system is the 
consumer system that uses the representation to catch and digest the fly.    
  That is how consumer-based teleosemantics determines representational content. It 
claims that it is the adaptive effect of the behavioural output triggered by the consumer system 
that determines content. The content is the external condition that should be the case for the 
consumer’s behavioural output to be adaptive. So, the tail’s splash represents the predator 
because the presence of the predator is required for the fellow beaver’s avoidance behaviour to 
be adaptive. After all, if there is no predator around the avoidance behaviour would be just loss 
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of energy. In the same vein, the content of the frog’s representational state is the external 
condition that should be the case for the frog’s behaviour to be adaptive – food or nutrients. 
The digested nutrients will increase the fitness and reproduction. After all, in case the 
represented entity is not nutritive, the behaviour will be just loss of energy.   
  However, this approach is not the only way in which the basic teleosemantic framework 
may be developed. There are other teleological theories that reject this consumer-based 
criterion which gives priority to the function of the consumer system in order to determine 
content. Instead, they propose a producer-based criterion which gives priority to the function 
of the mechanism that produces the representational state in order to determine content. That 
is the producer-based teleosemantics (DRETSKE, 1988, 1995; NEANDER, 1995; 2017; 
JACOB, 1997). How to properly develop the basic framework lies the heart of the 
contemporary debates on teleosemantics.     
  What about the representational status problem? In virtue of what does a given state 
counts as a representational state? That is, what is the instantiated property of a given state in 
virtue of which it is a representation? This is what the basic teleosemantic framework 
establishes: 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL STATUS: in order for a given state to constitute a 
representation, it is required (1) that the behavioural output triggered by the tokening 
of the state has a biological function; (2) that the mechanism which produces the 
behavioural output uses the state as a proxy for the presence of some external condition. 
  
The first condition requires that the mechanism which produces the behavioural output was 
selected to produce this behaviour whenever the representation is tokened precisely in order to 
achieve the selected effect. That guarantees that the behavioural output has a biological 
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function. The second condition requires that the consumer system should use the 
representational state as proxy for the presence of the external condition. It uses the state as an 
indication or signal that the external condition obtains. Whenever a given state satisfies these 
conditions, it is a full-blown representation according to the basic teleosemantics framework.  
 So, the tail splash of the beaver is a representational state. (1) the consumer system that 
produces the avoidance behaviour in response to the tokening of the tail splash state has the 
biological function of producing the behaviour to escape from the predator. (2) the consumer 
system uses the state as a proxy for the presence of the predator: the fellow beavers will move 
in different directions relative to where the state signals the location of the predator. That shows 
that the fellow beavers use the state as a proxy for the location of predators. In the same vein, 
the frog’s state is a representational state. (1) the consumer system that produces the catching 
behaviour in response to the tokening of the frog’s state has the biological function of catching 
and digesting the fly; (2) the consumer system uses the state as a proxy for the presence of the 
fly, the frog will snap its tongue in different directions relative to where the state signals the 
presence of the fly.   
  This basic teleosemantic framework entails that amoebas, paramecia, honeybees, vervet 
monkeys and other very simple organisms are intentional systems that produce full-blown 
representational states. Once again, this basic teleosemantic framework is developed in 
different ways, such that there are different teleological theories of representation that are more 
liberal or more restrictive in their criteria for a given system to be genuinely representational. 
So, certain theories consider very simple systems as representational while other theories do 
not count them as genuinely representational.   
  This is the basic teleosemantic framework’s strategy for solving the content and 
representational status problems. Its viability is challenged by several problems and objections 
and as a result the basic framework is developed in several and conflicting ways. It is not 
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possible to assess all problems and objections in this thesis. For instance, I will not assess the 
famous swampman objection.36 In this thesis, I will assess the problem of demarcation that 
threatens the teleosemantic solution for the representational status problem in the third and 
fourth chapters and I will assess the functional indeterminacy problem that threatens the 
teleosemantic solution for the content problem in the fifth chapter. But before all that, in the 
next section I will assess and reject Burge’s primitivist attack against reductionist naturalism 
in general and also against teleosemantics as a viable reductionist approach in particular.  
 
2.4 The challenge of primitivist naturalism  
 Tyler Burge defends primitivist naturalism about mental representations, according to 
which mental representations are primitive natural states. That is, they are primitive states 
which are part of the natural order but are not reducible to any other more fundamental natural 
state (BURGE, 2010). He claims that the reason that standard naturalist theories fail to reduce 
mental representation to some other natural notion – biological function (teleological theories), 
causal relations (causal theories), etc. – is that mental representation is a primitive, irreducible 
natural notion. Primitivist naturalism contrasts with both primitivist non-naturalism, which 
claims that mental representations are non-natural primitive states, and with reductionist 
naturalism, which claims that they are not primitive but are reducible to more primitive natural 
states. Burge’s account of primitivist naturalism is the most compelling and influential defence 
of primitivist naturalism, particularly his arguments against the teleological enterprise of 
reducing representational states in terms of biological function. In this section, I will argue that 
despite the ingenuity of the arguments, they fail to show that representational states are 
primitive or that the teleosemantic account of representational states is doomed to fail.  
  Burge’s main thesis is that there is a fundamental distinction between, on one hand, 
                                                             
36 For an overview of the debate on the swampman objection, cf. NEANDER, 2012. 
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biological functions and norms and, on the other hand, representational functions and norms 
(i.e., the function and norms of accurately representing reality). This distinction arises in the 
context of psychological explanations which posit representational states to explain the 
behaviour of cognitive systems and their relations with the external environment. But how 
should one distinguish cognitive systems that are genuinely intentional from those to which 
representational states are merely imposed but which, in reality, do not represent at all? Burge 
claims that genuine representational states are the ones that are posited by successful 
explanations which are not in any way replaceable by non-representational explanations. That 
is, the difference between representational and non-representational systems is that the 
representational state figures in the successful explanations of the behaviour such that it is not 
replaceable by a non-representational explanation because there is an explanatory gap between 
them. So, the positing of representational state is required to fully explain such behaviour. 
 Burge focuses on psychological explanations of perceptual systems, especially visual 
systems. He claims that representational states constitute a distinctive kind of natural state, they 
play a unique explanatory role in psychological explanations which cannot be assimilated to 
any role played by any other natural state. In contrast, reductionists maintain that the role 
played by representational states in psychological explanations are assimilable to the role 
played by some other natural state(s). So, there is a fundamental divergence between Burge’s 
primitivist view that representational states which figure in psychological explanations are 
primitive and irreducible and the reductionist view (which he calls “the deflationary tradition”) 
according to which representational states that figure in psychological explanations are 
reducible to some other natural state.   
  In order to establish primitivist naturalism, Burge develops several objections to the 
reductionist view. His attack is divided in two fronts. On the first one, he attacks the 
motivations behind the enterprise of developing a naturalistic reduction of representational 
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states, claiming that the motivations go precisely on the opposite direction, in favour of 
primitivism. On the second front, he attacks the very possibility of a specific reductionist 
approach – teleosemantics. I will assess each front in turn.  
 
The attack on the motivations for reductionist naturalism  
  Burge’s assessment of the motivations for reductionist naturalism starts with his claim 
that there is a notion of representational state that is distinctive of psychological explanations 
which cannot be assimilated by any notion from non-psychological explanations. However, 
this is precisely what reductionist naturalists try to do: since they assume that representational 
states come in degree (from very simple systems like bacteria or amoebas to complex systems 
like human cognition), they tend to ignore the relevant explanatorily distinction between the 
role played by “representation” in psychological explanations and the role played by it in non-
psychological explanations. The use of the same term in two different sorts of explanation is 
misleading because it overshadows the fact that the term has two completely distinct 
explanatory roles in the two explanations and refers to two different kinds. Burge claims that 
while in the case of psychological explanations the notion of representation plays an 
explanatory role which is distinctively psychological and genuinely representational, things are 
different in the case of explanations of simple organisms. There the notion of representation is 
dispensable and perfectly replaceable by non-representational notions (e.g., sensitivity, 
discrimination, covariation, registration, etc.) without at all weakening the explanatory power 
of the explanation. In sum, the fact that the same term is being used to refer to two different 
notions invoked by two different sorts of explanations is misleading because it blurs the 
distinction of kind between them – a representational notion in the case of psychological 
explanations and a non-representational notion in the case of non-psychological explanations.  
  But why does Burge claim that representation constitutes a distinctive state in 
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psychological explanations and that the motivations in favour of reducing it to more 
fundamental natural states are misplaced? Burge argues that reductionist naturalism is out of 
sync with scientific knowledge and practice (BURGE, 2010, pp. 296-7). It mistakenly assumes 
that a representation is not a scientifically respected notion because it is entrenched only in folk 
psychology and then that it must be made scientifically respectable by reducing it to some 
natural state which is scientifically respectable. Rather, the notion of representation is 
entrenched in psychological explanations and it cannot be taken to be prima facie defective or 
in need of supplementation because it has long earned its explanatory keep precisely by 
figuring in successful psychological explanations. According to Burge, this fact shows that the 
notion of representation is scientifically respectable and so that there is no urgency of reducing 
it to any other scientific notion. Psychological explanations are committed to entities needed 
to make their explanatory claims true, among which are representational states, and there is no 
reason to hold that a naturalist reduction of representation is required in order for psychological 
explanations to be successful. Their success is independent of any reductionist enterprise.  
  Burge argues that our ontology should be dictated by our successful scientific 
explanations37 and since our successful psychological explanations posit representational states 
in order to explain psychological phenomena, it follows that the motivations go in the direction 
of accepting these representational states in our ontology. After all, Burge argues, we cannot 
have a better reason to rely on a notion than that it figures centrally in a successful science.38 
Successful explanations are the one which yield agreement in the scientific community, open 
new questions, engender improvement in theory and experimentation, achieve pragmatic 
results, etc. Burge appeals to mainstream theories in perceptual psychology (and visual science 
                                                             
37 He develops this general claim in his paper “Mind-body causation and explanatory practice” (BURGE, 1993). 
38 “Notions like representation earn their keep in science […] by figuring in successful explanation. Successful 
explanation is marked in the usual ways by yielding agreement, opening new questions, making questions 
testable and precise, engendering progressive improvement in theory and experimentation. Mainstream work 
in perceptual psychology displays these features. [...] One could hardly have better epistemic ground to rely on 
a notion than that it figures centrally in a successful science.” (BURGE, 2010, p. 298). 
71 
 
in particular) as a notorious example of successful psychological explanations in which 
representational states play a central role. So, we should accept them in our ontology.   
  But if representations are irreducible primitive states39, what is left for the naturalist 
philosopher of mental representation to do? According to Burge, to determine the place of 
representations in the wider natural order by finding systematic connections between them. 
There is no conflict between representational states and the natural realm. The philosopher’s 
job is to clarify, explore and connect representational states with the wider natural order.40  
  Does Burge’s argument succeed in showing that the motivations behind reductionist 
naturalism are misplaced and that we have motivations for accepting representations as 
primitive natural states? No. In what follows I will try to show why Burge’s objection is flawed. 
My response will be divided into two fronts: on the positive one, I will show that there are 
strong motivations for appealing to a naturalistic reduction of mental representation even 
assuming, like Burge, that representation is a respectable scientific notion; on the negative 
front, I will show that there is a fundamental failure in Burge’s objection when he tries to 
establish that there is a motivation for adopting primitivism, not reductionism.  
   Following Burge, let’s assume that representation is a respectable scientific notion in 
psychology and hence that there is no need to reduce it to a respectable scientific notion in 
order to make it scientifically respectable. But now suppose that there is an available successful 
theoretical reduction of representational states to more fundamental natural states. Since we 
have the prior assumption that the notion of representation is scientifically respectable 
                                                             
39 “Is reduction of the sort expected by the Deflationary Tradition [i.e., reductionist naturalism] possible? 
Reductions are a legitimate type of explanatory unification. Occasionally reductions succeed. In principle, 
representation might be somehow reducible to other notions. I believe, however, that trying to reduce 
representation and veridicality to something more ‘naturalistically acceptable’ is probably pointless and 
hopeless. […] the notions of veridicality and representations – and notions like perceptual state, belief, 
propositional inference – are scientific primitives.”  (BURGE, 2010, p. 298).  
40 Burge also attacks apocalyptic statements of some reductionists to the effect that some dire consequence 
would ensue if reductionism fails (e.g., intentional irrealism). I will not assess this here since I have already 
previously noted that these statements are misplaced. Instead, in the second section of this chapter, I have 
proposed three motivations for reductionism that lack such apocalyptic feature.   
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regardless of whether it is reducible or not, the motivation behind this reduction is not to make 
the notion of representation scientifically respectable. So, is it a reason strong enough for one 
to discard this available reduction? No, there are at least three reasons to appeal to it.  
  The first reason is that the appeal to a reduction of representation is motivated not only 
by the need to make it scientifically respectable. Rather, it is illuminating to appeal to the 
reduction in order to reveal the ultimate nature of representational states. Thus, the necessity 
of making the notion of representation scientifically respectable is just one of the possible 
motivations behind the reductionist enterprise. In fact, revealing the ultimate nature of a kind 
of state is a motivation equally or even more strong than making it scientifically respectable.
 The second reason is that Burge’s own description of the philosopher of mental 
representation’s job entails that in this hypothetical situation there is a motivation for appealing 
to an available theoretical reduction. Burge is right in claiming that the philosopher should 
determine the place of representational states in the wider natural order by finding systematic 
connections involving them. Progress can be made by clarifying, exploring and connecting 
representational states with the wider natural order. But that is precisely what a theoretical 
reduction of representational states will do: it clarifies, explores and connects them with the 
wider natural order; and the development of a theoretical reduction establishes a systematic 
connection between the representational state and the rest of nature. After all, it provides a 
reduction of the notion of representation in more basic natural notions which are more 
widespread in nature; and it also establishes systematic connections between the representation, 
the natural states that constitute the basis of the reduction and the other natural states which are 
connected with them in multiple ways.  
   The final reason is methodological. We should appeal to a supposed naturalist 
reduction of representation since it would be ontologically more parsimonious to consider the 
representation as reducible to a natural notion rather than as primitive. After all, the treatment 
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of representation as a reducible state does not enrich the fundamental states in our ontology. 
  In sum, even assuming Burge’s criterion that the notion of representation should be 
accepted by a naturalist philosopher because it earns its keep in science by figuring in 
successful psychological explanations and so that there is no necessity to make it scientifically 
respectable, there is still a strong motivation to carry on with the reductionist enterprise.41 This 
is the positive front of my response to Burge’s objection; let’s move on to the negative one.  
  There is a fundamental problem in Burge’s defence of the view that there is a motivation 
for accepting representation as a primitive notion. It is not because successful scientific 
explanations regard a notion as primitive that it follows that there is a strong motivation for 
accepting this notion as primitive. That is, the fact that a given successful scientific explanation 
uses a certain notion as primitive does not imply that it is irreducible. That can even sometimes 
be the case, but this is not a sound motivation. Notice that what Burge is claiming is that the 
fact that a successful scientific explanation regards a notion as primitive constitutes a 
motivation for accepting it as primitive, but not that this is a sufficient reason for a definitive 
conclusion for its primitiveness. Burge holds that because successful psychological 
explanations appeal to representation as a primitive notion, there is a motivation to get rid of 
the reductionist enterprise – the prospects are not good for a viable reduction of representation. 
In what follows, I will argue contra Burge that this fact does not constitute a motivation for 
primitivism about representational states.   
  There is a lively debate in biology and philosophy of biology whether classical genetics 
is reducible to molecular genetics or not. This debate is alive regardless of the fact that classical 
genetics has successful explanations precisely because this is not a sufficient motivation for 
treating specific notions of classic genetics as not reducible. The antireductionist’s fundamental 
                                                             
41 Notice that this is a debate on the motivations for reductionist naturalism, not on the reasons that purport to 
demonstrate that representational states are reducible to more primitive natural states. That is, the validity of 
these motivations entails only that we should engage into the reductionist enterprise. Whether it will succeed 
in reducing representational states is a further matter that will be decided in the course of this very enterprise.    
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claim is that any number of different molecular arrangements could correspond to a single 
notion in classic genetics – gene, locus, allele, etc. Hence, supposed bridge laws for these 
notions would relate each of these kinds to many molecular kinds and so would not be genuine 
bridge laws. Notice that this debate is not only about the issue of the incorporation or 
integration of a reduced theory with a reducing theory, but also about the ontological issue of 
whether or not the entities posit by classic genetics are reducible to the entities of molecular 
genetics. If classic genetics is integrated to molecular genetics, then the entities referred to by 
the specific notion of classic genetics are reducible to the entities of molecular genetics; and so 
the ontological reduction is fulfilled.42 Note that this debate is not the only counter-example in 
biology to Burge’s objection, there are also other debates – e.g., whether evolutionary biology 
is an autonomous discipline or is reducible to molecular biology (ROSENBERG, 2006).  
  Finally, there is also a counter-example from the history of thermodynamics. There was 
a lively debate among physicists about the nature of heat between the 18th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century. Different theories of heat were developed in this period, mainly 
the caloric theory which explained heat in terms of the flow of a hypothetical weightless fluid 
called caloric and the kinetic theory according to which heat should be explained in terms of 
kinetic energy transfer. In the early 1850’s, the laws of thermodynamics were established by 
R. Clausius, W. Thomson and W. Rankine which appeals to the notion of heat. Even after the 
establishment of the successful laws of thermodynamics, the debate on whether heat is 
reducible or not to some other notion persisted. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
there was a contentious debate in which on one side E. Mach, P. Duhem and other physicists 
were objecting to the kinetic theory while L. Boltzmann and others were defending it. Finally, 
the defenders of the kinetic theory won this debate and it is now established that heat consists 
                                                             
42 There is an exciting overview of the reductionist debate on classic genetics in “Sex and Death: an introduction 
to Philosophy of Biology” (STERELNY & GRIFFITHS, 1999). 
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in the transference of kinetic energy from one body to another via molecular motion. That is, 
it is now established that heat is reducible to molecular motion, not that it consists in some 
irreducible substance like caloric. So, the establishment of the successful laws of 
thermodynamics in which the notion of heat plays a central role happened long before the 
establishment of heat as reducible to molecular motion. This counter-example shows that in 
the history of thermodynamics, the establishment of the laws of thermodynamics was not a 
motivation for treating heat as a primitive notion and instead there was a lively debate on this 
issue that was only concluded with the ultimate conclusion that heat is kinetic energy 
transference via molecular motion.43  
  What is the lesson to be drawn from these counter-examples? In order for Burge to 
defend his objection against reductionist naturalism, he has to show why it is the case that in 
psychological explanations, contrary to what happens in other branches of science, the fact that 
a successful scientific explanation appeals to a notion as primitive constitutes a strong 
motivation for regarding it as primitive. That is, in the case of psychological explanations that 
regard the notion of representation as primitive, Burge has to show that this constitutes a strong 
motivation for regarding representational states as irreducible.   
  Burge could reply, in relation to the above counter-examples from biology, that there 
is an internal debate among biologists about the viability of the reduction of notions in classical 
genetics and evolutionary biology. So, they do not constitute genuine counter-examples to his 
criterion that philosophers should accept that an established scientific notion is primitive 
provided that this notion appears in a successful scientific explanation as primitive. Therefore, 
if there is still a lively debate among scientists about its reducibility, then this is not an 
established scientific notion and so philosophers should remain neutral about this issue, instead 
                                                             
43 This brief description of the debate on the nature of heat in the history of thermodynamics is based on the 
first chapter of Stephen Brush’s book “The kind of motion we called heat – a history of the kinetic theory of 
gases in the 19th century” (BRUSH, 1976). 
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waiting for a scientific consensus about it.  
  But how decisive is the scientist’s word about the irreducibility of a given scientific 
notion? Is it the final word? I don’t think that this is always the case. Because of a divergence 
of theoretical interests, philosophers may worry about the irreducibility of a given scientific 
notion while scientists are neutral about this matter simply because they happen to be not 
interested in it and have never even thought about it. This may be the case with the notion of 
representation in psychological explanations, as well as with other notions in different areas of 
science. The second problem with the above reply is that it implicitly assumes that there is a 
difference of kind between the philosophical activity and the scientific activity, not a difference 
of degree as assumed by methodologic naturalists. So, there would be an unbridgeable gap 
between the nature of science and philosophy. It is not my goal here to take a position in this 
debate, but the onus of argument is on those how hold that there is a difference of kind between 
philosophical and scientific activities, not to just assume or even to be neutral about it.  
 
The attack on teleosemantics – the mismatch objection  
  Burge starts his attack on teleosemantics by assessing causal theories and their project 
of reducing representational states in terms of causal relations, but quickly rejects it by claiming 
that causal theories fail to give an account of the problem of misrepresentation. So, he 
introduces teleosemantics as the most promising naturalist theory to solve this problem via the 
identification of truth conditions with fitness conditions. However, Burge claims that 
teleosemantics is ultimately untenable; to show this, he developed the mismatch objection 
(BURGE, 2010, p. 301-3).  
  The mismatch objection maintains that there is a fundamental mismatch in the 
identification of truth conditions and fitness conditions which lies at the heart of 
teleosemantics. It claims that truth conditions are not identical with fulfilment conditions of 
77 
 
biological function. The performance of a biological function by a given system or trait 
contributes to its fitness and therefore has fitness value. However, Burge objects, a true 
representation has no fitness value in itself. While it is guaranteed that the performance of a 
biological function has fitness value, there is no guarantee that a true representation has fitness 
value. On the one hand, misrepresentation may not be the failure to fulfil any biological 
function, and on the other hand, a true representation may fail to fulfil any biological function. 
In sum, representational success is not identical with fitness success.44 Therefore, 
representational states are not reducible to biological functions and the teleological enterprise 
is doomed.    
  Challenged by this objection, the teleosemanticist replies that the biological function of 
a representational state is to detect the presence of a given distal condition and that the detection 
of this is in itself a contribution to fitness, while a failure of detecting it is in itself a failure to 
contribute to fitness. However, Burge objects, detection in itself is not a contribution to fitness. 
No biological function resides strictly in the detection of anything. Rather, it is the causal 
properties of the representational state which initiate or trigger the response to the detected 
distal condition that actually contributes in itself to fitness. That is to say, the representational 
state contributes to fitness by triggering the response (usually a behaviour) towards the distal 
condition, not by detecting it. So, the biological function of the representation is to trigger the 
organism’s response to the distal condition. It is this initiation, not the detection per se that 
contributes to fitness.45 This thesis is well illustrated by the aforementioned case of the frog: 
the biological function of the frog’s representation of the fly is not to detect it, but rather to 
                                                             
44 “There is, however, a root mismatch between representational error and failure of biological function. The 
key deflationist [teleosemantic] idea in explaining error is to associate veridicality and error with success and 
failure, respectively, in fulfilling biological function. […] Fitness is very clearly a practical value. It is a state that is 
ultimately grounded in benefit of its effects for survival for reproduction. […] But accuracy is not in itself a 
practical value. Explanations that appeal to accuracy and inaccuracy— such as those in perceptual psychology—
are not explanations of practical value, or of contributions to some practical end.” (BURGE, 2010, p. 301) 
45 “in itself detection does literally nothing to contribute to fitness. It is the causal properties of the detecting 
state in affecting responses that contribute” (BURGE, 2010, p. 301). 
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trigger the appropriate response towards it – the frog’s behaviour of capturing the fly.   
  However, this argument is flawed and the thesis that the biological function of the 
representation is only to trigger the appropriate response towards the detected distal condition 
is untenable. The first problem is that it is not true that the detection by itself does not contribute 
to fitness while the triggering of the response by the detecting state does. Rather, no effect in 
the chain of effects which increase fitness by itself contributes to fitness. Consider the case of 
the frog again. The snap of the frog’s tongue does not contribute by itself to fitness either, what 
contributes by itself is the whole chain of effects – the detection of the fly, its capture, its 
digestion, the transport of the resulting nutrients in the bloodstream, etc. Notice that the capture 
of the fly does not contribute to fitness without the digestion of the fly, the transport of the 
nutrients in the bloodstream, etc. No single effect by itself contributes to fitness, only the 
wholly chain of effects contributes by itself. The detection is an effect in this chain that 
contributes to fitness precisely because it is an indispensable element of this chain, just like the 
capture of the fly or its digestion. A given effect in the chain does not contribute to fitness by 
itself but does so in virtue of being part of a chain of effects which as a whole contributes to 
fitness, provided that the absence of this effect would disrupt the contribution to fitness.  
  Burge’s thesis is that the detection does not contribute to fitness by itself. The truth of 
a given state is not adaptive per se.46 The detecting state, however, has an adaptive effect since 
it triggers the appropriate response and hence increases fitness. So, the frog’s detecting state 
contributes to fitness by triggering the catching behaviour, not by detecting the presence of the 
fly. However, this thesis is untenable. In order to see why, it is necessary to see in detail how 
the detection of a distal condition is an effect of the representational state.   
  First of all, to say that the biological function of the system is to detect a given distal 
condition is a façon de parler. What is being said is that the function of the representational 
                                                             
46 “evolution does not care about veridicality [i.e., truth conditions]” (BURGE, 2010, p. 303).  
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system is to produce a representational state in reaction to the presence of the distal condition 
and the production of the representation is precisely the first effect of the reaction of the 
representational system to the presence of the distal condition. The detection of the distal 
condition by the representational system is the production of the representational state in 
response to the presence of the distal condition. The biological function of the representational 
system is to produce representations in covariance with the distal condition (even if this 
correlation is not perfectly reliable). Another way of stating this is to say that the biological 
function of the representational system is to produce true representations (after all, the 
representation is true if and only if the condition that it represents obtains). Thus, the first effect 
of the reaction of the representational system to the presence of the distal condition is the 
detection of the representational state, i.e., the production of the representational state. The 
second effect is the triggering of the response directed to the distal condition (usually, a 
behaviour). In the case of the frog, the first effect is the production of the representational state 
which consists in a neural firing in the brain and the second effect consists in the triggering of 
the behaviour that normally results in the capture of the fly.   
  Why take the triggering of the response to the distal condition as an effect of the 
representational system that contributes to fitness but not the detection of the distal condition 
that consists in the production of the representational state? This is plainly arbitrary. There is 
no principled way of maintaining that the contribution of the representational system to fitness 
resides only in the triggering of the response by the representational state but not also in the 
production of the representational state that consists in the detection of the distal condition to 
which the appropriate response is directed. The right criterion to establish which effects of the 
representational system contribute to fitness is every effect whose absence would prevent the 
response to increase fitness. That is, the neural firing which constitutes the detection of the 
distal condition, the triggering of the response, etc. Notice that in case of failure in detection or 
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the absence of the detection itself, there would not be any adaptive response at all. The 
production of the representation which consists in the detection of the distal condition is a 
necessary element in the chain of effects, without it there would be no triggering of the response 
and hence no adaptive response. In the case of failure, there would be no adaptive behaviour at 
all (the frog would not capture the fly), and in the case of the absence of the neural firing which 
constitutes the detection of the fly, there would be no trigger of any behaviour. The detection 
of the fly is an indispensable element in the chain of effects, without it there would be no 
increase of fitness. Burge could reply that the production of the representation is adaptive only 
inasmuch as it triggers the response, not because it detects any condition. But notice that in the 
absence of the detected distal condition, the response would not be adaptive – it would trigger 
a non-adaptive response.   
 Another argument in favour of such strong dependence between the representational 
system’s effect of detecting the distal condition and the effect of triggering the response is that 
subpersonal representations like the frog’s are pushmi-pullyu representations.47 In these cases, 
there is not an imperative content distinguished from an indicative component as it happens in 
personal representations. Rather, the representational state simultaneously indicates the 
presence of the distal condition and dictates an appropriate response towards it. The unique 
component of the representation is constituted by an indication of the presence of the fly in a 
certain direction and the dictation to the frog to snap its tongue in this direction. Evidently, one 
component may be abstracted from another in such a manner that from a theoretical point of 
view it is possible to distinguish an indicative and an imperative component, but in reality there 
is no such distinction. So, the connection between the imperative and the indicative component 
in pushmi-pullyu representations is stronger than in non-pushmi-pullyu representations. The 
fact that representations like the frog’s are pushmi-pullyu representations makes even more 
                                                             
47 This term was originally coined by Ruth Millikan, cf. MILLIKAN, 1995. 
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untenable the claim that the representational system’s effect of trigging the response directed 
to the distal condition contributes by itself to fitness but not the detection of this condition. 
 Burge recognizes that there is a strong coincidence or correlation between the detection 
of the distal condition (i.e., the production of the representational state) and the triggering of 
the response directed to the distal condition. However, he notes, even this strong coincidence 
or correlation is not identity and indeed there are cases in which they come apart. In order to 
demonstrate this, Burge appeals to real examples in which the representational system fails to 
detect the distal condition but nevertheless triggers an adaptive response. Thus, there is no 
sense in saying that in these cases the representational system fails to perform its biological 
function – after all, there is contribution to fitness. So, Burge concludes, representational 
systems were selected not because of their accuracy in detecting distal conditions, but because 
they trigger the responses to the distal conditions.    
  Burge states that there are a plenty of cases in which representational systems contribute 
to fitness by trigging a behaviour which increases strength and agility and so ultimately is 
adaptive even when it misrepresents the presence of predators in the environment. In his own 
words, 
“suppose that the avoidance mechanism functioned to increase strength and agility — 
in avoiding the predator — even in cases in which the animal engaged in avoidance 
behavior, because of a misrepresentation as of a predator, when no predator was 
present. Suppose that in each case, whether or not the predator is present, the avoidance 
mechanism contributes to the animal’s fitness for avoiding predators. Then, although 
the ultimate raison d’être for the mechanism might be absent in a given case, there 
would be no biological sense in which the mechanism failed to fulfill a biological 
function when it effected avoidance behavior in cases where the distal condition was 
not present.” (BURGE, 2010, p. 302) 
That is, the representational system contributes to fitness no matter whether it accurately 
represents or not the presence of the predators because it increases strength and agility. So, in 
82 
 
this case the representational system performs its biological function and there is no biological 
malfunction. This argument, however, is flawed.  
  The reason is that a given system may have more than one biological function. 
Evolutionary selection is plainly compatible with distinct and parallel functions. So, in Burge’s 
example, the representational system may have two distinct parallel biological functions - to 
detect predators and to increase strength and agility. Assuming that the representational system 
has two parallel biological functions, it is perfectly possible for it to perform its function of 
increasing strength and agility but not its function of detecting predators and vice versa. It is 
plainly compatible that the system fulfils one function, while failing to fulfil some other 
function. So, the representational system contributes to fitness in light of the adaptive effect of 
increasing agility and strength but fails to contribute to fitness in light of the adaptive effect of 
avoiding predators. Generalizing this result, in Burge’s case the representational system has 
the biological function of detecting a given distal condition that results in the avoidance of 
predators and also the biological function of triggering a behaviour which results in the increase 
of strength and agility.  
 My thesis is that the detection of the distal condition and the triggering of the response 
to the distal condition are both adaptive effects of the representational system. On one hand, in 
the majority of cases they will constitute only one biological function, with the detection of the 
distal condition causing the triggering of the response to the distal condition, with the failure 
of detecting the distal condition resulting in no increase of fitness (e.g., in the case of the frog). 
Notice that both effects are indispensable and that the absence of one of them will result in a 
break in the chain of effects which ultimately result in the increase of fitness. On the other 
hand, in minority cases like Burge’s one, the representational system has two parallel biological 
functions respectively constituted by the adaptive effect of detecting the distal condition to 
avoid predators and the adaptive effect of triggering avoidance behaviour to increase agility 
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and strength.48 In these cases, the representational system has the function of detecting the 
distal condition to avoid predators no matter whether this behaviour will increase strength or 
not, and it also has the function of triggering the avoidance behaviour to increase strength and 
agility no matter whether this behaviour will avoid predators or not. Both functions are parallel 
and compatible and, as a matter of fact, nature is rife with biological systems that were selected 
to have more than one adaptive effect and thus more than one biological function. Finally, 
notice that only the first function has a semantic nature, the second function has no semantic 
nature at all – it has nothing to do with the representation of anything. It is constituted by the 
effect of generating a certain behaviour that increases agility and fitness, but the triggering of 
this behaviour is independent of the representation of any distal condition. In fact, there are 
several examples of systems that also increase agility and strength but which do not represent 
at all. It is just a coincidence in these minority cases that the system that contributed to the 
increase of strength and agility by triggering this kind of behaviour is also a representational 
system - it might not have been.49     
  It will be useful to compare the above response to Burge with responses to another 
problem facing teleosemantics. The problem is that, since there are cases of representations 
which really serve a biological function in virtue of being false, truth conditions cannot be 
identical with fitness conditions and thus teleosemantics is flawed. For instance, there are cases 
of depressive realism in which psychologically healthy people tend to have inflated beliefs 
about their own social status, in opposition to depressed people who tend to have accurate 
beliefs about their own social status. Let’s assume that these false beliefs among healthy people 
                                                             
48 Or even a third biological function constituted by a third effect as long as it is adaptive. There is no pre-
established limit of the number of parallel functions that a given biological system may have. 
49 It could be replied that this argument developed here does not really address Burge’s objection because he is 
actually objecting that the detecting state is not genuinely a representation, but just a sensory state with no 
truth-condition. In fact, he objects that teleosemantics is too liberal since it treats certain states that clearly are 
not representational as representations. But this is a distinct objection and I will not address the objection of 
liberality here, but only in the next chapters since it is part of a bigger issue, the problem of demarcation.  
84 
 
have the biological function of encouraging them to be enterprising by increasing self-esteem. 
Thus, contrary to teleosemantics, these beliefs are adaptive in virtue of being false, not true.   
 The standard reply to this problem consists in stating that this objection only arises 
because it mistakenly assumes that these false beliefs have only one biological function, when 
in reality it has more than one function (PAPINEAU, 2016). They have the function of 
accurately representing reality and also the function of encouraging being enterprising. So, they 
fail to perform the function of accurately representing since they are false but they fulfil the 
function of encouraging enterprise.   
 In effect, I adapted this standard reply in explaining why we should not worry about 
Burge’s case. However, by doing this I am not committed to this standard response to the 
objection about depressive realism. These are different and independent cases and indeed I 
think that this two-functions strategy is more promising in order to deal with Burge’s case than 
to deal with depressive realism case. The reason is that in Burge’s case it is a matter of 
coincidence that the same representational system has the function of producing accurate 
representations and the function of increasing strength and agility, while in the depressive 
realism case it is not a coincidence that the same representational system has the function of 
producing true beliefs and the function of producing false beliefs in order to encourage 
enterprise. The crucial difference between these cases is that in Burge’s case it is a coincidence 
that the production of a false representation increases strength and agility, while in the 
depressive realism case the belief is adaptive in virtue of being false – only a false belief can 
have this consequence. After all, only a representational system can produce false beliefs in 
order to encourage enterprise, but other systems may increase strength and agility by non-
representational means.   
  So, in the depressive realism case there is the problem of explaining how a 
representational system can be adaptive in virtue of producing sometimes true beliefs, 
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sometimes false beliefs. Furthermore, how can they constitute distinct functions given that their 
functional statuses are not completely independent (in depressive realism cases, it is impossible 
for the representational system to simultaneously fulfil both functions of accurate representing 
reality and encouraging enterprise)? By contrast, these problems do not arise in Burge’s case 
since here it is just a coincidence that sometimes the production of a false representation will 
be adaptive and the relevant functions are completely independent – it is plainly possible for 
them to be simultaneously fulfilled or not fulfilled, or one fulfilled but not the other and vice-
versa.  
  After developing this proposal in order to deal with Burge’s case, I have since 
discovered that Agustin Vicente has also adopted the same strategy: the representational system 
has the biological function of detecting predators and also the function of increasing strength 
and agility (VICENTE, 2012). However, Vicente’s proposal is fundamentally different from 
mine. He claims that they are biological functions of different kinds. The function of increasing 
strength and agility is an aetiological biological function, but the function of detecting 
predators is a non-aetiological biological function. The only adaptive effect of the 
representational system is the effect of increasing agility and strength. Evolution does not care 
at all about the accuracy of the representational system – it does not care whether or not the 
system detects the distal condition. Rather, he argues, the representational system has a non-
aetiological biological function of detecting the distal condition because it is a “special kind” 
of biological function. But then why does the representation system have this biological 
function given that it was not selected for detecting the distal condition? According to Vicente, 
because it is “the result of a process of natural selection”. He concludes that “this may take us 
to reconsider the selected effect account of functions [i.e., the aetiological conception of 
biological function]” (VICENTE, 2012, p. 132).  
  Burge and Vicente agree that the representational system’s effect of detecting the distal 
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condition is not adaptive and as a result was not selected by evolutionary selection. Thus, it is 
not an aetiological biological function of the system. However, while Burge claims that 
accurate detection is not at all a biological function of the representational system, Vicente 
claims that it is a biological function, though not an aetiological one, which leads him to 
propose the revision of the aetiological conception of biological function. By contrast, what I 
have being arguing here is that the biological function of detecting the distal condition and the 
function of triggering the response to the detected distal condition are both aetiological 
biological functions of the representational system. So, my disagreement with both Burge and 
Vicente is that they claim that the detection of the distal condition is not an adaptive effect of 
the representational system, while I am arguing that it is an adaptive effect.   
  The problem with Vicente’s proposal is that it is completely obscure what kind of 
special biological function the representational system’s function of detecting the distal 
condition is. Notice that it is incompatible not only with the aetiological conception of 
biological function, it is also incompatible with other available conceptions of biological 
function such as the systemic conception (CUMMINS, 1975). So, it seems that Vicente would 
have to develop a completely new conception of biological function to accommodate his thesis 
that the accurate detection of the distal condition is a distinct kind of biological function. There 
is no problem with alternative conceptions of biological function and I am open to pluralism 
about the nature of biological functions. However, since Vicente has not clarified the nature of 
his new conception of biological function, it is not possible to assess its viability or the thesis 
that the detection of the distal condition is a special kind of biological function. My conclusion 
is that until the nature of this new conception of biological function is clarified, the thesis that 
accurate detection is not an adaptive effect of representational system but nevertheless is a 





  In this chapter, I have first introduced intentional naturalism and its reductionist and 
primitivist versions. I then presented motivations for reductionist naturalism in contrast with 
primitivist naturalism. After this, I introduced my favoured teleological approach, i.e., 
teleosemantics. Finally, in the last section I rejected Burge’s primitivist challenge to 
reductionism; that is, his attack that the motivations in fact support primitivist naturalism, not 
reductionism. I have also rejected the mismatch objection to teleosemantics. Burge also 
presented another objection to teleosemantics, the objection of liberality. However, I have not 
addressed this so far, as behind the objection of liberality lies a much larger issue: what are the 
minimal conditions for intentionality required to distinguish genuine representational states 
from non-representational ones? This is the problem of demarcation. In the next chapter, I 
address this problem and reject some responses to it, including Burge’s own demarcation 
proposal. In the fourth chapter, I present and defend my own solution to the problem of 












CHAPTER 3. THE MINIMAL CONDITIONS FOR INTENTIONALITY:  
THE PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION 
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3.5 The constancy mechanism proposal 
 
  What are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a given state should satisfy for 
it to constitute a representational state? That is, what are the limits of intentionality? This is the 
problem of demarcation. My approach to this problem will be divided into two chapters. In the 
first section of the present chapter, I introduce the problem of demarcation and show its 
relevance for the debate on the viability of naturalist theories of mental representation. In the 
second and third sections, I assess methodological and substantiality worries related to this 
problem. I first reject the view that the problem of demarcation is just terminological; after that 
I propose the adoption of a variation of the method of reflective equilibrium to develop and 
assess proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality. Finally, in the two last sections of 
this chapter, I assess and reject two demarcation proposals for the limits of intentionality: the 
causal independence and constancy mechanism proposals. The next chapter is dedicated to the 
positive side of my approach in which I will develop my own proposal for minimal conditions 





3.1 The problem of demarcation   
 Naturalist theories of mental representation are often criticized for being either too 
liberal or too restrictive about the requirements for a given state to be a representational state. 
A theory of representation is too liberal if it treats certain states as representational states when 
they are clearly not representations; it is too restrictive if it treats certain states as non-
representational states when they are clearly representations. Behind both objections, lies the 
problem of demarcation: what are the limits of intentionality? What is the border of 
intentionality that distinguishes the limiting cases of representational states from non-
representational states? The objection that a theory is too liberal is just the objection that it has 
drawn the limit of representationality too low, while the objection that the theory is too 
restrictive is just the objection that it has drawn this limit too high.  
  In the case of teleological and causal theories of content, the ‘liberal’ side of the 
problem of demarcation raises an objection. They are often challenged for treating states that 
clearly are not representations as representational states – they draw the limit of 
representationality too low.50 The following cases are illustrative of this objection: 
magnetosome states of anaerobic bacteria and the reptile’s body states which varies with the 
heat of the sun (BURGE, 2010, 300; 303-4); hormone concentrations in our blood; detection 
of light in amoeba or planaria for phototaxis (SCHULTE, 2015, pp. 119-20; FODOR, 1986, p. 
10-11); etc. For a variety of reasons, it has been claimed that it is a mistake to treat these states 
as genuine representations, i.e., that they clearly do not represent anything. Thus, the 
conclusion that these naturalist theories should be ruled out or at least highly refined.   
  But how to determine which states are genuine representations and which ones are not?  
A useful way of approaching this issue is to ask what are the minimal conditions that a given 
state should satisfy for it to constitute a representational state. Minimal conditions for 
                                                             
50 This is also called “the problem of the breadth-of-application” (BURGE, 2010, p. 304; SCHULTE, 2015).  
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intentionality are those conditions satisfied by states in the lower level in the hierarchy of 
representational states. If a given state does not satisfy one of these conditions, it follows that 
it lies outside the representational realm – no matter how it might look like a representation.  
  The hierarchy of representational states is well illustrated by checking the states which 
constitute it. There are very simple and primitive representational states at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, very sophisticated representations at the top and representational states with 
intermediate sophistication at intermediate levels. That is, the hierarchy is constituted by 
higher-level representational states at the top, lower-level representations in the bottom and 
intermediate-level representations in between. At the top there are representations like desires, 
beliefs and other propositional attitudes; abstract and scientific representations (e.g., 
representations of numbers, quarks etc.); and so on. At intermediate levels, there are less 
complex representations like pre-linguistic infant intentional gestural signals (BATES et al., 
1975), great ape gestural communications (CALL & TOMASELLO, 2007), and so on. What 
about the primitive states at the bottom of the hierarchy? We can ask ourselves a number of 
subsidiary questions about primitive states: what kind of states are there? Are honeybee dances 
which indicate the whereabouts of nectar genuine representations? Are representational 
anaerobic bacteria’s magnetesomes states which indicate the direction of the magnetic field 
and hence the direction of the bottom of the ocean? Are amoebas and planarias representational 
systems? To answer these questions, one must establish minimal conditions for intentionality, 
based on which one can determine which representational states lie at the bottom level of this 
hierarchy. That is the only way to have a justified response for the problem of demarcation. 
Otherwise, any response would be arbitrary and unfounded.   
 Consider a group of representational states. Some states are higher-level representations 
whose representational statuses are uncontroversial while other states are primitive states 
whose representational statuses are controversial. Now suppose that there is a demarcation line 
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distinguishing representational states from non-representational ones. Accordingly, the closer 
a given representational state is to this line, the more doubtful is its representational status. This 
line also distinguishes primitive representational states from other states that even though are 
not representational, their non-representational statuses are also controversial. These are 
borderline cases of primitive representational states. The problem that arises is how to 
demarcate which states are representational and which states are not. It is here that minimal 
conditions for intentionality come into play. Their role is to establish conditions to distinguish, 
among borderline cases of primitive representations, states that are genuinely representational 
from states that are not.  
  Here I assume that primitive representations are sensory representations such that the 
limits of intentionality are demarcated by sensory representations. That is, lower-level 
representational states are sensory representations. The role of minimal conditions for 
intentionality is to distinguish sensory representational states from non-representational states. 
The latter just register or indicate the relevant conditions, in contrast with sensory 
representations that represent them. If paramecia are representational systems, they represent 
the direction of light; if they are not, they merely indicate or register it. Non-representational 
sensory states have sensory discriminations of the relevant conditions, but there is no genuine 
representation, in contrast with sensory representations that genuinely represent them.51        
  There are several proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality. It is not possible 
to assess all of them, so I will limit my assessment to two of them. The reason for this choice 
is that, as it will become clear later, both proposals contribute to the development of the 
proposal that I develop in the next chapter. First, I assess the causal independence proposal. 
                                                             
51 The assumption that primitive representational states are sensory representations is widespread in this 
debate. Millikan claims that pushmi-pullyu representations are primitive and that they are sensory 
representations (MILLIKAN, 2004, p. 158). Burge and others claim that the lower border of perception is the 
lower border of intentionality (BURGE 2010, p. 317; SCHULTE, 2015). Here I will not commit myself to either of 
these claims, but only with the weaker claim that primitive representational states are sensory representations. 
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Jerry Fodor and Ansgar Beckermann have proposed that a given system does not count as 
genuinely representational unless there is a causal independency between the tokening of the 
relevant external condition and the tokening of the state which supposedly represents it. The 
minimal condition for intentionality is that there is a causal independence between the presence 
of the relevant stimulus and the tokening of the state (BECKERMANN, 1988; FODOR, 1986). 
Second, I assess the constancy mechanism proposal. Tyler Burge and Kim Sterelny have 
proposed that it is a minimal condition for intentionality of a given state that the system 
employs a constancy mechanism on its production (BURGE, 2010, pp. 315-9; 342-436; 
STERELNY, 1995). Before assessing these proposals, in the next two sections I give an 
account of some methodological and substantiality worries related to the problem of 
demarcation.   
 
3.2 A terminological problem?    
  It is a common concern whether what is at stake on the problem of demarcation is just 
a terminological issue about what is called “representation”. Here is the line of reasoning: it 
does not matter whether you call a given state a “representation” or not, for it does not make 
any difference. For instance, you may call the amoeba’s state that covaries with light to enable 
phototaxis whatever you want – a “representation”, a “registration” or an “indication” of light. 
What difference does it make? Whether it is appropriate or not to call it “representation” is just 
a terminological issue. What we call this state does not make any explanatory difference for 
the success of scientific explanations of the nature of amoebas. The same goes on in the case 
of controversial representational states of bacteria, honeybees, and so on. The conclusion is 
that the problem of demarcation is a scheinproblem, a pseudo-problem devoid of any real 
substance. 
  How should this concern be assessed? At first glance, this objection may look plausible, 
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but it misses the real nature of the problem of demarcation. Evidently, you can call anything 
by whatever name you want – “representation”, “registration”, “indication”, etc. Indeed, it 
makes no difference which terminology is adopted, but what you mean by the term you employ 
makes a difference. The meaning assigned to your chosen terminology is essential: if by 
“representation” you mean what is commonly meant by “representation” in English, then the 
question of whether a given state is a representation or not is substantial. That is the case 
because the notion of representation is pre-theoretic: it precedes any scientific or philosophical 
investigation on the nature of representational states. This fact by itself establishes constraints 
on which states genuinely represent other states and which do not. Since the notion of 
representation is pre-theoretic, the question of whether a given state is a genuine representation 
of another state gives rise to intuitions into our minds that may go in the direction of accepting 
or rejecting it as a genuine representation. These pre-theoretic intuitions constitute a constraint 
on what should be properly considered a genuine representation to a certain degree. That is one 
reason why several theories of representation are accused of being too liberal or too restrictive 
depending on what states they consider representations. If a given theory takes certain states to 
be genuine representations and our intuitions indicate that they are clearly not representations, 
then this theory will be sooner or later accused of too liberal; while if this theory does not 
consider certain states as representational and our intuitions indicates that they are clearly 
representational, then this theory will probably be accused of too restrictive. That is how this 
game is played among philosophers of mental representation. Not surprisingly, that is when 
the problem of demarcation arises among them.   
  But first, why should our pre-theoretic institutions constitute a constraint on what 
successful scientific theories of cognition should appropriately posit as representational states? 
The most popular view among philosophers of mental representation nowadays is precisely 
that the distinctive explanatory role played by the posit of representational states in successful 
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scientific theories is a reason good enough to justify even the representational status of states 
that we intuitively don’t take to be genuinely representational. What better reason could we 
have to accept a counter-intuitive representational state than that it plays the distinctive 
explanatory role in a successful scientific theory of cognition? After all, the notion of 
representation is a technical and scientific notion. In short, the requirement that the distinctive 
explanatory power of positing representational states is the supreme constraint for assessing 
whether a given state is genuinely representational or not.52 Furthermore, one of the lessons 
that philosophers usually take from the enterprise of naturalizing intentionality is that intuitions 
should be put aside because (among other reasons) intuitions commonly go in the opposite 
direction of the results of successful scientific theories. This explanatory requirement view 
constitutes a serious challenge to the thesis that pre-theoretic intuitions constitute a constraint 
on assignments of representational statuses.53  
  It is true that our pre-theoretic intuitions may clash with successful scientific theories 
of cognition on the matter whether the posited representational states are genuinely 
representational. For instance, is it intuitive to claim that rats genuinely represent the local 
environment?54 When doing their jobs, philosophers of mental representation should certainly 
not put too much weight on what pre-theoretic intuitions dictates about mental representations. 
That is, our pre-theoretic intuitions cannot have the final word when engaged in on a 
philosophical investigation on intentionality. However, they cannot be entirely thrown away 
either. That is the case because if a given scientific explanation posits a state as 
                                                             
52 This explanatory view is highly connected with the explanatory requirement that constitutes the basic 
conception of mental representation in the sense that the explanatory requirement is used there to specify what 
is a mental representation, while on this view it is used to establish the limits of intentionality.  
53 “The project is to characterise such putative intentional properties by examining the theoretical role they play. 
From this perspective, pre-theoretic intuitions about cases have no special status.” (SHEA, 2007, p. 406). 
54 Place cells on rat’s hippocampus fire when and only when the rat is in a certain location in the environment. 
John O’Keefe and Lynn Nadel have proposed that the hippocampal formation functions as a cognitive map 
consisting of a set of place representations (Cf. O’KEEFE & NADEL, 1978). This is the “hippocampal 
representation” of local environment (O’KEEFE & BURGESS, 2005, p. 855). But one could claim that it is not 
intuitive that rats are intentional systems because they lack the required cognitive complexity to be intentional.  
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representational, but it has nothing to do with what we ordinarily understand as a 
representation, then this state is not a representation at all. Evidently, the scientist may decide 
to baptize the posited state in the scientific explanation with whatever preferred term, but it 
does not touch in any sense the conclusion that this state is not a genuine representation, since 
it is entirely incompatible with our intuitions on the nature of representational states.  
  Finally, the last reason for the substantiality of the problem of demarcation arises from 
its comparison with other philosophical problems. Note how many traditional and substantial 
philosophical problems would be dismissed on the grounds that they are easily solved by just 
providing new definitions of the relevant terms and putting aside our pre-theoretic intuitions 
on this matter. For instance, consider the question: can computers have consciousness? All that 
you have to do is to redefine “consciousness” as “electrical activity”, put aside your intuitions 
contrary to the claim that mere electrical activity is enough for consciousness and then the 
problem is solved. Evidently computers have consciousness, for they are machines with 
electrical activity. Consider the trolley problem: what is the morally right thing to do?  
Should we let the trolley kill five people on the main track or should we pull the lever, putting 
the trolley in the sidetrack and killing just one person? If one redefines “moral” as a feature of 
every human action and puts aside the moral intuitions, then both actions are equally morally 
right. The dilemma is dissolved. Evidently, such a strategy is a misleading way of answering 
these questions, since it does not address the genuine philosophical problems behind them – 
respectively, the nature of consciousness and the moral dilemma behind the thought 
experiment. Likewise, the adoption of this strategy to deal with the problem of demarcation 
does not really address the philosophical problem behind it – the nature of intentionality in 
general and the minimal conditions for intentionality in particular. This is not a terminological 
problem precisely because our intuitions have a role to play on the assessment of posits of 
representational states by cognitive theories. The notion of representation is not just a technical 
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notion that has nothing to do with our intuitions and so the its comparison with purely technical 
notions like “quark” or “gene” is fully misleading.55  
  Notice that I have defended the view that intuitions constitute a constraint on what are 
properly posited as representational states by cognitive theories. Intuitions, however, do not 
constitute the final word on this matter; and yet they cannot be thrown away, either. However, 
I have not committed myself to the extent in which pre-theoretic intuitions constitute a 
constraint. Such commitment is not necessary to show that the problem of demarcation is 
substantial. The problem of demarcation is substantial, not terminological. The urgency of 
investigating the minimal conditions for intentionality still stands. But before engaging in this 
investigation, it is necessary to carry out a previous investigation on the status of our pre-
theoretic intuitions on the assessment and development of proposals for minimal conditions for 
intentionality, as well as their relationship with the explanatory requirement.   
 
3.3 The method of reflective equilibrium and the status of pre-theoretic intuitions  
  I have defended the thesis that the problem of demarcation is a substantial problem 
about intentionality by arguing that our pre-theoretic intuitions constitute a constraint on the 
assessment of the positing of representational states by cognitive theories. But what is the status 
of our intuitions on the development of a solution to the problem of demarcation? Which role 
should they play in the assessment of minimal conditions for intentionality? And finally, how 
they are related to the explanatory requirement for the positing of representational states? That 
is the methodological problem that will be addressed in this section. In what follows, I propose 
the adoption of a variation of the method of reflective equilibrium to develop a proposal for the 
limits of intentionality, constituted by, on the one hand, mutual adjustments between pre-
                                                             
55 William Ramsey has presented similar arguments as the ones above to show that pre-theoretic intuitions are 
a constraint for the assessment of proposals of the limits of intentionality, cf. RAMSEY, 2007, pp. 11-3.  
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theoretical intuitions on representationality and, on the other hand, the explanatory role of 
positing representational states.  
  First of all, let’s address another challenge against appealing to pre-theoretical 
intuitions on philosophical debates about representations. The challenge runs like this: our 
intuitions should play no role in the demarcation of the limits of intentionality because ordinary 
people do not have a pre-theoretical notion of representation; if so, there is no intuitive view 
about representation in general. People have pre-theoretical intuitions about specific cases – 
e.g., it is intuitive that beliefs and meaningful words are representations and it is counter-
intuitive that stones and clouds are representations. But people do not have intuitions about 
representation in general. The notion of representation is not a common-sense notion shared by 
ordinary people. So, it makes no sense to say that the positing of a state as a representation 
violates our pre-theoretical notion of representation simply because there is no such thing as 
an intuitive notion of representation.   
  I doubt that this is the case; rather, it strikes me that there is a pre-theoretical intuitive 
notion of representation. People have, for example, an intuitive notion of representation that 
embraces representations of very different kinds: written words, mental states, paintings, etc. 
But to refute the above argument is not necessary to go as far as asserting that people have a 
pre-theoretical notion of representation qua representation. It is enough to assume that people 
have intuitions about specific cases of representations – about a written word, a mental state, a 
painting, etc. The collection of all intuitions about these specific cases of representations shared 
by ordinary people constitute an intuitive notion of representation even if ordinary people are 
not aware of their intuitions about representation per se. This notion is precisely constructed 
out of all features that are shared by all instances of representation that people face in their 
everyday lives. Hence, there is a pre-theoretical intuitive notion of representation in general 
which is elicited by the intuitions that people have about specific representations.    
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  Having dispelled this worry, I address the two fundamental methodological problems 
on the status of pre-theoretical intuitions on the problem of demarcation. First, to what extent 
should our pre-theoretic intuitions about the limits of intentionality be vindicated in the 
assessment of proposals for the limits of intentionality? In the previous section, I maintained 
that our intuitions should not be thrown out of the assessment of representational status of 
posited states by cognitive theories, nor constitute the final word about it. The first problem is 
how to determine the intermediate level between these two extremes on which intuitions 
constitute a constraint to assess proposals for the limits of intentionality.   
  Now let’s move to the second methodological problem about the status of our intuitions 
on the limits of intentionality.  Suppose that after this investigation, we have reached a 
definitive response to this first methodological problem which establishes that intuitions 
constitute a constraint in the assessment of the positing of representational states to a certain 
degree. But what if our pre-theoretic intuitions about the limits of intentionality are 
incompatible? That is, what if the intuitive conception of representation is inconsistent? It is 
possible that we have incompatible intuitions on whether a given kind of state is genuinely 
representation or not. If that is the case, then no matter how plausible is the degree in which 
our intuitions should constitute a constraint to the assessment of demarcations of the limits of 
intentionality, this constraint must be put aside in virtue of its internal inconsistency. After all, 
it is a basic principle that appropriate constraints for the assessment of the positing of 
representational states should be consistent.   
  The goal of this section is to give a solution for both methodological problems. First, I 
argue that there is no general rule to determine in advance the degree in which our pre-theoretic 
intuitions constitute a constraint on the assessment of demarcations of the limit of 
intentionality; rather, I will propose a variation of the method of reflective equilibrium applied 
to the case of minimal intentionality. Second, I argue that it is possible that intuitions on the 
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limits of intentionality are inconsistent, but this is not a reason to conclude that they cannot 
constitute a constraint. In conclusion, to appeal to Wilfrid Sellars’ distinction, the application 
of the method of reflective equilibrium will result in the establishment of a demarcation of the 
limits of intentionality which is constrained by the manifest image of representation – our pre-
theoretic intuitions – and the scientific image of representation – the successful cognitive 
theories which posit representational states to explain behaviour (SELLARS, 1962).    
   In light of the implausibility of defending one of the extreme positions on the degree to 
which our intuitions constitute a constraint on a demarcation of the limits of intentionality, a 
natural proposal would be to defend the intermediate position that this demarcation should 
vindicates only the pre-theoretic essential intuitions. That is, for a given state to have minimal 
intentionality, we should respect some essential or indispensable intuitions on what is a 
representation. An essential pre-theoretic intuition is precisely the one which a state should 
respect for it to constitute a genuine representation. However, this is not a viable proposal.
 Suppose that you have a set of all pre-theoretic intuitions on minimal intentionality  
and that you are wondering whether a given state is representational. How should we 
distinguish essential from the nonessential intuitions? This is a fundamental problem for this 
proposal. It is hard to determine which intuitions are essential in order to distinguish them from 
non-essential ones. Evidently, the determinacy of essential intuitions should be principled, 
based on a certain criterion. Otherwise the selection of essential intuitions would be plainly 
arbitrary. But it is hard to conceive of a non-arbitrary criterion that satisfies this condition.56   
  It is clear that some intuitions are more entrenched than others in our intuitive 
conception of representations. The more an intuition is entrenched, the more weight it should 
                                                             
56 Furthermore, it is possible that two competing theories posit two distinct kinds of representational states in 
such way that both states respect all but one of the supposed essential intuitions. It would be absurd to claim 
that notwithstanding the explanatory power of positing these representations and the fact that they respect all 
but one intuition, they should not be considered as representations because they violate an essential intuition. 
It is utterly implausible to claim that a supposed essential intuition has this definitive and conclusive power. 
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have on the assessment of proposals for the limits of intentionality. But even among the 
intuitions that are the most entrenched ones, none of them should be necessarily vindicated by 
a theory of cognition for the posited representational states to be representational. There is 
always the possibility that we should consider the posited states as genuinely representational 
even though they do not respect one of our most entrenched intuitions about representations. 
For instance, we should consider them as representations because they respect other intuitions 
which are equally entrenched (as well as other less entrenched intuitions) and because they 
play the relevant explanatory role. All things considered, the explanatory role of the posited 
representation may compensate for its violation of a highly entrenched intuition. But how can 
intuitive and explanatory considerations be put together to develop a demarcation proposal? 
 I think that the only way is via mutual adjustments between intuitions on minimal 
intentionality and the distinctive explanatory role of positing representational states by 
successful cognitive theories. The constraints constituted by intuitions and the explanatory role 
should be both used to assess proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality. On one side, 
the positing of a representational state can adjust the intuitive conception of representation such 
that we can start accepting certain states as genuine representations that we were not disposed 
to accept before. On the other side, the intuitive conception of representation can adjust what 
states should be properly posited as genuine representations such that certain posited states are 
no longer accepted as genuine representations. What I am proposing is a variation of the method 
of reflective equilibrium that was made famous by Nelson Goodman and John Rawls when 
they applied it respectively to the justification of laws of inference in logic and of principles of 
justice.57 My strategy is to adopt a variation of the method of reflective equilibrium to develop 
the appropriate proposal for the limits of intentionality and to assess rival proposals.  
  It is highly unlikely that there is any general rule or principle based on which one can 
                                                             
57 Cf. GOODMAN, 1979, pp. 62-66; RAWLS, 1999, pp. 17-9; 40-46. For a general overview, cf. DANIELS, 2016. 
101 
 
establish the right degree of the extent of which our intuitions on minimal intentionality should 
be respected in the assessment of responses to the problem of demarcation. This is a doomed 
enterprise with no prospect of success. It is more viable to assess each proposal to find out 
which intuitions are vindicated by them, which ones are not and finally to balance it with the 
explanatory role played by the representational states in the theories that posit them. But how 
to balance them? The method of reflective equilibrium is the best way of accomplishing this 
task.58 
  Reflective equilibrium is the method of going back and forth between our judgments 
about particular cases of a subjective matter: the principles that we accept as governing these 
judgements and the theories that we accept as explaining these particular cases and which were 
also based on these judgments and principles. So, in this method, there are three distinct but 
connected elements playing a role, i.e., theories, intuitive principles and judgements. The three 
elements should be revised to achieve coherence among them. There will be reflective 
equilibrium when the revision reaches a state of acceptable coherence. Judgments, principles 
and theories are justified by being brought into agreement with each other via mutual 
adjustments. For instance, intuitive principles are amended if they yield judgments that we are 
not willing to accept; while judgments are rejected if they violate principles that we are not 
willing to amend. The goal of the method of reflective equilibrium is to achieve a state of 
optimal equilibrium, that is, a state in which we are no longer inclined to revise none of the 
judgments, principles and theories since together they have the highest degree of acceptability.
 So far, so good. But how should the method of reflective equilibrium be applied to the 
problem of demarcation? First, we need to specify the intuitive judgments and principles that 
                                                             
58 Ramsey does not propose the adoption of the method of reflective equilibrium which consists in mutual 
adjustments between intuitions and theoretical virtues of positing representational states. But he also claims 
that theories that posit representational states should not be tested by our intuitions based on a general 
principle that determines in advance the extent of which intuitions constitute a constraint to these theories. Cf. 
RAMSEY, 2007, p. 8-14. 
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play a role in this method when applied to the problem of demarcation. After that, we need to 
specify the theories that posit representational states to explain behaviour.  
  The relevant intuitive judgments are judgments about whether specific states are 
intuitively representational or not. We share the intuition that certain states are representational 
(e.g., beliefs, desires, sentences, perceptions, etc.) and that other states are not representational 
(e.g., stones, clouds, energy transference, etc.). These are examples of intuitive judgments 
about the representationality status of specific states. The intuitions are stronger in the cases of 
conscious representational states like beliefs and desires, while in the case of subpersonal states 
(those that pertain not to the person but to a part of the person) like the (supposed) 
representation of edges in V1 of the cerebral cortex posited by neuroscientists are less 
intuitively representational.    
  Intuitive judgments give rise to intuitive principles that a given state should respect to 
constitute a representational state. The recognition that several states that are intuitively 
representational share a given property gives rise to an intuitive principle. The requirement of 
the satisfaction of this property constitutes a principle that a candidate for representational state 
should respect. However, the justification of intuitive principles and judgments goes in both 
ways because there is mutual justification – certain principles justify certain judgments because 
they respect these principles; certain judgements justify certain principles because they give 
rise to these principles. In what follows, I propose the autonomy, complexity and activity 
principles. I then show how certain judgments give rise to them and how they justify certain 
judgments. However, this is not an exhaustive list. Rather, these are the principles that I take 
to be the most entrenched in our intuitive conception of representation. In the next sections I 
assess the intuitiveness of proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality in light of these 
three principles.     
  But before presenting the intuitive principles on the limits of intentionality, it is worth 
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clarifying one issue. In the first chapter, I have proposed two intuitive requirements that 
constitute a basic conception of mental representation – the misrepresentation and original 
intentionality requirements. Evidently, they also constitute the intuitive conception of 
representation. However, here I am considering only those intuitive principles that concern the 
limits of intentionality. They are necessary in order to develop and assess proposals for minimal 
conditions for intentionality. That is, conditions that distinguish, among borderline cases of 
primitive representations, states that are genuinely representational from non-representational 
states. By contrast, in the first chapter I have appealed to the misrepresentation and original 
intentionality requirements to construct a basic notion of what is a mental representation. The 
problem of the limits of intentionality presupposes a basic conception of representation based 
on which one can ask what is the lower border of the states that satisfy this basic notion. In 
sum, the intuitive requirements proposed in the first chapter are concerned with the nature of 
mental representations, while the intuitive principles that I will propose here are different 
because they are concerned with the limits of intentionality. That said, let’s present these 
intuitive principles.    
  First, there is the autonomy principle. A genuine intentional system is an autonomous 
system – the forces responsible for its behaviour originates within the system, not outside. That 
is, intentional systems are self-moving systems. But why is this principle intuitive? This 
principle is present in our judgment that a needle which moves in the direction of the magnet 
is not representing the presence of the magnet in that direction. The needle is not an 
autonomous system, the magnetic forces which causes its movement in the direction of the 
magnet comes not from within the needle, but from outside, i.e., from the magnet.59 By contrast, 
humans, dogs, bees and other organisms are autonomous systems. That is one of the reasons 
                                                             
59 To say that the forces responsible for the behavioural output originate within the system precludes an external 
force to have any influence on its behaviour? Not at all. What matters is that in case of the absence of internal 
forces, there would be no behaviour at all. 
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that their intentional status is intuitive. If the behaviour of the organism is generated from forces 
outside it, then this is not an intentional system. It is a condition for intentionality that the way 
how the organism behaves is not caused from forces that originate outside the system 
(BECKERMANN, 1988, p. 127). The autonomy principle partly justifies the intuitive 
judgements that certain systems are intentional. If it is not intuitively clear that a given sensory 
system is intentional or not (e.g., planarians or paramecia), the recognition of its autonomy tips 
the balance in favour of the judgment that the relevant state is representational.    
  The second intuitive principle is the complexity principle. Systems without a certain 
cognitive complexity are not genuinely intentional. This intuition is highly entrenched in our 
intuitive notion of representation. The intuitiveness of this principle is grounded on the fact 
that it is implausible to claim that unicellular organisms like paramecia and other systems are 
intentional because they lack the minimal complexity required for intentionality. By contrast, 
it is plausible to claim that humans, dogs and other animals are intentional systems precisely 
because they have this minimal cognitive complexity. But what is the exact nature of this 
minimal cognitive complexity? This is an open question. There is no clear-cut line based on 
which it is possible to establish the minimal cognitive complexity that a certain system should 
have for it to be eligible as intentional. Nevertheless, the fact that this is an open question does 
not entail that it is not intuitive that systems without a certain complexity are not 
representational. It does not follow from the fact that there is no strict limit for the extent of 
this cognitive complexity that there is no limit at all. Hence, the complexity principle still 
stands. Finally, just like what happens with the autonomy principle, the complexity principle 
(partly) justifies the intuitive judgements that certain systems are intentional. If it is not 
intuitively clear that a given system is intentional, the recognition that this system has a certain 
cognitive complexity makes it more intuitively representational.     
  Finally, the third principle is the activity principle (BECKERMANN, 1988, p. 130). 
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Consider a system that has a certain cognitive complexity and the forces responsible for its 
behaviour are internal. Nevertheless, the system is deprived of any active role – it is wholly 
passive. The relevant state is just automatically triggered by the presence of the external feature 
and the state automatically triggers the behavioural output. But what is the distinction between 
active and passive systems? Paradigmatic cases of passive systems are tropistic systems like 
amoebas and paramecia (i.e., systems that moves in a certain direction in a direct response to a 
given external stimulus). The passivity comes from the fact that their behavioural output is 
automatically activated by the respective specific stimuli. But why is the activity principle 
intuitive?   
  I think that this principle is intuitive because the notion of one state representing another 
state carries with it the idea that representing is not just to receive input stimuli from some 
external feature or just to be in some basic relation with it (isomorphism, correlation, etc.). That 
is why it is not intuitive that the mercury volume represents temperature even though it receives 
input stimuli from the environment and there is a strong correlation between the mercury 
volume and the temperature when the temperature increases or decreases. In the same vein, it 
is counter-intuitive that a random drawing in a sheet of paper represents a galaxy far away (or 
vice versa) simply because there is an isomorphic relation between them. Behind these 
judgments lies the intuition that representing is an activity of an intentional system. The mere 
covariation or isomorphism requires no active role from the system. For one state to represent 
another is for it to play an active role. That role may be fulfilled in different ways, but some 
active role is always required. Finally, the activity principle (partly) justifies the intuitive 
judgements that certain systems are intentional. If it is not intuitively clear that a given system 
is intentional, the recognition that this system plays an active role makes it more intuitively 
representational.     
  But what is the difference between the activity and autonomy principles? Are they 
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really different? It is possible for a given system to be autonomous but play no active role, but 
an active system cannot be not autonomous. That is, every active system is autonomous, but 
there are autonomous systems that are not active. If the system plays some active role, then its 
behavioural output cannot be entirely caused by forces outside the system. After all, if there is 
no relevant internal force, no active role may be played. It is required for the system to have 
some active role that its internal forces are (partly) responsible for the behavioural output. For 
the system to make any difference for the resulting behaviour, it should have some force to 
affect the behaviour and that is not possible in case of the behaviour is fully generated by forces 
outside the system. In sum, the activity principle is more demanding than the autonomy 
principle. Let me illustrate it with a system that is autonomous but wholly passive.  
  Paramecia are unicellular ciliated organisms that are highly sensitive to the presence of 
light: whenever there is light in the surrounding environment, they move in the opposite 
direction of it. This phenomenon is called tropism, i.e., the turning of the organism (or parts of 
it) in a given direction in response to the presence of a certain external stimulus. Paramecia and 
other autonomous are self-moving systems: the forces responsible for the paramecium moving 
away from light are not (wholly) originated outside the system (e.g., in the light). Nevertheless, 
tropistic systems are wholly passive: they do not have any active role in the resulting avoidance 
or approaching behavioural output towards the relevant stimulus. That is the case because 
tropistic systems move as long as the relevant stimulus is present, but when it ceases, the system 
immediately stops. The behaviour is fully chained to the stimulus. But how may the system 
have any relevant active role if its behavioural output is fully chained to the presence of a 
specific stimulus? The behaviour is wholly determined by the presence of the stimulus. Hence, 
the conclusion that even though tropistic systems respect the autonomy principle – they are 
self-moving systems – they do not respect the activity principle – they are fully passive.   
  So far, so good. On one hand, the complexity, autonomy and activity intuitive principles 
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are behind some judgments that we have about some representational states; on the other hand, 
these principles partly justify the judgments that some states are representational. Together they 
constitute the intuitive constraint on proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality. The 
intuitive judgments and principles are the first two elements playing a role in the application 
of the reflective equilibrium to the problem of demarcation. What about the third element, that 
is, the cognitive theories that posit representational states to explain behaviour?   
  These are the theories from cognitive science and other sciences of mind that posit 
representational states to explain behaviour. There are cognitive theories that posit 
representational states to explain the behavioural output of rats, vervet monkeys, honeybees, 
great apes, etc.60 But how do these theories constitute a constraint on proposals for minimal 
conditions for intentionality? The posit of a representational state by a cognitive theory is 
supposed to play a distinctive explanatory role, i.e., it should have an explanatory power that 
justifies its positing. After all, if the positing of a representational state fails to have any 
explanatory purchase (and hence the intentional and non-intentional explanations have the 
same explanatory powers), then the non-intentional explanation should be preferred in virtue 
of considerations of ontological parsimony. If a given demarcation proposal considers certain 
states as representational but these states don’t play the distinctive explanatory role of 
representational states in cognitive theories, it follows that this proposal should be rejected. But 
what is the distinctive explanatory power of representational states in cognitive theories that 
justifies positing their existence? After all, if explanatory considerations constitute a constraint 
on proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality, how we are supposed to assess them if 
we don’t know beforehand what is the explanatory power of representational states?   
  I don’t think that a previous specification of the explanatory power of representational 
states is required for the assessment of demarcation proposals. Indeed, I think that a full 
                                                             
60  Cf. O’KEEFE & NADEL, 1978; SEYFARTH et al., 1980; VON FRISCH, 1967; CALL & TOMASELLO, 2007.  
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specification of the explanatory power of representational states goes hand in hand with the 
assessment of minimal conditions for intentionality. Hence, I adopt the following strategy. I 
assess the minimal conditions for intentionality established by each demarcation proposal by 
asking whether the limits of intentionality that it draws is explanatorily justified. Each proposal 
provides an explanatory justification for establishing minimal conditions. The idea is precisely 
to assess whether this is the genuine explanatory power of representational states. Does the 
relevant proposal give rise to a supposed intentional explanation that has an explanatory power 
different from the non-intentional explanation? Or does it give rise to an explanation that 
ultimately does not have an explanatory power distinctive from the non-intentional 
explanation? I conclude that the assessed demarcation proposals are not explanatorily justified. 
After this negative stage, I develop my own proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality 
– the dual proposal – that is explanatorily justified since it is grounded on what I take to be the 
genuine explanatory power of representational states.    
  A consequence of this approach is that it does not follow from the fact that a given 
successful cognitive theory posits a certain state as a representational that it is genuinely 
representational. The reason is that there is always the possibility that the relevant state does 
not play the distinctive explanatory role of representational states and hence its positing as a 
representation is not explanatorily justified. It is precisely the job of the philosopher of mental 
representation to deal with this fundamental problem on the nature of intentionality. In fact, 
cognitive scientists and other scientists of the mind usually do not really assess this problem; 
rather, they just assume the notion of representational state in the development of the scientific 
investigation. As Stephen Palmer observes, ‘‘we, as cognitive psychologists, do not really 
understand our concepts of representation. We propose them, and talk about them, argue about 
them, and try to obtain evidence in support of them, but we do not understand them in any 
fundamental sense’’ (PALMER, 1978, p. 259). The philosopher’s job is precisely to provide a 
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full theoretical understanding of the nature of representational states by making the 
clarifications and implications of the notion of representationality. That is, to provide a 
characterization of intentional explanations and how they differ from the non-intentional 
explanations, a characterization of representational states and how they are distinct from non-
representational ones, the specification of the distinctive explanatory purchase of 
representational states, and so on.   
  The intuitive conception of representation provides the judgments and principles that 
constitutes the intuitive constraint on proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality, while 
the distinctive explanatory role of representational states in cognitive theories constitutes the 
explanatory constraint on demarcation proposals. But how do these two constraints interact? 
How may one constraint suppress the other in the context of mutual adjustments that 
characterizes the reflective equilibrium?     
  Consider, for example, the scientific discovery of the chemical composition of gold. 
Before that, people held an intuitive conception of gold – it was whatever intuitively looked 
like gold, functioned like gold, etc. Such a conception provides paradigmatic cases of gold 
picked out by our intuitions on gold – e.g., the substance that constitutes certain crowns, 
medals, and other artefacts, the substance that has certain chemical reactions, etc. These 
paradigmatic cases of gold are based on human practices and common sense related to gold. 
However, the development of chemistry led to the discovery that gold is the chemical element 
‘Au’ with an atomic number of 79. That discovery entailed that several substances that 
previously were intuitively thought to be gold actually were not gold since they did not have 
an atomic number of 79. Fool’s gold (iron pyrite) cases are notorious examples. But why fool’s 
gold is not gold since it looks intuitively like gold? Maybe this is not a scientific discovery 
about gold, but about another substance since gold just is that substance that for centuries 
people considered as gold (i.e., both gold and fool’s gold).  
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   That objection, however, is implausible. The scientist’s job is precisely to specify the 
chemical composition of the substances that are paradigmatic cases of gold. In the middle of 
the scientific investigation, it was discovered that the majority of the paradigmatic cases of 
gold are composed of the chemical element Au, but a minority has a different chemical 
composition and so are not genuinely gold – no matter if they intuitively look like gold. We 
can make this distinction based on the explanatory role of identifying gold with the element 
Au in the overall scientific theory. Such discovery has an explanatory significance that justifies 
ruling out the minority cases as genuinely gold. This identification has the explanatory 
purchase of unifying all things that are constituted of the element Au as gold. Based on it, 
science establishes that on one hand, there are substances that we previously thought as not 
being gold that are gold since they are Au, and on the other hand, there are substances that we 
previously thought as being gold that are not gold because they are not the element Au. This 
explanatory criterion constitutes a reason strong enough for trumping the counter-intuitive 
consequences of the identification of gold with the element Au like ruling out of certain 
intuitive instances of gold as genuinely gold (fool’s gold) or including certain substances as 
gold that do not intuitively look like it.   
  The discovery of the composition of gold is an instance of the following scientific 
investigation. Intuitions pick out the paradigmatic cases of a given substance and further 
scientific investigation leads to the discovery of the constitutive nature of this substance that 
entails the revision of some paradigmatic cases that were the starting point of this very 
investigation as not genuine instances of the substance. That conclusion is based on the 
explanatory role played by the discovered constitutive nature in the end of the scientific process 
(in the gold’s case, the elemental structure of Au). That is, the scientific investigation of what 
constitutes these paradigmatic cases leads to the discovery of the constitutive nature shared by 
a majority but not all paradigmatic cases, which entails the elimination of these minority cases 
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as genuine instances of the relevant substance. Besides gold, that same scientific process was 
the case with the discovery of the composition of water (H2O), the elemental structure of silver 
(Ag) and other substances.   
  This process of scientific investigation is analogous to how intuitive and explanatory 
considerations constitute constraints for demarcation proposals and interact such that one may 
trump the other (and vice versa). The investigation starts with paradigmatic cases of 
representational states picked out by the intuitive conception of representations (e.g., 
representational states at the personal level and more simple ones) as well as with intuitive 
principles on representational states. In parallel, there are paradigmatic cases of 
representational states posited by successful cognitive theories (e.g., representational states in 
rats, vervet monkeys, honeybees, etc.). Based on these paradigmatic cases, one engages into 
the philosophical investigation to specify what is the distinctive explanatory power of 
representational states. Each proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality specifies what 
it takes to be the distinctive explanatory role of representational states. It should then be 
assessed whether it is explanatorily justified, i.e., whether the specified explanatory role is in 
fact the distinctive explanatory role of representational states. Note that the intuitive principles 
and the paradigmatic cases are required not only for the identification of the subject matter of 
the investigation – minimal intentionality – but also for the specification of the explanatory 
role. After all, if there are no paradigmatic cases, the subject matter of the investigation is up 
on the air – it may turn out that the investigation is not about representational states anymore. 
In sum, the paradigmatic cases are the starting point of the investigation of such explanatory 
role of representational states. 
  Just like what happened with the case of gold, the specification of the distinctive 
explanatory role may rule out certain paradigmatic cases as genuine representational states, as 
well as include other states as genuinely representational. However, different from what 
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happens on the case of gold, intuitions may rule out certain states as representational even 
though they play the specified explanatory role. In each demarcation proposal, it should be 
assessed whether the specified explanatory role of representational states suppress or does not 
suppress its supposed counter-intuitive consequences. The ultimate goal is that the proposal 
that results from mutual adjustments between the intuitive and explanatory constraints reaches 
an optimal equilibrium in which the proposal is defensible in light of both intuitive and 
explanatory considerations.  
  The appropriate demarcation proposal is justified by being brought into agreement with 
the intuitive and explanatory constraints via mutual adjustments. That means that on one hand, 
an intuitive judgment or principle is rejected if it violates the positing of representational states 
by a cognitive theory that play an explanatory role that we are unwilling to reject. On the other 
hand, positing of representational states by a theory should be rejected if it yields assignments 
of representational status to states that we are not intuitively disposed to accept as genuinely 
representational. Intuitive judgments, principles and the positing of representational states by 
cognitive theories are revised via mutual judgments, going back and forth on what these 
constraints dictate until they are harmonious.  
  We can illustrate such mutual adjustments in the following ways. Suppose that we have 
a certain intuitive judgment that a given state is not genuinely representational. Nevertheless, 
on one hand, this state is posited by a successful cognitive theory and it plays the distinctive 
explanatory role; on the other hand, it respects several intuitive principles and the intuitive 
judgment that it violates is not highly entrenched in our intuitive conception of representation. 
It is plausible to adjust the intuitive constraint by setting aside this intuition. That is, the non-
intuitive aspects of a posited representational state should be sufficiently compensated by the 
explanatory role of positing this state. If so, it becomes plausible that it is a genuine 
representation. Now suppose that there is a cognitive theory that posits a certain state as a 
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representation. Nevertheless, on the one hand, this state does not respect several intuitions that 
are highly entrenched in our intuitive conception of representation; on the other hand, the 
positing of this state as a representation does not play an indispensable explanatory role. 
Therefore, it is plausible to reject the assignment of a representational status to this state.   
  It is expected that the appropriate demarcation proposal is the one vindicated by these 
intuitive and explanatory constraints in the end of this process of mutual adjustments. That will 
be the optimal state: there is an optimal equilibrium between the intuitive principles and the 
explanatory role of representational states posited by cognitive sciences. But how can one be 
assured that this optimal state is achievable after all? The fact is that there is no assurance 
beforehand. Only in the end of this process is that one can give a secure response to this 
question.  
  The method of reflective equilibrium provides a plausible way to deal with the second 
methodological problem on the status of intuitions: is the intuitive conception of representation 
inconsistent? Inconsistency is always a real threat when dealing with a conception of a given 
phenomenon which has not passed through the sieve of a rigorous theoretical investigation on 
the nature of this phenomenon. That is the case of intuitive conceptions in general and of the 
intuitive conception of representation in particular. In fact, there are several candidates of 
inconsistent intuitive views. As an illustration, I will briefly describe what some take to be an 
inconsistency on our intuitive conception of free will.    
  Galen Strawson and others have argued that there is an inconsistency between our 
intuitions on free will. A free action is an action for which the agent is truly responsible for it. 
Determinism is the view that every event (in conjunction with the laws of nature) is causally 
necessitated by antecedent events. We have an intuitive conception of free will according to 
which free actions are not determinate and not random. We cannot have free actions if our 
actions are wholly determined by causes anterior to our existence. But if our actions are not 
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determined, we cannot have free actions either. That is the case because if our actions are not 
determined, then they would be totally or partly random, but we cannot be responsible for our 
actions if they are random. The conclusion is that free will is incompatible with both 
determinism and indeterminism: there is an inconsistency between the intuition that free 
actions are not determinate and the intuition that free actions are not random.61  
  However, even assuming that there are potential incompatibilities among our intuitions 
on the limits of intentionality, it does not follow that they cannot constitute a genuine constraint 
on demarcation proposals. The reason is that these potential inconsistencies may be fixed by 
the mutual adjustments between intuitive and explanatory constraints that characterize the 
method of reflective equilibrium. In this revision process, inconsistent intuitions may be fixed 
via the rejection or modification of one or more intuitions. Alternatively, in the end of the 
theoretical investigation of the limits of intentionality, we may find out that the relevant 
intuitions are not incompatible at all. The worry that they are inconsistent is explained away. 
Thus, the concern that the intuitive conception of representation is inconsistent is not a reason 
to throw away the intuitive constraint on proposals for the limits of intentionality.62  
  Let me finally describe my strategy of adopting the method of reflective equilibrium in 
order to develop my proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality. It is divided into two 
stages. The first one is negative: it is the assessment and rejection of two demarcation 
proposals, the causal independence proposal in the next section (FODOR, 1986; 
BECKERMANN, 1988) and the constancy mechanism proposal (BURGE, 2010, pp. 292-308; 
STERELNY, 1995; RESCORLA, 2013). I assess them in light of both the explanatory and 
                                                             
61 Cf. STRAWSON, 1986, p. 25-6. This argument, however, is contentious. There is a whole literature on free will 
and determinism and It is not my goal to assess this argument here. I have just presented it to illustrate a 
candidate of inconsistent intuitive conception of a given phenomenon. 
62 But what if our intuitions are so utterly inconsistent that they cannot be fixed? The answer to this question 
cannot be given in advance. Only in light of the possible inconsistent intuitions is that this question is answerable. 
But the fact that they may be fixed via mutual adjustments is enough to show that possible inconsistencies are 
not a reason for an a priori rejection of intuitions as a genuine constraint on demarcation proposals. 
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intuitive constraints, but primarily focused on the explanatory constraint. I have previously 
defended the autonomy, complexity and activity principles as the most entrenched principles 
in our intuitive conception of representation. But what is the nature of the distinctive 
explanatory role that constitutes the explanatory constraint? This is a hard problem that will 
occupy us in much of what follows.   
   Fodor and Beckermann propose that it is a minimal condition for intentionality that the 
relevant state is causally independent of the external condition which it supposedly represents. 
This demarcation proposal gives rise to the objection that teleosemantics and many other 
naturalist theories are too liberal since they treat certain states that are not causally independent 
of the relevant external condition as genuine representations. By contrast, Burge, Sterelny and 
Rescorla objects that teleosemantics and many other naturalist theories are too liberal by 
appealing to the constancy mechanism proposal. According to this proposal, it is a minimal 
condition for intentionality that a system employs constancy mechanisms in the production of 
representational states. Since teleosemantics and many other naturalist theories treat certain 
systems that do not employ such constancy mechanism as genuinely representational, it follows 
that these theories are too liberal. I argue that these proposals fail to specify the distinctive 
explanatory role of representational states and hence that they are not explanatorily justified. 
Finally, they are not intuitive on relevant aspects and since there is no explanatory argument to 
compensate it, the conclusion is that these proposals should be rejected.     
  The next chapter is wholly dedicated to the positive stage. There I develop my own 
proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality – the dual proposal. I start by developing 
the success pattern proposal. However, this proposal is flawed because the success pattern 
condition is too liberal on the requirements for positing of representational states to be 
explanatorily justified. It is also too liberal in light of the intuitive principles for a state to be 
representational. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the success pattern proposal as dictated by 
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the mutual adjustments that characterize the method of reflective equilibrium. I revise it by 
adding another minimal condition for intentionality – the constancy mechanism condition. The 
result is the dual proposal for the limits of intentionality that establishes two minimal conditions 
– the success pattern and the constancy mechanism conditions. I then argue that the dual 
proposal establishes the distinctive explanatory role of representational states and so is 
explanatorily justified. Furthermore, it is immune to the objections that I raise to the causal 
independence and the constancy mechanism proposals, even though it establishes a variation 
of the constancy mechanism condition that was proposed by the constancy mechanism 
proposal. Finally, I argue that the dual proposal vindicates the intuitive conception of 
representation. The result will be the optimal state in the revisionary process of the method of 
reflective equilibrium. The mutual adjustments between the explanatory role of positing 
representations and the intuitive conception of representation reaches the optimal equilibrium 
in which we are not inclined to revise the resulting proposal anymore, i.e., the dual proposal. 
 
3.4 The causal independence proposal  
  Jerry Fodor and Ansgar Beckermann have proposed that a given state is not a genuine 
representation unless there is a causal independence between the external stimulus which 
triggers the tokening of the state and the output behaviour triggered by the state. The criterion 
is that if there is a causal dependency between the tokening of the relevant stimulus and the 
tokening of the supposed representational state (and hence with the output behaviour), then this 
is not a genuine representational state. But if there is no such causal dependence, then it 
becomes plausible to attribute a representational status to the relevant state.63 That is the causal 
independence proposal (FODOR, 1986; BECKERMANN, 1988).   
  Consider tropistic systems like amoeba and paramecia. Are paramecia genuinely 
                                                             
63 Note that this is not a sufficient condition for intentionality, but rather a minimal condition for intentionality. 
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representing the presence of light when they have an avoidance behaviour towards it? Or they 
are just indicating or registering, not genuinely representing the presence of light? Generalising 
the question, do tropistic systems really represent the relevant external stimuli that triggers the 
token of the supposed representational states and thus the subsequent responsive behaviours?64 
  According to the causal independence proposal, tropistic systems like paramecia are 
not genuine intentional systems. The problem is that the there is a causal dependence between 
the presence of the external stimulus and the triggering of the internal state. That is, there is a 
causal relation which establishes that the presence of the external stimulus is the cause of the 
tokening of the state and so of the production of the relevant behaviour. For instance, there is 
a causal relation between the presence of light in the surrounding environment of the 
paramecium and the tokening of the internal state and the avoidance behaviour. Hence, the 
paramecium’s internal state is not a genuine representation of light. This is a deep contrast with 
genuine representational systems in which the relation between the relevant external stimulus 
and the tokening of the representational state is not causal. The causal independence proposal 
claims that a given sensory state is genuinely representational only if there is a causal 
independence between the relevant stimulus and the tokening of the state (and hence with the 
response behaviour). That is, it is possible in a given situation to have the external stimulus but 
not the relevant state, since they are not causally dependent. 
  But what is the nature of this causal dependence? Here Fodor and Beckermann diverge. 
Fodor claims that it is a lawful relation – a natural law which establishes that the presence of 
the relevant external condition causes the tokening of the internal state and hence the triggering 
of the response behaviour. There is a lawful covariation between the presence of the external 
condition which constitutes the external stimulus and the production of the sensory state which 
ultimately triggers the output behaviour. In Fodor’s words, “any system that can respond 
                                                             
64 Here I am just conceding, for the sake of the argument, that tropistic systems have genuine behaviour.  
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selectively to nonnomic properties is, intuitively speaking, a plausible candidate for the 
ascription of mental representations; and any system that can’t, isn’t” (FODOR, 1986, p. 11). 
Thus, the fundamental distinction is that non-intentional systems respond to properties of the 
relevant external condition in a nomological way, while intentional systems respond to 
properties of the external condition in a non-nomological way.65   
  In contrast, Beckermann rejects this non-nomic requirement and maintains that for a 
system to be intentional it is required that there is no causal dependence, regardless whether 
there is a natural law supporting it or not.66 That is, the system is intentional provided that there 
is no causal dependence between the tokening of the internal state and the relevant external 
condition, no matter whether such dependence is nomological or not.67 Hence, Beckermann 
and Fodor provide different formulations of the causal independence proposal. In what follows, 
I put aside this controversy and assess the general formulation of the proposal according to 
which a state is representational only if there is no causal dependence between its tokening and 
the presence of the relevant stimulus. After all, if it turns out that causal independence is not a 
minimal condition for intentionality, it makes no difference whether the relevant causal 
dependence relation is nomological or not.68  
  What are the arguments supporting the causal dependence proposal? Consider a 
situation in which there is a covariation between the response behaviour of a system and the 
presence of a given external condition. There is no causal dependence between the response 
                                                             
65 Fodor has since changed his position, but the extent of this change is not clear, cf. FODOR, 1991, p. 257. 
66 “In my eyes, however, that is [Fodor’s non-nomic requirement] asking too much. For, as I see it, the basic 
criterion is not that a behaviour which constitutes a selective response to a specific feature of the environment 
cannot be caused by this feature but that it is in fact not caused by it.” (BECKERMANN, 1988, p. 140). 
67 Fodor’s nomological requirement is susceptible to counter-examples. For instance, Kim Sterelny has noted 
that desert isopods can distinguish their relatives through chemical cues and being a relative of isopod number 
47,012 is not a nomic property. But it is highly implausible to attribute intentionality to desert isopods (cf. 
STERELNY, 1995, p. 251 - 270). Moreover, Louise Antony and Joseph Levine have pointed out that Fodor’s 
distinction of nomic and nonnomic properties is problematic (cf. ANTONY & LEVINE, 1991, pp. 3-7). 
68 This general formulation of the proposal is not committed to the thesis that causes necessitate their effects. 
So, for any two events x and y, there is at least one situation in which x is the case, but not y. 
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behaviour and the external state, that is, the external condition does not cause the responsive 
behaviour. But if there is no causal dependence, why is there such covariation? What explains 
the fact that there is a covariation between the response behaviour and the external condition 
given that there is no causal relation at all? Notice that there is no third state which causes the 
presence of the external condition and the responsive behaviour.   
  The explanation of this fact, argues Fodor and Beckermann, is not a non-intentional 
explanation, but an intentional one. The best available explanation consists in positing a 
representational state which represents the external condition and triggers the response 
behaviour. There is a covariance between the external condition and the response behaviour 
because the system has a state which represents the external condition and the tokening of the 
state triggers the response behaviour. But the relation between the system’s state and the 
external condition is not causal – the external condition does not cause the tokening of the state. 
Rather, there is a semantic relation between them which explains why there is a covariation 
even though not a causal relation. Therefore, the semantic relation between the system’s state 
and the external condition is what explains this covariation. Namely, the covariation between 
(i) the external condition and (ii) the tokening of the system’s state and the subsequent output 
behaviour. The explanation of the mystery of the non-causal covariation between the external 
state and the response is “the great evolutionary problem that mental representation was invited 
to solve” (FODOR, 1986, p. 14).   
  But what is this semantic relation? How is it possible? Fodor and Beckermann argue 
that the intentional system infers from the presence of a certain property (or properties) of the 
environment which is causally related to the system, the presence of other environmental 
property that is not causally related to the system. That relation between the system’s state and 
the non-causally related property of the environment constitutes the semantic relation between 
them, with the system’s state representing the property. The inference is what Fodor calls a 
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“selection” and Beckermann calls a “choice” (FODOR, 1986, p. 11; BECKERMANN, p. 132).  
  The idea is that the intentional system makes a perceptual inference from the presence 
of a certain property (or properties) in the environment to which the system is causally related, 
to the presence of another environmental property to which the system is not causally related. 
That latter property, not the former, is the one which is represented by the system. The 
perceptual inference is responsible for the tokening of the representational state and ultimately 
for the triggering of the behavioural response. But how does this inference occur? Typically 
(but not exclusively) the inference occurs via a covariation between the causally related and 
the non-causally related properties of environment in the sense that the indication of the 
presence of the first property leads the system to infer the presence of the second property.69 
 In sum, the explanation of the covariance between the external condition and the 
responsive behaviour despite the absence of a causal relation between them is the existence of 
the system’s representational state. The representation is not causally related to the external 
condition but nevertheless represents it via an appropriate inference which ultimately triggers 
the responsive behaviour. The inference bridges the gap between the properties of the 
environment that are causally related to the system70 and the properties of the environment that 
are not causally related to the system. Hence, the positing of an internal representational state 
is explanatory justified because it plays a crucial and indispensable explanatory role in the 
explanation of the covariance between the external state and the response behaviour of the 
system.   
  But when is the positing of a representational state not explanatorily justified? Precisely 
                                                             
69 Considering the represented property O of an external object S by a given intentional system, “presumably 
such [perceptual] inferences exploit information from memory as well as information about the detected [...] 
properties of S; in the typical [..] case, this would be information to the effect that the [detected] properties 
cohabit with property O, so that the detection of the former provides a reliable index of the presence of the 
latter” (FODOR, 1986, p. 14). This is the so called “perceptual inference” of classical intentional psychology. 
70 Since we are talking about the relevant stimulus to which a tropistic system is causally sensible, the properties 
of the external condition to which tropistic systems are causally related are not distal, but proximal properties.  
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when there is a non-intentional relation between the response behaviour of a system and a given 
external condition. In this case, the explanation of the covariance is clearly causal – the 
presence of the external state causes the response behaviour. That is what happens in tropistic 
systems – there is a causal connection between the response behaviour of the tropistic system 
and the presence of the external condition. Since the non-intentional explanation fully explains 
the behaviour of the tropistic system – nothing is left to be explained – then the appeal to any 
intentional notion in order to explain the system’s behaviour is not required. So, paramecia 
have avoidance behaviour when there is an appropriate light in the surrounding environment 
because the light directly causes the avoidance behaviour. That is a non-intentional 
explanation, it does not appeal to any intentional notion. Hence, the positing of the 
representational state in cases where there is a causal connection between the external condition 
and the system’s response behaviour is dispensable. It does not satisfy the explanatory 
requirement and so fails to earn its explanatory keep. In light of the ontological parsimony 
requirement, given that intentional and non-intentional explanations of the system have the 
same explanatory power, it follows that the non-intentional one should be preferred.  
  The causal independence proposal seems prima facie to be plausible. It draws a 
distinctive and clear-cut line between genuine representational systems and tropistic systems 
by appealing to a plausible criterion of causal independence that constitutes the explanatory 
role of representational states. What could be wrong with it? Before assessing this proposal, it 
is necessary to make the following elucidation.  
   The problem whether tropistic systems are genuinely intentional may be characterised 
as the question whether the system’s state constitutes a representation of the external stimulus. 
It assumes that there is an intermediate internal state between the presence of the relevant 
stimulus and the tropistic system’s behavioural output and asks whether such state is 
representational or not. However, this characterization leaves out a third possibility – maybe 
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there is no intermediate state at all; the presence of the relevant stimulus directly causes the 
behavioural output. Hence, the problem may also be characterised as the question whether there 
is an intermediate internal state, and if so, whether it represents or does not represent the 
relevant stimulus. Here there is no assumption of an intermediate internal state and the door is 
open for three different responses: (i) there is an intermediate internal state which represents 
the relevant stimulus; (ii) there is an intermediate internal state but it does not represent the 
relevant stimulus (maybe it is just a sensory state that registers or indicates such stimulus); (iii) 
there is no intermediate internal state. In what follows, I do not commit myself to either the 
assumption that there is an intermediate internal state (representational or not), or with the 
assumption that there is no intermediate internal state. Thus, I characterise the problem as 
whether tropistic systems are intentional or not. In case in which they are not intentional, there 
is still the possibilities that there is or not an intermediate internal state.71   
  That said, let us assess the core claim of the causal independence proposal. The 
system’s state represents a causally independent external condition because (i) the system 
infers its presence from the presence of a second external condition; and (ii) there is a 
covariation between these conditions and this second condition is causally related to the 
system. But if so, why not claim that a system’s state that is caused by an external condition 
which by its turn is caused by a second external condition represents this second condition? 
That is, why not claim that the system’s state represents the condition in the end of this causal 
chain, namely, the second external condition? This case, however, is easily ruled out by the 
causal independence proposal. If the system’s state I is caused by external condition A which 
is caused by external condition B, then I is caused by B and so there is a causal dependence 
that rules out I as a representation of B. So, the proposal rules out the intentionality of direct 
                                                             
71 Notice that the fact that there is no intermediate sensory state is fully compatible with the fact that there are 
other intermediate internal states that trigger behaviour but are neither representational nor sensorial.  
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causal dependence (i.e., X is not a representation of Y because X is caused by Y) and also of 
indirect causal dependence (X is not a representation of Z because X is caused by Y that is 
caused by Z).   
  So far, so good. Now suppose that in a given situation I and B are both tokened but not 
A. For instance, a situation in which I and B are tokened by another external condition C that 
independently causes I and B but does not cause A. So, in this case there is no indirect causal 
relation between I and B. That is, there is no single causal chain connecting I and B. Rather, 
there are two distinct causal chains responsible for their tokens. Now notice that an indirect 
causal dependence is a weaker causal dependence relation than a direct one. Finally, one can 
weaken the indirect causal relation even further by stipulating that the causal chain is not 
constituted by only three states, but by four, five states, etc. But then it becomes implausible to 
claim that intentionality is ruled out in indirect causal dependence cases but not in the above 
non-causal covariation scenario. If even such weaker causal dependence rules out 
intentionality, why does the covariation relation not also rule out intentionality? What is the 
fundamental difference between them? It is implausible to say that this is so because the weaker 
causal dependence is a stronger relation than the covariation relation since the possibility of a 
perfect covariation relation is not excluded. So, why does the weaker causal dependence rule 
out intentionality, but a perfect covariation relation does not rule it out? It is not a good reason 
to claim that this is the case because the weaker causal dependence is still a stronger relation 
than a perfect correlation. I think that this is problematic for the causal independence proposal, 
but it does not constitute a knock-down objection. A stronger objection is required to 
demonstrate that this proposal is not viable. In what follows, I present what I take to be the 
fundamental problem with it.   
  Fodor and Beckerman are right in claiming that in cases where the behaviour of the 
relevant system is fully explainable in non-intentional terms, the positing of the system as 
124 
 
intentional is dispensable. There is nothing missing in the explanation of the system’s 
behaviour that could justify the assignment of a representational state to it. However, what is 
crucial for the conclusion that tropistic systems are non-intentional is not that the relevant states 
are causally dependent on the stimuli that trigger their tokens. Rather, it is that positing these 
states as representations plays no distinctive role in the explanation of tropistic behavioural 
outputs.  
  The fundamental distinction between tropistic and genuine intentional systems does not 
rest on the fact that genuine representations are causally independent from the properties of the 
external environment which they represent, but rather on the fact that the positing of some 
internal state as a representation plays a distinctive role in the explanation of the system’s 
behaviour. To illustrate this view, consider a mechanical system which drains the water of a 
bathtub whenever it is full. In order to do it, the drain system has a sensor which detects the 
level of water in the bathtub and thus whenever the sensor indicates that the bathtub is full, the 
system starts to drain the water. Therefore, the stimulus which activates the drain system is a 
certain amount of water in the bathtub.72 Does the system really represent this stimulus?   
  It is absurd to defend this conclusion precisely because you can fully explain how the 
drain system works without positing that it is an intentional system which represents the 
amount of water inside the bathtub. The attribution of intentionality to the drain system plays 
no explanatory role in the explanation of how this system works. The case of tropistic systems 
is analogous: in both cases, the fundamental reason that the systems are not genuinely 
intentional is not that the internal states are causally dependent on the relevant stimulus, but 
                                                             
72 Alternatively, in order to avoid the commitment with an intermediate state between the stimulus and the 
drain of water which constitutes the sensor of water, one may just suppose that the bathtub has a hole with the 
appropriate size to prevent the leaking of water. In this case, the state of the bathtub being full of water would 
directly cause pouring of water via this hole.    
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rather that the positing of a representational state is explanatory idle.73 The non-intentional 
explanation fully explains their behavioural outputs, nothing is left to be explained by the 
intentional explanation. That is the fundamental reason that tropistic systems are not genuinely 
intentional.   
  Finally, causal dependence is only one of the reasons that positing a given system as 
representational does not play the explanatory role. Notice that there are situations in which 
the positing of an internal state as a representation plays no explanatory role even though it is 
causally independent of the stimulus which triggers it. In addition to causal dependence, there 
are other reasons for the positing of an internal state as representational to be explanatory idle.  
  Let’s consider the tokening of a system’s internal state that covaries with a given 
external condition, but nevertheless the presence of this external condition does not cause the 
tokening of the state. Now suppose that there is a second external condition that causes both 
the first external condition and the tokening of the system’s internal state. Hence, there is no 
causal dependence between the internal state and the first external condition. Furthermore, by 
coincidence, the tokening of the internal state makes the system to move in the direction of the 
first external condition. So, does the internal state represents the first external condition? Isn’t 
the approaching behaviour of the system towards the first external condition a strong evidence 
that the system represents it? Not at all. The system’s behaviour is fully explainable by the non-
intentional explanation. What happens is that the non-intentional explanation that appeals to 
the second external condition to explain the system’s behaviour has the same explanatory 
power as the intentional explanation that posits the system as representing the first external 
condition. Therefore, the conclusion is that positing the internal state as a representation of the 
first external condition is explanatory idle, even though there is no causal dependence between 
                                                             
73 Evidently, both cases are highly distinct in relation to the question whether intuitively they are intentional 
systems or not. But here I am focusing on the explanatory aspect of positing that these systems are intentional. 




  This is only one example of a situation in which the explanatory requirement for 
positing an internal state as representational is not satisfied for a reason other than causal 
dependence. In this case, the relevant reason is that there is a mere covariation of the internal 
state and the first external condition in virtue of a second external condition, which causes the 
tokening of both in a complete independent way.74 Causal dependence is just one of the reasons 
that the positing of a system’s internal state as a representation may be explanatorily idle and 
so the ultimate and fundamental distinction of representational states from tropistic and similar 
states does not lie on the distinction between causal dependence and independence, but rather 
on the distinction between the explanatory idleness and the explanatory power of positing of 
internal state as representational. Contra Fodor and Beckerman, that is the condition for 
minimal intentionality that one should keep an eye on.   
  But there is a problem behind this verdict that positing certain systems as intentional is 
explanatorily idle which was still not properly answered. What is the precise nature of a 
justified appeal to an intentional explanation of the behaviour of a given system? That is, what 
is the distinctive explanatory role that positing a representational state should play for it to be 
explanatorily justified? It could be objected that only in light of the specification of such 
distinctive explanatory role is that it is possible to conclude that positing certain systems as 
intentional is not explanatorily justified. So, it is not possible to determine that positing tropistic 
systems as intentional systems is explanatorily idle. However, this objection is not viable.  
  The previous specification of the distinctive explanatory role of representational states 
                                                             
74 It could be replied that in this example the causal dependence between the internal state and the second 
external condition is the reason that positing the internal state as representational is explanatory idle. That is 
true but note that the causal independence proposal claims that a state is not a representation of an external 
condition provided that the former is causally dependent on the latter. This criterion does not preclude in any 
way whatsoever the internal state to represent the first external condition when there is causal dependence 
between this state and a second external condition (not between the state and the first external condition), as 
it happens in the above example. So, this is a reason for the explanatory idleness of positing a representational 
state different from the causal dependence reason. 
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is not required to conclude that positing certain systems as intentional is not explanatorily 
justified or that a given proposal fails to specify the distinctive explanatory power of 
representational states. The verdict that the causal independence proposal fails to specify such 
explanatory role is not precluded in the absence of such specification for two reasons. First, 
this verdict is based on counter-examples to the causal independence proposal – there are 
systems that although they satisfy the causal independence condition, there is no explanatory 
justification for their positing as intentional systems. Second, this verdict is also based on the 
fact that the causal independence proposal fails to specify what the non-intentional explanation 
leaves to be explained by the intentional explanation in cases in which the positing of 
representational states is explanatorily justified. In conclusion, the causal independence 
proposal fails to specify the explanatory role of representational states. But what is left to be 
explained? Above I have just assumed that there is something left to be explained, otherwise 
there would be no distinctive explanatory power of representational states in intentional 
explanations. The goal of the ongoing investigation is precisely to specify what is this 
explanatory power. Finally, this negative stage of ruling out proposals that fail to specify the 
explanatory role of representational states is required for the further development of this 
investigation. As it will be clear in the next chapter when I will specify this explanatory role, 
this negative stage will help to reach the positive stage in which this explanatory power is 
finally specified.  
  What about the intuitiveness of the causal independence proposal? Is it compatible with 
the intuitive conception of representation?  It is clear that positing tropistic systems as 
intentional systems violates principles of our intuitive conception of representational states. It 
is true that the causal independence proposal rules out tropistic systems and other very simple 
systems as genuinely intentional since they fail to satisfy the causal independence condition. 
Hence, it seems that this proposal is compatible with the complexity principle which establishes 
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that systems without a certain cognitive complexity are not genuinely intentional. However, 
there is no guarantee that the satisfaction of the causal independence condition by a given 
system entails that it has a minimal cognitive complexity. The previous example of the internal 
state that covaries with the first external condition in virtue of the presence of a second external 
condition which independently causes the tokening of both satisfies the causal independence 
proposal. However, there is no guarantee that such system has a minimal cognitive complexity. 
Since the system is causally chained to this second external condition and automatically moves 
into the direction of the first external condition only in virtue of this causation, it is deprived 
of a minimum cognitive complexity. Evidently, it is an open question what is the extent of such 
minimal complexity, but it is hard to argue that the mere fact that there is no causal dependence 
between the relevant state and the external stimulus is enough for the system to respect the 
complexity principle. The required cognitive complexity is more demanding than that.  
  What about the autonomy principle? It requires that the forces responsible for the 
system’s behavioural output originates within the system, not outside. The causal independence 
condition rules out several systems that approach or avoid certain external stimulus in virtue 
of forces that originate outward the system because in these cases there is a causal dependence 
between the system and the relevant external stimulus. So, it is plausible to claim that the causal 
independence proposal does not violate the autonomy principle.  
  Finally, there is the activity principle which requires that the system cannot be wholly 
passive for it to be intentional. Some active role is required. The causal independence condition 
rules out the needle as an intentional system in which the forces that causes its movement in 
the direction of the magnet comes only from the magnet. That is the case because here there is 
a causal relation between the system and the magnet. But the causal dependence condition fails 
to rule out intentionality in the aforementioned example in which the internal state covaries 
with the first external condition by being caused by a second external condition. In this case, 
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the system’s behavioural output towards the first external conditions is automatic, it is 
completely determined by the presence of this second external condition and hence there is no 
space for the system to have any active role. Thus, the causal independence proposal violates 
the activity principle.   
 In the context of mutual adjustments between the theoretical virtues of positing 
representational states and the intuitive conception of representation, it is required a strong 
explanatory reason for the causal independence proposal to override the complexity and 
activity principles. That is, a strong explanatory reason, that together with the compatibility of 
the causal independence proposal with the autonomy principle, justifies the acceptance of this 
proposal despite its violation of the complexity and activity principles. Is such explanatory 
reason available? As previously showed, the causal independence proposal is not explanatorily 
justified, it fails to specify the distinctive explanatory power of representational states. Such 
explanatory reason is simply absent.  
 In conclusion, the causal independence proposal is flawed because it fails to specify the 
distinctive explanatory power of representational states and thus it is not explanatorily justified. 
Furthermore, it is not intuitive since it violates the complexity and activity principles that are 
highly entrenched in our intuitive conception of representation. That said, let us move on and 
assess the constancy mechanism proposal.  
 
3.5 The constancy mechanism proposal   
 Some philosophers claim that it is plausible that a given system represents a certain 
distal feature but not the proximal stimulus because even though at different instants there is a 
great variety of proximal stimuli reaching the system’s sensory apparatus, the distal feature and 
the system’s response behaviour remains the same. Hence, the conclusion that the same thing 
is being represented throughout all these changes in proximal stimuli, namely, the distal object. 
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That is the line of reasoning behind this conclusion. Given that there is a great variety of 
proximal stimuli coming from the distal object and still the distal object and the system’s 
responsive behaviour remains the same despite all varieties in proximal stimuli, it follows that 
the system is representing the distal object, not the proximal stimuli.    
  In order to achieve this result, the system should employ a constancy mechanism, that 
is, a mechanism that guarantees that the system still represents the distal feature despite huge 
varieties (to a certain extent) in proximal stimuli coming from the environment. There are 
several examples of constancy mechanisms: colour constancy is possibly the most famous. A 
given visual system sees an object as having the same colour even when there are huge 
differences in the environmental light conditions. The system keeps the representation of the 
object’s colour constant despite a great variety of light reflected by the object under different 
lighting conditions and so a great variety of light rays reaching the retina. To illustrate colour 
constancy, consider the following cases. There is a white cup which appears to us as having a 
uniform colour under a highly uneven illumination, despite the fact that the light reflected by 
the cup’s shaded region is very different from the light reflected by the unshaded one. This is 
a case of colour constancy – the visual system represents all regions of the cup as having the 
same colour even though there is a huge variation in the illumination incident on them. Now 
consider a case of shape constancy: a coin looks round when viewed head-on as well as when 
viewed from acute angles, despite the areas projected by the coin on the retina are hugely 
different under these two conditions. This is a case of shape constancy because the coin looks 
as having the same shape even though it is seen from very different angles and so there is a 
huge variety in the light intensities reflected by the coin. Other cases of constancy mechanisms 
include size constancy, position constancy, etc.75   
                                                             
75 This is a very simplified characterization of constancy mechanisms. A proper characterization would have to 
assess different problems, like the ones on similarities and dissimilarities aspects of the appearance of the object 
throughout changes of proximal stimuli (e.g., colour, shape, etc.). It is not my goal to enter into this debate here, 
for a discussion on the proper characterization of constancy mechanisms, cf. COHEN, 2015; HILBERT, 2005. 
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  In light of this feature of constancy mechanisms, several philosophers have defended 
the employment of the constancy mechanism as a minimal condition for intentionality. Tyler 
Burge has defended that the limits of perception are the limits of intentionality and that what 
distinguishes perceptual and non-perceptual states is that perceptual states employ constancy 
mechanisms.76 Hence, what distinguishes representational states from non-representational 
states is that the first ones employ constancy mechanisms. According to Burge, “certain 
processes in perceptual systems systematically distinguish effects of stimulation that are special 
to the individual and the context from perspective-independent attributes of the wider 
environment. Explanation of the formation of perception keys on processes in perceptual 
systems that make this distinction. Such processes constitute the ground of perception, 
representation, and objectivity” (BURGE, 2010, p. 23). Kim Sterelny also reaches the same 
conclusion, even though he is not committed to Burge’s thesis that the limits of intentionality 
are the limits of perception. He defends that it is a minimal condition for a given state to 
constitute a representation that “there is a sufficient variety of proximal routes and sufficient 
stability of distal sources” (STERELNY, 1995, pp. 261-2).  
 It strikes me that one of the motivations behind the constancy mechanism proposal is 
the following. Philosophers like Fred Dretske have defended that the employment of constancy 
mechanisms is a condition for the system to represent the distal feature, not the proximal 
stimuli.77 That is, the appropriate criterion to determine when an intentional system represents 
the distal feature, not the proximal stimuli that reach the sensory apparatus, is when the system 
employs a constancy mechanism in the production of the representational state. The seeming 
initial plausibility of the constancy mechanism criterion leads to the temptation of using it not 
                                                             
76 “[...] perception marks the lower border of representation. Perception lies not only at the root of empirical 
objectivity. It is, I think, where states with veridicality conditions first clearly emerge.” (BURGE, 2010, p. 549). 
77 Dretske is famous for being one of the first philosophers for appealing to the system’s employment of 
constancy mechanisms as a criterion for determining whether the system is representing the distal object or the 
proximal stimulus, cf. DRETSKE, 1981, p. 163. 
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only to determine when the system is representing distal objects and not proximal stimuli, but 
also to demarcate the limits of intentionality.78 According to the resultant demarcation 
proposal, it is a minimal condition for a system to be intentional that it employs the constancy 
mechanism. However, this move is a non sequitur.   
  It is a great leap to infer from the thesis that a system represents a distal feature in virtue 
of the employment of the constancy mechanism to the thesis that the employment of the 
constancy mechanism is a minimal condition for intentionality. First, the constancy mechanism 
criterion implicitly assumes that the relevant system is an intentional system – after all, to ask 
whether the system represents the distal feature or the proximal stimuli is already to assume 
that the relevant system is intentional. Second, it is plainly possible that a non-intentional 
sensory system produces a state that correlates with a distal feature of the external environment 
even when the proximal stimulus reaching its sensory apparatus varies a lot. That may happen 
because there is a third state which causes both the production of the system’s sensory state 
and the occurrence of the distal feature.79 Finally, it is interesting to note that Dretske, famous 
for holding the constancy mechanisms criterion for determining distal content, refuses to hold 
that the employment of constancy mechanisms is a minimal condition for intentionality – i.e., 
that it is required for a system to be intentional in the first place (DRESTKE, 1981, p. 163; 
1986, p. 168-171).  
  Since the thesis that the system represents distal objects in virtue of the employment of 
constancy mechanism does not imply the thesis that such employment is a minimal condition 
for intentionality, what other arguments are there for the constancy mechanism proposal? What 
                                                             
78 Here I am not committing myself with the plausibility of the claim that the employment of the constancy 
mechanism is a condition for a system to represent a distal feature. I am just describing what I take to be one of 
the main motivations behind the constancy mechanism demarcation proposal in order to assess it. I will 
effectively assess the distal content problem for the teleosemantic account of content only in the fifth chapter.  
79 Suppose that you have a system with an internal state that merely covaries with a certain external state 
because there is a second external state which causes both the internal state and the first external state. The 
proximal stimuli may change a lot and nevertheless the internal state and the first external state will continue 
to covary as long as the second external state causes the presence of both states.   
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other reasons are there for the thesis that the employment of constancy mechanism draws the 
limits of intentionality?  
  Kim Sterelny and, followed by him, Peter Schulte have proposed the counterfactual 
robustness argument in favour of the constancy mechanism proposal that appeals to a 
distinction between two kinds of explanations, namely, robust-process and actual-sequence 
explanations (STERELNY, 1995, p. 258-262; SCHULTE, 2015). This distinction is well 
illustrated via the explanation of the result of a football match. Consider the final of the 1970 
FIFA World Cup in which Brazil defeated Italy. You may explain the result of this football 
match in two different ways. On one hand, there is the actual-sequence explanation which 
consists in a detailed description of the match, describing every pass, free kick, cross, goal, 
shooting, and so on – that is, a complete physical description of every move in the match. On 
the other hand, there is the robust-process explanation which consists in a description of the 
abilities of Pelé, Rivellino, Tostão and other Brazilian players and concludes that given their 
superior quality over the Italian players, Brazil would defeat Italy in one way or another. As it 
happens, one explanation has advantages over the other, the reason that they are not 
replaceable. The actual-sequence explanation is more specific (i.e., it has a complete 
description of everything that happened in the match, including a description of why Brazil 
won by 4x1), but the robust-process explanation has the advantage of explaining what would 
probably have happened if things had been a little bit different (e.g., Brazil, not Italy, had the 
kick-off) – Brazil would still probably win.   
  The lesson that Sterelny has drawn from the robust-process and actual-sequence 
explanations distinction is that intentional explanations are robust-process explanations, not 
actual-sequence ones. An actual-sequence explanation of the behaviour of a given organism 
describes the precise sequence of neurological and physical events which lead to the behaviour, 
while an intentional explanation of it is a robust-process explanation. But what is so special 
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about the intentional explanation as a robust-process explanation in such a way that the actual-
sequence explanation of behaviour misses? What is left behind? The case here is analogous to 
what happens with the robust-process explanation of the result of the football match – the 
intentional explanation of behaviour explains how the organism would have behaved if things 
were a little bit different.   
  Let’s contrast the actual-sequence and robust-process explanations of the avoidance-
behaviour of an animal when it stares at something in his visual field.80 The actual-sequence 
explanation specifies the shadow in the animal’s retina, every detail of what happened in his 
brain, limbs, etc. However, it cannot explain what would have happened if the animal were in 
a slightly different position, or if the perceived object were in a slightly different angle, etc. In 
contrast, the intentional explanation explains that the animal had this avoidance-behaviour 
because it saw a predator. For instance, in case of the animal were not in position x but in 
position y or in case of the predator were not in the angle α but β, the animal would still have 
the behaviour of trying to avoid it. In sum, intentional explanations of behaviour are capable 
of giving an account of counterfactual scenarios, while actual-sequence explanations are not.  
  As it happened with the robust-process explanation of the result of football match, the 
intentional explanation of behaviour has the advantage of explaining what would have 
happened in different situations. It loses in richness of detail in order to gain in systematicity. 
While actual-sequence explanations of behaviour appeal to proximal features (e.g., a shadow 
in the retina with a certain form), intentional explanations appeal to distal features of the 
environment which are represented by the organism (e.g., the representation of a predator 
nearby which may be triggered by shadows of slightly different forms in retina). The intentional 
explanation explains behaviour as a response to a distal feature of the environment (e.g., the 
                                                             
80 As an actual example of it, Sterelny mentions the piping plover avoidance behaviour when it stares a predator 
approaching its nest, which consists in the feigning of a broken wing in order to seduce the predator into its 
direction and hence to keep it away from the nest (RISTAU, 1991; STERELNY, 1995, p. 261). 
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representation of a predator), which may be triggered via widely different proximate stimuli 
(e.g., different shadows in the retina).   
  In light of this characterization of the distinction between intentional and non-
intentional explanations, it becomes clear why only systems that employ constancy 
mechanisms have behavioural patterns that are prone to intentional explanations. Constancy 
mechanisms allow the system’s behaviour to be triggered by the same distal feature despite a 
great variety of proximal stimuli. Without the employment of constancy mechanisms, the 
system’s behaviour is triggered only by proximal stimuli. Since intentional explanations are 
robust-process explanations, the intentional explanation of the system’s behaviour appeals to 
the system’s response to distal features of the external environment and the only way that the 
system can respond to distal features but not to proximal stimulus is via the employment of 
constancy mechanisms. Hence, the conclusion that the employment of constancy mechanisms 
is a condition for the system’s responsive behaviour to be properly explained in intentional 
terms and so that constancy mechanisms constitutes a condition for minimal intentionality.81 
What could be problematic with the counterfactual robustness argument?   
 One could complain that it is not clear why a distinction between robust-process and 
actual-sequence explanations in fact consists in a distinction between intentional and non-
intentional explanations. That is, that the distinction between robust-process and actual-
sequence explanation do not demarcate a line between intentional and non-intentional systems, 
but merely a line between systems that employ constancy mechanisms and systems that do not 
employ. However, this is not fair. The problem is that this objection can be raised against every 
demarcation proposal for the limits of intentionality, no matter how plausible or appropriate it 
                                                             
81 Notice that the counterfactuality robustness of intentional explanations lies on the variation of proximal 
stimuli, not on the presence of the distal feature which remains invariable. But there is no actual-sequence 
explanation of the system’s behaviour by appealing to the presence of the distal feature because what ultimately 
triggers the production of the system’s state are the proximal stimuli, not the distal feature (e.g., when there is 
no light reaching the retina, there will be no tokening of the internal state and so no responsive behaviour). 
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may be. After all, for every demarcation proposal which specifies whatever property p as a 
minimal condition for intentionality (e.g., causal independence, employment of constancy 
mechanisms, etc.), it is always possible to object that this proposal does not draw a line between 
intentional and non-intentional states, but rather a line between p states and non-p states. Then, 
the whole debate on the limits of intentionality would become sterile, incapable of yielding any 
fruit.82 Here I take a different route. I develop an objection that applies to both the constancy 
mechanism proposal and the counterfactual robustness argument. It is based on the fact that 
the distinction between proximal and distal features comes in degree which gives rise to a 
serious problem for the constancy mechanism proposal in general and the counterfactual 
robustness argument in particular.  
  But before developing this objection, a clarification is necessary. I have formulated the 
constancy mechanism condition as establishing that in order for the relevant state to represent 
an external condition, it is required that the state still represents the external condition despite 
the variety of proximal stimuli that reach the system’s apparatus. One may wonder if such 
formulation is compatible with reductionist naturalist theories of mental representation since it 
appeals to the very notion of representation. In fact, it is very easy to formulate the constancy 
mechanism condition in non-representational terms: the producer system should employ a 
constancy mechanism in the production of the state such that there should be a constancy 
between the tokening of the state and the presence of the external condition, despite the variety 
of proximal stimuli reaching the system’s apparatus. That is, the production system should 
guarantee a conjunction between the tokening of the state and the presence of the external 
condition. That said, this is my fundamental objection to the constancy mechanism proposal. 
  The counterfactual robustness argument assumes that there is no intentional explanation 
of behaviour which posits proximal content representations and so that there is no 
                                                             
82 Marc Artiga has also reached this conclusion but on different grounds, cf. ARTIGA, 2016, p. 422.  
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representation of proximal features. In other words, it assumes that there is no behaviour prone 
to proximal content intentional explanations. That is the reason for this conclusion. The 
fundamental assumption of the argument is that it is a distinctive feature of intentional 
explanations that they give an account of counterfactual cases. This assumption implicitly 
assumes that there is no proximal content intentional explanation since it is not possible to give 
an account of counterfactual scenarios based on the positing of representations with proximal 
content. Only intentional explanations that posit distal content representations give an account 
of counterfactual scenarios because here the employment of constancy mechanisms is required 
in order for the state to represent the same distal feature despite proximal stimuli variations. 
But if the content of a representation is the proximal feature, what kind of variation could there 
be among counterfactual situations in order for a proximal content intentional explanation to 
give an account of them? There is none. An illustration of how distal content explanations give 
an account of counterfactual situations makes this point clear.   
  Let’s come back to the case of the animal’s avoidance behaviour to escape from 
predators. The animal still represents the same distal feature, the presence of the predator, 
despite differences among the predator’s space positions or in environmental lighting reaching 
the retina. Such variations constitute the counterfactual scenarios that the distal content 
intentional explanation is capable of giving an account. It provides explanation of the animal’s 
avoidance behaviour throughout all these counterfactual situations and that is the reason that 
this intentional explanation is a robust-process explanation, not an actual-sequence one. But 
what varieties could there be for a proximal content intentional explanation to give an account? 
None. There is no variation that could constitute any counterfactual scenario which a proximal 
content intentional explanation could give an account. Hence, proximal content explanations 
are not robust-process explanations.    
 Finally, the defender of the counterfactual robustness argument may justify from an 
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explanatory point of view that there is no genuine proximal content explanation in the 
following way. The positing of a system’s internal state as a proximal content representation 
in order to explain behaviour makes no explanatory difference since a non-intentional 
explanation that posits no representation has the same explanatory power than a proximal 
content explanation. So, only representations of distal features have explanatory power and 
since only systems with constancy mechanisms can represent distal features, the conclusion is 
that their employment is a minimal condition for intentionality.   
 So far, so good. But here a serious problem arises for both constancy mechanism 
proposal and counterfactual robustness argument – the minimal distance problem. Its starting 
point is that the distinction between proximal and distal stimuli comes in degrees – it is not 
clear-cut. There are no strict groups of proximal and distal stimuli because there is no non-
arbitrary line which strictly divides proximal and distal stimuli. Evidently, certain stimuli are 
more proximal than others, in the sense that there is a hierarchy of stimuli classified by 
proximity. But any strict line drawn in order to divide it into two groups – proximal and distal 
stimuli – will always be blurry. Someone could propose that there would be not two groups, 
but three groups – distal, intermediary and proximal stimuli. However, in this case, the problem 
of drawing the limits strikes again, because the distinction between distal and intermediary 
stimuli and the distinction between intermediary and proximal stimuli are also blurry.   
  The fact that the distinction between proximal and distal stimuli is not strict raises a 
problem to both the counterfactual robustness argument and the constancy mechanism 
proposal: what is the minimal distance from the system’s sensory apparatus that a stimulus may 
be in order for a state to genuinely represent it? Notice that the employment of a constancy 
mechanism presupposes that there is some distance between the representational state and what 
is being represented. Otherwise there would be no distance based on which a constancy 
mechanism would keep the state representing the same feature despite huge variations in the 
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stimuli reaching the system’s sensory apparatus. But what is the extent of this minimal 
distance? The counterfactual robustness argument gives rise to one response, while the 
constancy mechanism proposal gives rise to another one. I will assess each response by turn. 
 Maybe the direct response to this problem is that the minimal distance between the 
stimulus and the token state for the later to represent the former is this one. The stimulus is any 
stimulus but the most proximal one – the most proximal stimulus cannot be represented. The 
main argument for this response comes from the constancy mechanism proposal itself. No state 
can represent the most proximal stimulus because in this case no employment of a constancy 
mechanism is possible. There would be no distance for the state to represent the same feature 
despite the stimuli variation reaching the system`s sensory apparatus. Some minimal distance 
between the tokening of the state and the trigger stimulus is required for the employment of 
constancy mechanism to be possible in the first place. Furthermore, notice that in the case of 
the most proximal stimulus which triggers a certain state, it would be explanatory idle to posit 
that the state represents this stimulus because the non-intentional explanation behaviour would 
have the same explanatory power. Therefore, the minimal distance between the stimulus and 
the token state cannot be the most proximal one.   
  What about the second most proximal stimulus? The counterfactual robustness 
argument gives rise to the following justification for the second most proximal stimulus 
constituting the minimal distance, in contrast with the most proximal stimulus. The second 
most proximal stimulus is the closest stimulus to the sensory apparatus that a given stimulus 
may be that still gives rise to a robust explanation of behaviour, i.e., an explanation that gives 
an account of counterfactual situations. The explanation that posits the state as representing the 
second most stimulus in the stimuli chain gives an account of counterfactual situations. By 
contrast, an explanation that posits the state as representing the most proximal stimulus cannot 
give an account of counterfactual situations. Therefore, the latter is not a robust explanation 
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and thus not an intentional explanation. This is how the counterfactual robustness argument 
gives rise to a justification for the minimal distance being the second most proximal stimulus, 
not the most proximal stimulus.    
  However, this justification is problematic. At the second most proximal stimulus level 
the group of counterfactual situations is so small and irrelevant that threatens the viability of 
the claim that there is a genuine robust intentional explanation of behaviour in contrast with 
non-intentional explanations that lack such robust character. Note that according to the 
counterfactual robustness argument, it is the amount of counterfactual situations that a given 
explanation is capable of giving an account which determines whether the explanation is 
sufficiently robust or not. But if the amount of counterfactual situations is so small, an 
explanation which gives an account of it is not explanatorily relevant in order to make this 
explanation genuinely robust.   
  It could be replied that there is at least one counterfactual situation that an intentional 
explanation gives an account because it posits that the state represents the second most 
proximal stimulus, while a non-intentional explanation cannot give an account of this 
counterfactual situation. However, the fact that an explanation gives an account of just one 
counterfactual situation is not sufficient to make it robust. The explanation is not sufficiently 
robust to justify the positing of the state as representing the second most proximal stimulus 
precisely because this positing is not explanatorily relevant.   
  The following example illustrates what is problematic with the above justification for 
the second most proximal stimulus as constituting the minimal distance. Suppose that stimuli 
chain triggers the tokening of a certain state in a cognitive system and that 𝑠" is the most 
proximal stimulus of the chain, 𝑠# is the second most proximal stimulus, 𝑠$ is the third one and 
so on. As previously shown, the state cannot represent 𝑠" because there is no distance between 
the sensory apparatus and the stimulus. Now consider the hypothesis that the state represents 
141 
 
𝑠# because an intentional explanation that posits this state as representing 𝑠# provides an 
account of the counterfactual situations constituted of variations of 𝑠". However, the amount 
of counterfactual situations constituted by variation of 𝑠" is so small and irrelevant for the 
explanation of behaviour that an account of it is not sufficient to make robust an explanation 
which gives an account of these counterfactual situations. Hence, the positing of the state as 
representing 𝑠# is explanatory irrelevant and according to the counterfactual robustness 
argument the minimal distance is not 𝑠#.  
  What about the hypothesis that the minimal distance is 𝑠$? The same problem arises 
again. The amount of counterfactual situations constituted by variation of 𝑠" and 𝑠# is still 
small and explanatorily irrelevant. An account of it is insufficient to make robust an explanation 
that gives an account of these counterfactual situations by positing the state as representing 𝑠$. 
Once again, the positing of the state as representing 𝑠$ is explanatory irrelevant.   
  What is the lesson we should draw from this exercise? The conclusion is that it is not 
clear what is the first stimulus in the causal chain (𝑠#, or	𝑠$, or, 𝑠*...) for which the positing of 
the state as representing this first stimulus gives rise to a robust intentional explanation. That 
is, an explanation which provides an account of a sufficiently big and relevant amount of 
counterfactual situations constituted by variations in the intermediate stimuli between the 
tokening state and the first stimulus in that causal chain. In the absence of some justified 
criterion, it is indeterminate what is the minimal distance from the sensory apparatus that a 
stimulus may be for the state to genuinely represent it. This is the indeterminacy objection for 
the response that the counterfactual robustness argument gives rise to the minimal distance 
problem.   
 Let’s move to the response which the constancy mechanism proposal gives rise for the 
minimal distance problem. The constancy mechanism proposal maintains that the employment 
of a constancy mechanism is a minimal condition for a certain state to be representational. 
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Accordingly, it is a condition for a state to represent a given feature that it represents the same 
feature despite significant variations of proximal stimuli reaching the system's sensory 
apparatus. Based on this proposal, it could be argued that since there are variations of 𝑠" 
between the sensory apparatus and the second most proximal stimulus 𝑠#, then the room is 
open for the employment of a constancy mechanism and hence 𝑠# is the minimal distance. 
However, this move is problematic. In this case, the only possible variation of proximal stimuli 
reaching the sensory apparatus is constituted of variations of 𝑠". Is it enough variation for the 
state to genuinely represent 𝑠#? Maybe not. It is not clear that there is enough variation for the 
employment of the constancy mechanism to be possible in the first place – maybe it is only 
possible when there is more variation. The same problem arises for the hypothesis of 𝑠$ as the 
minimal distance. The only possible variation of proximal stimuli is constituted of variations 
of 𝑠" and 𝑠#. Is it now enough variation for the state to genuinely represent 𝑠$? Once again, 
maybe not. It is also not clear that there is enough variation for the employment of the constancy 
mechanism. The conclusion is that it is indeterminate what is the minimal distance between the 
sensory apparatus and the stimulus in order to have enough intermediate stimuli variation. That 
is, enough intermediate stimuli variation for the employment of the constancy mechanism to 
be possible in the first place. It is an open question what is the first stimulus in the causal chain 
for there to be enough variation of intermediate stimuli required for the employment of the 
constancy mechanism.   
  The indeterminacy objection threatens both responses to the problem of minimal 
distance, the response based on the counterfactual robustness argument in particular and the 
response based on the constancy mechanism proposal in general. Its neutralization requires a 
non-arbitrary criterion to determine the extent of the minimal distance from the system’s 
sensory apparatus that a stimulus may be in order for the state to genuinely represent it. If the 
minimal distance is indeterminate, then the constancy mechanism proposal and the 
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counterfactual robustness argument would collapse. In the absence of a solution to the minimal 
distance problem, the viability of the constancy mechanism proposal is threatened since it 
depends on a strict distinction between proximal and distal stimuli. That is, if this distinction 
is indeterminate, it follows that the constancy mechanism proposal’s assumption that there is 
only representation of distal features is also indeterminate and so the constancy mechanism 
proposal is in trouble.  
   At this point, it could be replied that the indeterminacy objection runs the risk of being 
a slippery slope argument. This risk is illustrated by this analogy. Baldness is a vague notion: 
it is not fully determinate the point in which someone that is not bald becomes bald. How many 
strands of hair should a non-bald person lose to become bald? There is no strict turning point, 
but a continuum between full baldness (no hair) and full non-baldness (full head of hair), 
somewhere in the middle lies the limits of baldness. Now suppose that a supermodel agency 
prohibits bald male supermodels. It would be nonsense to claim that this is not a viable 
condition for supermodel selection since it does not provide a principled way of determining 
exactly when someone non-bald turns bald. After all, baldness is a useful notion and it works 
quite well for the selection of supermodels. Analogously, the constancy mechanism proposal 
cannot be rejected because it does not provide a principled way of determining the extent of 
the minimal distance from the system that an external condition may be in order for the state 
to genuinely represent it. Rather, there is a continuum between representationality and non-
representationality in which there are clear cases of representational states and clear cases of 
non-representational states. There is nothing problematic about it just like there is nothing 
problematic about the continuum between baldness and non-baldness.   
  In fact, there is nothing problematic with the notion of baldness in its use on our 
everyday life to distinct bald from non-bald people. Nevertheless, things are different in respect 
of the philosophical debate on the minimal conditions for intentionality. Here we are looking 
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for minimal conditions for intentionality to develop a categorisation of representational and 
non-representational states, not for a continuum between these states. In order to develop such 
categorisation, the categories of representationality and non-representationality cannot suffer 
from this level of indeterminacy precisely because it threats the viability of the delivered 
distinction between representational and non-representational states. Furthermore, notice that 
the constancy mechanism proposal requires “sufficient variation” in proximal stimuli between 
the state and the distal external condition for the first to represent the latter (STERELNY, 1995, 
pp. 261-2). But how huge should this variation be for it to constitute sufficient variation for 
intentionality? The very specification of this proposal makes it clear that it is not whatever 
variation that is required for intentionality. That is another reason for the conclusion that 
indeterminacy of the required amount of stimuli variation is problematic for the viability of 
this proposal. It is not a solution to this problem to just claim that there is a continuum between 
representational and non-representational states.  
  What is the lesson one should draw from this conclusion to the overall debate on the 
problem of demarcation? I think it is that the appropriate proposal for minimal conditions for 
intentionality should not rely on a distinction between proximal and distal stimuli unless this 
proposal has a solid criterion to respond for the minimal distance problem. As result, the 
objection of indeterminacy would constitute no threat to this proposal. However, it is hard to 
see how this is a viable way out for the constancy mechanism proposal since it draws the limits 
of intentionality appealing only to the constancy mechanism condition. Another minimal 
condition is required to determine the extent of the minimal distance from the system’s sensory 
apparatus that a stimulus may be for the state to genuinely represent it. In the next chapter, I 
develop a proposal that adopts a variation of the constancy mechanism condition; I show that 
this proposal is not threatened by the objection of indeterminacy. That is the case because it 
also adopts another minimal condition that provides a non-arbitrary criterion to determine such 
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minimal distance – the success pattern condition. The result will be the dual proposal for the 
minimal conditions for intentionality. 
  What about the intuitiveness of the constancy mechanism proposal? Is it compatible 
with the intuitive principles that are highly entrenched in our intuitive conception of 
representation? It is clear that the constancy mechanism proposal respects the complexity 
principle. The employment of a constancy mechanism by a given system guarantees that it has 
a certain cognitive complexity since the capacity to employ a constancy mechanism makes it 
more complex than a system deprived of such capacity. The employment of a constancy 
mechanism makes possible for the system to represent the same external condition despite a 
variety of proximal stimuli reaching its sensory apparatus. But is the cognitive complexity 
required for the employment of constancy mechanisms enough for the satisfaction of the 
complexity principle? That is uncontentious in the case of more complex organisms like 
humans, chimps and even vervet monkeys. Let’s consider simple systems like honeybees to 
assess if their actual degree of complexity satisfies the complexity principle. The employment 
of the constancy mechanism guarantees that the organism’s behavioural output is not chained 
to a given stimulus, i.e., a variety of input stimuli may trigger the tokening of the 
representational state. This fact makes the organism cognitively more complex than organisms 
like tropistic systems that are chained to a specific stimulus. The employment of constancy 
mechanisms makes the honeybee complex enough to produce representational states with 
shape and colour constancy, the behavioural output of foraging is not chained to a specific 
shape or colour of flowers (the sources of nectar). I take this stimulus-behaviour unchained 
feature to be complex enough for the systems that share it to satisfy the complexity principle 
and hence to be genuine candidates for intentional systems.   
  The constancy mechanism proposal also respects the autonomy principle according to 
which intentional systems are autonomous, the forces responsible for their behavioural outputs 
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originate within the systems, not outward. The employment of the constancy mechanism 
requires autonomy from the system. By producing a state that represents the same external 
feature despite the variety of input stimuli, the system keeps the tokening of the state constant 
whenever the relevant external feature is present which triggers the behavioural output. That 
requires a selection process of picking from all input stimuli just the ones that correlates with 
the external feature, ruling out the remaining stimuli, which results in the establishment of a 
constancy relation between the tokening of the state and the presence of the external feature. 
The selection process that tokens the internal state constitutes an internal force that affects the 
resulting behaviour. If the selection process tokens the state that triggers the behavioural output, 
then this process constitutes a force that affects this behaviour. The forces responsible for it 
cannot be wholly originated outside the system. The conclusion is that the constancy 
mechanism proposal respects the autonomy principle. The satisfaction of the constancy 
mechanism condition guarantees the autonomy of the system.  
  However, the constancy mechanism proposal keeps the door open for the violation of 
the activity principle. This one requires that the system should have some active role in order 
for it to be genuinely intentional. But it is possible that even though the tokening of the state is 
triggered by a variety of proximal stimuli and correlates with the relevant external condition, 
the system has no relevant active role in the production of the behavioural output. That is the 
case because a given system that employs the constancy mechanism may have always the same 
behavioural output as a response to the presence of the external feature. But it is hard to argue 
that a system that always produces the same behaviour as a response to the presence of the 
external feature has some relevant active role. The door would still be open for a system which 
always produces the same behaviour to have some active role if the constancy mechanism 
condition is conjoined with some other minimal condition that would justify the claim that this 
system is active even though it always produces the same behaviour. The constancy mechanism 
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condition alone fails to do that. So, the employment of the constancy mechanism fails to 
guarantee that the system has some relevant active role. The conclusion is that the constancy 
mechanism proposal keeps the door open for the violation of the activity principle.   
  In sum, the employment of the constant mechanisms guarantee that the relevant system 
respects the complexity and autonomy principles but keeps the door open for the violation of 
the activity principle. Hence, the constancy mechanism proposal is not entirely compatible with 
the intuitive conception of representation. In the context of mutual adjustments between 
intuitive and explanatory constraints on the assessment of minimal conditions for 
intentionality, it could be argued that putting aside this counter-intuitive aspect of the constancy 
mechanism proposal is justified because this proposal is explanatorily justified. However, such 
a move is not allowed for the proponent of the constancy mechanism proposal because as 
previously showed, this proposal fails to specify the distinctive explanatory power of 
representations and so is not explanatorily justified. In conclusion, the constancy mechanism 
proposal should be rejected.  
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I addressed the problem of demarcation and the minimal conditions for 
intentionality. I started by defending the substantiality of this problem by arguing that this is 
not a purely terminological debate on what we call representations, but a solid problem on the 
nature of intentionality. After that, I have proposed the method of reflexive equilibrium for 
establishing the appropriate proposal for the limits of intentionality. I argued that the proposal 
should be constrained by mutual adjustments between explanatory and intuitive requirements 
in order to reach an optimal equilibrium state in which we are no more inclined to revise the 
resulting minimal conditions. Finally, I assessed and rejected the causal independence and the 
constancy mechanism proposals for minimal conditions for intentionality in terms of both 
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explanatory and intuitive considerations. This concludes the negative stage of my approach to 
the problem of demarcation. Let us pass on to the positive stage. The goal of the next chapter 





















CHAPTER 4. THE MINIMAL CONDITIONS FOR INTENTIONALITY:  
THE DUAL PROPOSAL 
 
4.1 The success pattern proposal  
4.2 The objection of liberality  
4.3 The dual proposal: constancy mechanism joins success pattern  
4.4 Is the dual proposal intuitive? 
 
  The goal of this chapter is to develop the dual proposal for minimal conditions for 
intentionality, my solution for the problem of demarcation. In the first section, I develop the 
success pattern proposal. Its starting point is the assumption that intentional explanations have 
the distinctive power of explaining success, i.e., to explain when certain behaviours are 
successful or not. Evidently, the success or failure of a behaviour consists in the achievement 
or not of a given result. Note that success assessments of behaviour by intentional explanations 
presuppose that the system pursues a given result via the production of this behaviour. This 
feature of intentional explanations gives rise to the success pattern condition for minimal 
intentionality: a given system is intentional only if (a) what I call a “success pattern” is present 
in its behaviour; (b) it uses the representational state as proxy for the presence of the relevant 
external condition. Nevertheless, in the second section I show that the success pattern condition 
alone draws the lower border of intentionality too low in light of both explanatory and intuitive 
considerations. The delivered demarcation is too liberal because it treats systems that are 
clearly not representational as representational. That is the objection of liberality. The 
establishment of other minimal condition for intentionality is hence required. In the third 
section, I propose a variation of the constancy mechanism condition. Together with the success 
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pattern condition, this constancy mechanism condition constitutes the dual proposal for the 
minimal conditions for intentionality which establishes the genuine limits of intentionality. 
Finally, I show that even though the dual proposal adopts a variation of the constancy 
mechanism condition, it is not threatened by the indeterminacy objection. This objection is 
problematic for the constancy mechanism proposal, but not for the dual proposal. The reason 
is that the latter nonarbitrarily determines the minimal distance from the sensory apparatus that 
the external condition may be for the system to genuinely represent it.     
  In the last section, I show that the dual proposal is compatible with the intuitive 
conception of representation to an acceptable extent because it respects three of the most 
entrenched intuitive principles on representationality – the activity, autonomy and complex 
principles. Beyond this extent, however, the limits of intentionality become blurry. It turns out 
to be a pragmatic choice to accept or reject the intentionality of some states. The reason is that 
it is not possible to establish a fully precise demarcation without violating the explanatory 
requirement. The result is the optimal state in the reflective equilibrium. The mutual 
adjustments between the distinctive explanatory role of representational states and our intuitive 
conception of representation achieves the optimal equilibrium. There is no inclination to revise 
the resulting proposal anymore, i.e., the dual proposal.  
 
4.1 The success pattern proposal  
  Representational states by themselves cannot make any difference for the organism or 
the external environment. An isolated representation is idle unless it triggers other state(s) that 
will trigger behaviour. It is the production of behaviour, either directly by triggering a 
behavioural state or indirectly by triggering other internal state(s), that may or may not achieve 
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any supposed pursued goal of a representational state.83 Hence, the achievement of the 
organism’s pursued external result is only reachable through the behaviour triggered by the 
representation. The success pattern proposal maintains that the positing of a representational 
state gives rise to an intentional explanation with the distinctive explanatory power of 
explaining success. That is, the intentional explanation specifies the external condition in which 
the triggered behavioural output succeeds in achieving the pursued result. By contrast, the non-
intentional explanation does not appeal to any pursued result and hence cannot explain 
successful behaviour. That is the fundamental distinction between intentional and non-
intentional explanations according to the success pattern proposal. But what is the precise 
nature of the distinctive explanatory power of the intentional explanation in explaining 
successful behaviour? How does the fact that the representational state pursues a certain 
external result make any difference to the explanation of behaviour?  
  Let’s start this investigation by taking a look at the extent of the explanatory power of 
non-intentional explanations. Suppose that a given organism has a behaviour pattern B in 
response to a certain internal state S that is triggered by an external condition C. What could 
be the explanation for such behaviour? The non-intentional explanation consists in a 
specification of the causal chain of the tokening of C that triggers S which results in B. It is 
potentially capable of explaining every causal transaction that occurs between the tokening of 
C and the production of B. In the ultimate and ideal case, the non-intentional explanation 
consists in a complete explanation of the causal chain that specifies every single atomic and 
molecular movement that occurs between the tokening of C and the production of B. It is 
potentially capable of explaining every single bodily movement of the organism by providing 
an explanation of every causal transaction that originated it. As is shown by the sciences of 
                                                             
83 Is it really possible for a representational state to directly trigger behaviour? That is, without the 
intermediation of other internal state(s) that will produce behaviour? That possibility makes no difference for 
the ongoing argument and so I will just leave that door open.   
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mind after the cognitive revolution, a full causal explanation of behaviour is made possible by 
providing a wiring diagram that shows how environmental inputs affect internal states of the 
organism that, in conjunction with other internal states, originate the behavioural output. 
Finally, it is typically assumed by cognitive sciences that representational states interact 
casually in virtue of their non-semantic properties (i.e., syntactic properties) to originate 
behavioural outputs. Nevertheless, these causal transactions are faithful to the content of the 
representational states. This is well illustrated by Dretske’s analogy that a glass may shatter if 
you scream “shatter”, but your screaming’s meaning is causally irrelevant to the shattering 
(DRETSKE, 1988).84 In light of this, a serious problem arises for the justification of intentional 
explanations: given that the non-intentional explanation has the power of providing a full causal 
explanation of behaviour, what would be left to be explained by an intentional explanation? 
What is missed by the non-intentional explanation that could justify the positing of S as a 
representational state?  
  The starting point is to notice that intentional explanations are external explanations, 
while non-intentional explanations are internal explanations. The causal explanation of 
behaviour establishes no relation or connection between the organism and the external 
environment; it is true of the organism irrespective of its external environment. If everything 
is changed in the external environment with the exception of the proximal stimulus that 
triggered the causal chain that resulted in the bodily movement, the causal explanation would 
still be true of the organism. By contrast, intentional explanations are external explanations. 
The intentional explanation establishes a new set of relations between the organism and the 
external environment where it is embedded by establishing relations between representational 
                                                             
84 There is a lively debate on whether representational content has causal relevance or efficiency. Some 
philosophers maintain that content is not causally inert and hence that representational states causally interact 
in virtue of their content, while others disagree (cf. DRETSKE, 1988; BLOCK, 1989; RESCORLA, 2015). However, it 
is not my focus to enter into this debate. Here I am just arguing that there is a complete non-intentional 
explanation of behaviour, that is, a full causal and non-semantic explanation of behaviour. 
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states and external features of the environment (SHEA, 2013, p. 498). The non-intentional 
explanation only specifies the relation between the organism and a certain proximal feature of 
the environment, namely, the proximal stimulus that triggered the relevant causal chain. Once 
it has specified this proximal stimulus, the non-intentional explanation has nothing more to say 
about the external environment. Hence, the establishment of relations between the 
representational state and some environmental external features is distinctive of intentional 
explanations.  
  But how does the intentional explanation establish a relation between the 
representational state and the external feature of the environment? It comes in two steps. First, 
the intentional explanation specifies the result or end that the organism pursues with the 
tokening of the representation and the resulting behavioural output. The pursued result is 
directed towards a given external feature in the environment – e.g., escaping from something, 
eating something, approaching something, etc. This is the reason that it is an external result, 
not an internal one. Second, the intentional explanation specifies the success conditions for the 
behavioural output to achieve this result. The establishment of the relation between the 
organism and the external feature comes in two steps because the establishment of success 
conditions presupposes the specification of the pursued result; otherwise, it would not be 
possible to establish whether the behaviour succeeds in achieving it or not.   
  The distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations consists in the 
explanation of successful behaviour, i.e., the prediction of the success or failure of the 
behavioural output in achieving the organism’s persuaded result. The establishment of success 
assessments of behaviour is what gives rise to intentional explanations of behaviour. The 
intentional and non-intentional explanations establish different descriptions of behaviour at 
different levels, namely, the success pattern description and the non-intentional description. No 
matter how complete the non-intentional specification of the causal chain that leads from the 
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relevant proximal stimulus to the behavioural output, it is not capable of explaining the success 
or failure of the organism in achieving the pursued result. That is, the non-intentional 
explanation is not capable of explaining successful or unsuccessful behaviour. We can illustrate 
it with the predator example.   
  Suppose that a given organism pursues the result of avoiding predators and that the 
tokening of a certain internal state is what triggers a certain behaviour. As it is clear, the pursued 
result is towards the presence of predators – after all, the organism is pursuing their avoidance. 
Now suppose that in a given situation the tokening of this internal state triggers the behaviour 
which may lead to the avoidance or not of a predator. The non-intentional explanation of this 
behaviour is the specification of the causal chain that starts with the stimulus input that leads 
to the token behaviour and ends with the behavioural output. But what is the point of positing 
that this internal state represents the predator? Because it gives rise to an explanation of the 
success or not of the organism in achieving the relevant result, i.e., escaping from the predator. 
The true representation of the predator leads to the avoidance behaviour which leads to the 
success of escaping from the predator; the false representation leads to the failure of avoiding 
the predator simply because there is no predator around. When the state is true, it contributes 
for the organism to avoid predators; when the state is false, there is no contribution; on the 
contrary, it leads to loss of energy. The intentional explanation is required precisely for the 
explanation of the success or not of escaping from the predator. Two factors guarantee the 
success of the organism in escaping from the predator. First, that the internal state truly 
represents the presence of the predator – the external condition of the presence of the predator 
obtains; second, that the behavioural output is the avoidance behaviour. The truth of the 
representation guarantees success provided that the behavioural output is the appropriate one. 
After all, in the case that the organism does not exhibit avoidance behaviour, it would make no 
difference whether it truly represents the presence of the predator or not.     
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  The explanatory power of intentional explanations lies in the capacity to explain 
success, that is, the achievement of the organism’s pursued result. There is a characteristic 
pattern assumed by intentional explanations, the success pattern – a certain appropriate 
behaviour B in pursuing result R is prompted by representational state S that represents external 
condition C; when S is true (i.e., when C obtains), the performance of B leads to the 
achievement of R. The truth of the representation explains the success of the appropriate 
behaviour to achieve the pursued result and the falsehood explains the failure of achieving this 
result. The positing of the representational state by the intentional explanation provides it with 
two explanatory powers that are absent in non-intentional explanations – generality and 
prediction. That is precisely what justifies the positing of representational state and the appeal 
to the intentional explanation.   
  This is the success pattern proposal of the explanatory power of intentional 
explanations. Its core thesis is that the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations 
is the capacity to explain success. It was originally proposed by success semantics (RAMSEY, 
1927; WHYTE, 1990) and it is also assumed by the main proponents of teleosemantics 
(MILLIKAN, 1984, 2004; PAPINEAU, 1993, 2016). However, the success pattern proposal 
was not originally formulated as a solution for the problem of demarcation, my job here is to 
adapt it as a proposal for the minimal conditions for intentionality in the context of this 
problem. The success pattern proposal identifies success conditions with truth conditions – the 
representations is true if and only if it contributes to the achievement of the pursued external 
result, and false otherwise. The truth condition is the condition that should obtain for the 
prompted appropriate behaviour to be successful, i.e., to achieve the result.   
  Here it is necessary to make an observation on the conception of behaviour assumed 
above. One may object that even assuming that the representational state has a pursued result 
(and so that there is a success assessment of the behavioural output), there is nothing left to be 
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explained by the intentional explanation once there is a full causal explanation of behaviour. 
Rather, intentional explanation doesn’t explain behaviour, but success. I think that what is at 
issue here is just a terminological matter of what is being called “behaviour”. This objection 
assumes that behaviour is just bodily movement and hence there is nothing left to be explained 
by an intentional explanation once there is a full explanation of bodily movement. After all, 
the full causal explanation specifies the causal transactions that result in the bodily movement. 
However, I am assuming a broader notion of behaviour according to which a complete 
explanation of behaviour is not restricted to a full causal explanation of behaviour. Rather, a 
complete explanation of behaviour also explains when such bodily movement is successful or 
not. That is, it also contains an explanation of successful behaviour. This is the sense in which 
intentional explanations are explanations of behaviour. Evidently, one can choose to call 
“behaviour” only the bodily movement and hence to claim that the subject matter of intentional 
explanations is not behaviour, but success. Nevertheless, this is only a terminological matter 
of what is being called “behaviour”, which does not touch in any way the viability of the 
success pattern proposal of intentional explanations.  
  So far, so good. However, an ontological question remains about the nature of the 
success pattern assumed by this account of intentional explanations – what is the ontological 
nature of the success pattern? On the one hand, there is the anti-realist response according to 
which the success pattern is not real; it does not really exist in the behaviour. It is just a 
projection on the behaviour made by the observer – once there is no one observing the 
behaviour, there is no success pattern. By contrast, the realist response claims that the success 
pattern exists and is present in the behaviour independently of whether there is an observer 
around or not. There is no projection being made, the success pattern is not on the eyes of the 
observer, rather the observer just discoveries a previously existing pattern. In what follows, I 
will argue that success patterns are real in the sense of real patterns introduced by Daniel 
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Dennett (DENNETT, 1991).    
  Success patterns are patterns of interaction between the behavioural output of the 
organism and the input stimuli from the external environment. To say that a given success 
pattern exists in an organism is to say that the behavioural output of the organism exhibits such 
a success pattern. A success pattern is real because the behavioural output has such a pattern 
irrespective of whether there is anyone who recognises that it is there. Rather, there would be 
a success pattern there even if an observer had never existed who recognises that it exists. For 
instance, consider the catching behaviour of an organism towards food in different situations 
where food is located in different places and nevertheless the organism catches it. The 
intentional explanation for it is that the organism represented the presence of food and so 
catches it. The success pattern is on the catching behaviour throughout these situations 
irrespective of whether there is an observer to verify the presence of this pattern on these 
occasions. Evidently, for an observer to recognize the existence of a success pattern in the 
behaviour of a given organism it is required for the observer to posit an internal representational 
state on this organism. But the intentional explanation does not consist in a projection made by 
the observer of a pattern that would not exist in case of the absence of the projection; rather, 
the success pattern is present in the behaviour irrespective of any projection. There is a fact of 
the matter as to whether a given organism’s behavioural output has a success pattern, 
irrespective of whether there is someone to recognize that the behaviour exhibits such a pattern. 
Intentional explanations pick up real success patterns of the way the organism interacts with 
the surrounding environment; they are there independent of any projection or observation.   
  The success pattern proposal was originally proposed by success semantics to give an 
account of intentional explanations of behaviour given rise to by belief and desire states, but it 
is generalizable to every intentional explanation – including intentional explanations given rise 
to by representations with minimal intentionality. However, the success pattern proposal comes 
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with a problem: how do intentional explanations determine the external result that the organism 
pursues? There is an instance of a success pattern only if the relevant organism pursues a given 
result, but how does the intentional explanation determine which the result is? For instance, in 
the predator example, what is the criterion for the specification that the organism’s pursued 
result is the avoidance of a predator but not a different result?   
  Success semantics originally appealed to the success pattern proposal in order to 
determine the truth-conditions of beliefs. A belief’s truth-condition is the condition that 
guarantees the fulfilment of any desire by the behaviour which that belief and desire would 
combine to cause.85 But such specification of the belief’s truth-conditions presupposes the 
specification of the desire’s truth-conditions – it determines the content of beliefs in terms of 
the content of desires. Thus, it provides no solution for the problem of how to determine the 
organism’s pursued result (in the case of belief-desire systems, the satisfaction of the desire), 
it just presupposes it. Furthermore, such specification of the belief’s content is not acceptable 
in light of the naturalistic standard since it presupposes the semantic notion of the desire’s 
content. The case of success semantics illustrates quite well the problem of appealing to the 
success pattern in order to give an account of the explanatory role of intentional explanations: 
how to specify the pursued result in a naturalistically acceptable way?   
  It is here that teleosemantics comes into play. Teleosemantics claims that the pursued 
result of a representational state is constituted by its biological goal or purpose. The success of 
achieving the pursued result is just biological success. The organism tries to fulfil a certain 
biological function via the tokening of the representational state and the triggered behavioural 
output. It is such biological function that determines the organism’s pursued result and, 
derivatively, the representation’s pursued result. The representational state is teleological, it 
                                                             
85 Cf. WHYTE, 1990, p. 150. Frank Ramsey, the founding father of success semantics, determined the truth-
conditions of a belief in the following way: “any actions [behaviours] for whose utility [success] p is a necessary 
and sufficient condition might be called a belief that p, and so would be true if p, i.e. if they are useful 
[successful].” (RAMSEY, 1927, p. 5). 
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has a biological function that determines its success conditions and hence the success 
conditions of the triggered behavioural output in achieving this pursued result, that is, its 
biological goal. There are several theories of biological function that specify how a given 
representational state has a biological function (aetiological theory, systemic theories, etc.)86, 
but it is not my focus here to assess them. It is sufficient to note that there are rival theories of 
biological function. Here I will just assume that one of them is right. Hence, a representational 
state has a biological function that determines its pursued result and so the success conditions 
for the resulting behavioural output to achieve its pursued result. In the predator example, the 
goal of the representational state is to avoid predators because its biological function is to avoid 
predators. Teleosemantics assumes the core thesis of success semantics of identifying truth 
conditions with success conditions and takes the further step of specifying the success 
conditions of representational states in terms of their biological function (MILLIKAN, 1984, 
2004; PAPINEAU, 1993, 2016.). In short, success conditions are biological success conditions 
and the external result pursued by the organism via tokening the representation is its biological 
goal.87  
  But it should be highlighted that the success pattern proposal is independent of the 
teleological specification of the pursued result. In fact, it is compatible with any naturalist 
specification of it, teleological or not. My preference for a teleological specification should not 
be confused with an endorsement of the thesis that the success pattern is committed to a 
teleological specification of the pursued result. Note that the fact that the organism’s pursued 
result is specified in terms of biological function (or in any other way) does not play any 
explanatory role in the success pattern proposal. This proposal just assumes that there is a result 
                                                             
86 For the aetiological theory of function, cf. WRIGHT, 1973, MILLIKAN, 1989a; NEANDER, 1991. For the systemic 
theory, cf. CUMMINS, 1975.  
87 Here the following problem arises for the viability of teleosemantics: why should the pursued result be 
specified in terms of biological function? That is, why should the biological function be the one that specifies the 
pursued result, not something else? However, it is not my aim to assess this problem here. In what follows, I will 
just assume that it is the biological function of the representation that determines the pursued result.   
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pursued by the organism via the tokening of the representation; what determines this result is 
a further and independent matter. In what follows, unless otherwise specified, I will remain 
neutral on the question of the appropriate specification of the pursued result.   
  The success pattern proposal maintains that it is a minimal condition for a given system 
to be intentional that a success pattern is present in its behaviour. That is, if there is no success 
pattern in the behavioural output, it follows that the system is not genuinely representational. 
When the success pattern condition is combined with the teleosemantics identification of the 
representation’s pursued result with its biological function, it becomes the teleological pattern 
condition. Hence, the teleological pattern condition is just a variation or a subtype of the 
success pattern condition. Evidently, the conclusion that a system is in fact intentional depends 
on the verification that its behaviour shows this success pattern, but this condition is not merely 
stating that the system is intentional only if you can recognise that its behaviour has a success 
pattern. Rather, it is stating that it is a condition for minimal intentionality that the success 
pattern is present in the behaviour; how this pattern is verifiable is a distinct and further matter. 
In fact, different systems may require different methods of verification that vary from the nature 
of the systems. For instance, the method of verification of the success pattern as present in the 
behaviour of a person is different from the method of verification of it as present in the 
behaviour of an animal. That is why cognitive science and neuroethology have different but 
continuous subject matters and methodologies (the latter studies animals like toads and bees 
while the former studies humans).   
  Finally, the success pattern condition does not establish that in order for a given internal 
state to be intentional, the presence of the success pattern in the behavioural output is enough. 
It also requires that the organism should use the internal state as a proxy for the presence of the 
relevant external condition to achieve the pursued result. That is, the internal state guides the 
production of the behavioural output in the achievement of the organism’s pursued result. The 
161 
 
organism has a pursued result that is only achievable when a given external condition obtains. 
Thus, it uses the internal state that stands for the external condition as a guide for achieving 
this result via the production of the behaviour. In the predator example, the relevant internal 
state is a representation of the predator because it satisfies both requirements. First, the 
behavioural output has a success pattern (the success condition is the avoidance of predators). 
Second, the organism uses the internal state as a proxy for the whereabouts of the predator to 
escape the predator (e.g., move in the opposite direction). That is, the internal state guides the 
organism in the production of the behavioural output in so far as it informs the organism about 
the location of the predator. In sum, the success pattern condition establishes that it is a minimal 
condition for intentionality that the behavioural output has a success pattern and that the 
organism uses the relevant internal state as a proxy for the relevant external condition in the 
production of the behavioural output in order to achieve the pursued result. The success pattern 
condition is satisfied if and only if both requirements are satisfied.88  
 
4.2 The objection of liberality   
 The success pattern proposal is a clear and straightforward proposal of the distinctive 
explanatory power of intentional explanations – the explanation and prediction of successful 
behaviours, i.e., the achievement of the organism’s pursued result by tokening the 
representational state. Whenever such a condition is not satisfied, the positing of the 
representational state plays no explanatory role and hence must be discarded. It is clear that the 
success pattern condition rules out several candidates for representational states. For instance, 
consider a variation of Dennett’s lectern example (DENNETT, 1987, p. 23). There is a stone 
                                                             
88 Ruth Millikan (1984) is famous for introducing the distinction between the producer system that produces the 
internal state from the consumer system that consumes the internal state. The part of the organism that uses 
the state as a guide for the production of the behavioural output in order to achieve the pursued result is the 
consumer system. However, I will not commit myself here to a clear-cut distinction between these systems; it is 
enough to claim that the organism uses the internal state as a guide for the production of the behaviour.  
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in a given place that stays there unless something moves it to another place (e.g., a person or a 
strong wind). How to explain such a stationary position? The intentional explanation claims 
that the stone has an internal representational state that represents something in the surrounding 
environment that keeps this stationary position. Why would it be absurd to appeal to this 
intentional explanation to explain the stone’s stationary position? According to the success 
pattern proposal, the stone clearly does not have a behavioural output with success conditions. 
It pursues no result and so its supposed stationary behaviour cannot be assessed in terms of the 
success or failure of achieving any result. In light of the teleological pattern condition, this 
conclusion is even more persuasive, since it is clear that the stone has no biological function 
that could constitute a pursued result. The non-intentional explanation of the causal transactions 
responsible to keep the stone stationary explains everything that has to be explained about the 
stone’s stationary position. Following the same line of reasoning, the success pattern condition 
rules out several other absurd candidates for intentional systems.   
  The success pattern condition also rules out the intentionality of several other systems 
for another reason. If the internal state is not used by the system as a proxy for some external 
feature in the production of the behavioural output, then it is not intentional even if the system 
pursues an external result via the production of this behaviour and hence has success 
conditions. Notice that the success pattern condition does not claim that the mere presence of 
success conditions in the behavioural output is sufficient for intentionality. It also requires that 
the system uses the state as a guide in the production of the behaviour to achieve its pursued 
result. After all, it is evident that the presence of success conditions on the behavioural output 
is not sufficient for minimal intentionality. It would include several states that are clearly not 
representations as representational states. The problem is that success conditions are 
widespread – artefacts like thermostats have success conditions (namely, to keep the 
temperature at a given set point), every biological system has success conditions in so far as it 
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has one or more biological functions, every goal-directed system has success conditions, etc. 
Thus, the requirement of the presence of success conditions is not sufficient for minimal 
intentionality.89  
  Several systems are not intentional despite the presence of success conditions on the 
behavioural output precisely because there is no use of the relevant state as a proxy for the 
presence of the relevant external condition to achieve the pursued result. For instance, the 
eagle’s wing has success conditions constituted by the biological function of soaring. But the 
eagle does not use the wing state as a proxy for the presence of some external feature to achieve 
some biological goal. In fact, there is no use of the wing state as a proxy of any feature at all. 
The fact that the wing is assessable in terms of the success of achieving soaring is not sufficient 
for it to be intentional. 
  So far, so good. The success pattern condition succeeds in ruling out several internal 
states that are clearly not representational, either because the behavioural output has no success 
conditions or because the system does not use the relevant state as a proxy for the presence of 
some external condition to achieve the pursued result. Nevertheless, a serious threat comes 
with the assumption of the success pattern condition – the objection of liberality.  
  The objection is that the success pattern condition draws the lower border of 
intentionality too low. It seems that there are several systems that satisfies the success pattern 
condition but nevertheless are clearly not intentional. Consider thermostats: devices which 
sense the environmental temperature in order to keep it at a set point. Thus, whenever 
temperature is below this set point, the thermostat triggers another device that increases the 
system’s temperature, while whenever it is above the set point, the thermostat triggers the 
device to decrease the temperature. Why not give an intentional explanation of the thermostat’s 
                                                             
89 Even worse, it is subject to the objection of pansemanticism. Maybe there are success conditions everywhere 
(why not?) which would lead to the absurd consequence that every state in the universe is intentional. 
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behaviour and conclude that the thermostat represents the environmental temperature? After 
all, the thermostat pursues the maintenance of temperature at the set point and it succeeds 
whenever it keeps the temperature at this set point. Evidently, the thermostat and other artefact 
cases are easily ruled out as genuinely representational states by appealing to the original 
intentionality condition – the thermostat has no original intentionality. The designer that 
constructed the thermostat is the one that pursued the maintenance of the temperature in the 
relevant set point. Hence, the thermostat would have only derived intentionality and a derived 
pursued result.90 But note that what rules out artefacts as genuine representations is the original 
intentionality condition, not the success pattern condition.  
  Success patterns are wide spread. Even restricting the success pattern condition to 
systems that have original pursued results (and hence ruling out systems with derived pursued 
results), the resulting demarcation proposal draws the limits of intentionality too low. Success 
patterns are recognizable not only in several artefacts but also in very simple biological 
organisms – even very implausible candidates for representational systems satisfy the success 
pattern condition. They not only have behavioural outputs with success pattern, they have 
behavioural outputs with success patterns and use the relevant internal states as proxies for the 
presence of the external conditions to achieve the pursued biological goal. This is quite clear 
in the following example.  
  When the osmolarity of human blood (roughly, the number of particles in a given 
quantity of blood plasma) reaches above a certain level, the antidiuretic hormone (also called 
“vasopressin”) is produced by the hypothalamus. It then acts on the kidneys, where it triggers 
an increase in the quantity of water that is reabsorbed during urine formation, resulting in the 
lowering of the osmolality of the blood. Once again, the intentional talk arises here because the 
                                                             
90 Here I assume that thermostats have derived intentionality since they are artefacts. It could be objected that 
that there are real cases of natural thermostats and hence that these ones would have original intentionality 
(provided that they are intentional). However, the appeal to thermostats is merely illustrative. Another example 
of an artefact with derived intentionality would also be appropriate to illustrate the objection of liberality.     
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success pattern is clearly present on the antidiuretic hormone. Why not claim that the 
antidiuretic hormone produced by the hypothalamus represents high plasma osmolarity? The 
hypothalamus is an intentional system because it has a clear pursued result (to keep the 
osmolarity in a certain level), it produces the antidiuretic hormone as a signal for high 
osmolarity, and the kidney uses the antidiuretic hormone as a proxy for the high osmolarity to 
lower the osmolarity of the blood. This “behaviour” is successful whenever it achieves this 
result. Even worse, in this case the appeal to the original intentionality requirement would not 
be able to rule out the hypothalamus as a representational system. After all, there would be no 
derived intentionality here, but an unequivocal original intentionality – the hypothalamus has 
the biological function of producing antidiuretic hormone to lower the level of osmolarity. The 
hypothalamus is a system that satisfies not only the success pattern condition, but also the 
teleosemantic version of the success pattern condition and the original intentionality 
requirement. The same line of reasoning entails that tropistic systems are also intentional. 
 Considering the anaerobic bacteria example, Tyler Burge claims that the positing of the 
magnetosomes state as representational is not explanatorily justified. It is clear that there is a 
success pattern present on the bacterium’s behaviour since (a) it has the biological goal of being 
attracted to the prevailing magnetic field because it correlates with the direction of oxygenated-
free water that is lethal for it; and (b) the bacterium uses the magnetesomes state that triggers 
this behaviour as a proxy for the direction of the magnetic field. But the bacterium’s behaviour 
is fully explained by the non-intentional explanation that specifies the relevant causal chain 
between the magnetic field and the bacterium’s movement towards the magnetic field, and the 
positing that the magnetesomes state has the biological goal of avoiding oxygenated waters. 
So, there is nothing left to be explained by the intentional explanation – the positing of the 
magnetesomes state as a representation is explanatorily idle. In Burge’s words, “everything in 
the example can be explained using the notion of biological function (with respect to oxygen 
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poverty), normal environmental conditions, and sensory discrimination (with respect to 
magnetic forces). Adding an odd use of the term ‘representation’ contributes nothing to 
explanation.” (BURGE, 2010, p. 300).91  
   What about the intuitiveness of the success pattern proposal? Is it compatible with the 
intuitive conception of representation or does it violate our highly entrenched principles? I 
think that the lower border of intentionality drawn by the success pattern proposal is intuitively 
too low. This conclusion is based on both the fact that it violates highly entrenched principles 
of our intuitive conception of representation and it also treats several states as representations 
that are not intuitively representational. First, it violates the complexity principle. According 
to this principle, a certain cognitive complexity is required in order for a given system to be 
intentional. It considers microorganisms like bacteria and even unicellular organisms like 
paramecia as full-blooded representational states. However, whatever is the minimum 
cognitive complexity required by the complexity principle, microorganisms like bacteria and 
unicellular organisms like paramecia do not satisfy it. They are cognitively too simple.   
  Second, the success pattern proposal violates the activity principle. This one establishes 
that an autonomous system that is deprived of any active role – i.e., a wholly passive system – 
is not intuitively intentional. What happens is that the supposed representational state is 
automatically triggered by the presence of the relevant external feature that finally triggers the 
behavioural output. The success pattern proposal treats the magnetosome state of the anaerobic 
bacterium as representational, but the bacterium is fully passive in the whole process. The 
orientation of the bacterium in a given direction (bottom of the ocean) is a direct result of the 
force exerted by the prevailing magnetic field. The bacterium plays such a passive role that, 
even dead, it aligns itself with the magnetic field.92 But if the bacterium is dead, it is not 
                                                             
91 Kim Sterelny makes similar claims about the explanatory idleness of positing tropistic systems and other very 
simple biological organisms as intentional systems, cf. STERELNY, 1995. 
92 Cf. BLAKEMORE, 1975, p. 379; SCHULTE, 2015, p. 125. 
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representing anything. In light of the violation of the complexity and activity intuitive 
principles, the conclusion is that the lower border of intentionality drawn by the success pattern 
proposal is not intuitive. This proposal is not justified from either the explanatory or the 
intuitive perspectives.  
   What is the lesson to be drawn from these intuitive and explanatory objections against 
the success pattern proposal? I think that it is that the satisfaction of the success pattern 
condition is not enough to give rise to intentional explanations. That is, the fact that there is a 
success pattern present in the organism’s behaviour and that the organism uses the relevant 
internal state as a proxy for the presence of some external condition in order to produce a 
behaviour to achieve the pursued result is not sufficient for the system to be intentional. If every 
system that satisfies the success pattern condition gives rise to intentional explanations, it 
follows that there is an intentional explanation for the osmolarity, the paramecium, the 
anaerobic bacteria and other cases. Notice that these are different cases from the 
aforementioned eagle’s wing state example in which there is no use of the state by the eagle as 
a proxy for any external feature. Rather, in these cases there is an effective use of the relevant 
state as a proxy for the external feature to achieve the biological goal. The positing of the 
representational state is not explanatorily justified in these cases because the behavioural output 
is fully explainable by the non-intentional explanation that specifies the causal chain from the 
relevant stimulus to the behavioural output and the result pursued by the organism. On the other 
hand, the success pattern proposal violates two of the most intuitive principles entrenched in 
our intuitive conception of representation: the complexity and the activity principles. The 
conclusion is that the success pattern proposal is too liberal; it draws the lower border of 
intentionality too low. Thus, some further minimal condition for intentionality is required to 
make it more restrictive. That is precisely what I will do in the next section. I will propose the 
adoption of a second minimal condition that together with the success pattern condition will 
168 
 
constitute my proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality – the dual proposal.  
 
4.3 The dual proposal: constancy mechanism joins success pattern  
  In what follows, I will propose that intentional patterns are a subset of success patterns. 
Every intentional pattern is a success pattern, but not the other way around. As a result, the 
behaviours of systems like the hypothalamus and the paramecium have success patterns but 
not intentional patterns, i.e., they have non-intentional success patterns. The explanatory 
purchase of representational states is not justified in cases of systems with non-intentional 
success pattern behaviour, only in the case of systems with intentional success pattern 
behaviour. Evidently, in order for this distinction to be tenable it is required to establish a 
criterion based on which the distinction can be made.  
  Success patterns are real. They are patterns of interaction between the organism’s 
behavioural outputs and a certain external condition. They are present in the behaviour 
irrespective of whether there is an observer verifying its existence; they are not mere 
projections of the observer. They are present as long as the organism’s behavioural output 
pursues the achievement of a given result, giving rise to success assessments of the behavioural 
output in achieving this result. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional success 
patterns should thus be drawn based on the distinctive explanatory power of intentional 
explanations. But how to do that?  
  Success patterns give rise to certain kinds of explanations, namely – explanations of the 
success or failure of the behavioural output in achieving the pursued result. Since we are 
looking for a distinction between intentional and non-intentional success patterns, we should 
look for the distinction in explanatory powers due to intentional and non-intentional success 
patterns. The right approach to establish this distinction is to take a deeper look at the 
explanatory powers of the explanations given rise by success patterns in general, and then try 
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to select among these explanatory powers the ones that are distinctive of intentional 
explanations.93   
  I have previously defended that the presence of a success pattern endows the 
explanation of the behavioural output with generalization and predictive powers. However, this 
is not enough to justify the positing of the representational state. In what follows, I defend that 
the positing of representational states requires further explanatory powers, that is, explanatory 
powers that are not given rise to by the presence of the success pattern. I claim that the 
employment of the constancy mechanism gives rise to such further explanatory requirements 
because it allows the recognition of the presence of the same pattern despite the variety of input 
stimuli. A success pattern on the behavioural output of a given organism is intentional only if 
the organism employs a constancy mechanism on the production of the representational state. 
The presence of the success pattern guarantees the rising of certain explanatory powers that 
originate in the behavioural output triggered by the representation, while the employment of 
the constancy mechanism guarantees the rising of other explanatory powers that originate in 
that which triggers the tokening of the representation. The fundamental distinction between 
these explanatory powers is that the first arises from what is caused by the tokening of the 
representation (output side), while the second arises from what causes the tokening of the 
representation (input side). They are distinct but complementary explanatory powers. The 
presence of a success pattern gives rise to an output explanatory power, but it does not 
guarantee that this success pattern is intentional. The employment of the constancy mechanism 
gives rise to an output explanatory power that guarantees the intentionality of the relevant 
                                                             
93 What about a pragmatic approach? The distinctive explanatory power of intentional patterns is the result of 
a mere pragmatic choice of the scientist that has the preference of explaining certain success pattern behaviours 
but not others in an intentional way. So, the distinction between intentional and non-intentional success 
patterns is a pragmatic projection of the scientist in light of their own theoretical interests (simplicity, utility, 
etc.). However, this proposal goes in the opposite direction to the intentional realism that I have defended. If 
the distinction between intentional and non-intentional success patterns is pragmatic, then the explanatory 
power of intentional explanations derives from a pragmatic choice of some success patterns as intentional. 
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success pattern. This is a variation of the constancy mechanism condition that I have assessed 
in the third chapter. But now it is applied for the recognition of the same success pattern despite 
the multiplicity of input stimuli that causes the tokening of the representation.   
  The satisfaction of the success pattern condition guarantees that there is a success 
pattern in the behavioural output; the satisfaction of the constancy mechanism condition 
guarantees that this is an intentional success pattern. In sum, the explanatory powers that are 
distinctive of intentional explanations and that justify the positing of the representational state 
are constituted by the explanatory power given rise to by the presence of the success pattern 
(output explanatory power) and by the explanatory power given rise to by the employment of 
the constancy mechanism (input explanatory power). In case of the dissatisfaction of either the 
success pattern or the constancy mechanism conditions, the system is not intentional. Both are 
minimal conditions for intentionality from an explanatory point of view.     
  Let’s start this investigation considering tropistic systems like paramecia. Tropism is 
the movement of the system (or parts of it) in given direction, in response to a given external 
stimulus. Now consider that the presence of a certain stimulus in the surrounding environment 
makes a given tropistic system to move in the opposite direction. The system moves in the 
opposite direction whenever such a stimulus is present. There are three different explanations 
for this avoidance behaviour. First, the causal explanation consists in the specification of the 
causal chain that starts with the presence of the stimulus and ends with the movement of the 
system in the opposite direction. So, the system has this avoidance behaviour because of this 
causal pattern. Second, there is the non-intentional success explanation that specifies the causal 
chain and posits a goal-directed intermediate state between the stimulus and the avoidance 
behaviour that produces this behaviour to achieve the pursued result. It consists in the 
specification of this non-intentional success pattern. So, the explanation is that the system has 
this avoidance behaviour because it tries to achieve its pursued result – it is through this 
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behaviour that it tries to achieve this result. The difference is that the causal explanation is just 
the specification of the causal chain, while the non-intentional success explanation posits a 
goal-directed intermediate state in the causal chain (i.e., the goal-directed state) to explain the 
avoidance behaviour. Finally, there is the intentional success explanation, i.e., the intentional 
explanation. It also posits intermediate goal-directed state between the stimulus and the 
avoidance behaviour, but in contrast with the non-intentional success explanation it posits an 
intermediate state that is not only a goal-directed state, but something more – a representational 
state. The system moved in the opposite direction of the stimulus because it represented its 
presence and this representational state triggered the avoidance behaviour. So, is the positing 
of this representational state explanatorily justified? If not, why does it have no explanatory 
purchase? Why does the intentional explanation have no distinctive explanatory role for 
tropistic systems?   
  Suppose that there is a success pattern in the behavioural output of this tropistic system 
constituted by the biological goal achieved by avoiding the relevant stimulus. So, the 
distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional success explanation is that the first 
assumes that this is an intentional success pattern (i.e., the intermediate state is a 
representational state) and that the second assumes that it is a non-intentional success pattern 
(i.e., the intermediate state is just a goal-directed state). But from an explanatory point of view, 
it makes no sense to posit that this success pattern is intentional because the intentional success 
explanation that it gives rise to has the same explanatory power as the non-intentional success 
explanation. There would be nothing left to be explained by the intentional success explanation 
that the non-intentional one has not explained. Given that both explanations have the same 
explanatory power, it follows that the positing of the representational state should be ruled out. 
  Now contrast this success pattern in the tropistic system with genuine intentional 
success patterns. What would a non-intentional success explanation miss? In the case of 
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intentional success patterns, the representational state is triggered by several stimuli (s¹, s², 
s³…) that triggers behavioural outputs to pursue the same result. In all of these cases, the 
intentional explanation bridges across a variety of different input stimuli (s¹, s², s³...). The 
positing of the representational state allows the intentional explanation to identify the presence 
of the same success pattern despite the variety of input stimuli. By contrast, the non-intentional 
success explanation misses the identification of the same success pattern that is present 
throughout all of these cases because they involve different causal chains that start with 
different input stimuli. For every different causal chain, the non-intentional explanation 
provides a distinct and independent explanation of behaviour. It misses the same success 
pattern that is common between them. It is true that you can sum up all distinct causal chains 
into one single causal explanation by simply conjoining them. But such movement would not 
allow the identification of the same success pattern, the mere conjunction of distinct causal 
explanations does not make any connection between them. The identification of the same 
success pattern is only possible via the positing of the intermediate state as a representation. 
Such positing by the intentional explanation allows for the recognition of the same success 
pattern that is present in all of these distinct causal patterns. That is, such recognition is only 
possible because the organism employs a constancy mechanism in the production of the 
representational state that allows it to represent the same external feature despite the variety of 
input stimuli reaching the sensory apparatus. This is a variation of the constancy mechanism 
condition because the employment of the constancy mechanism is now applied for the 
recognition of the same success pattern despite the multiplicity of input stimuli that cause the 
tokening of the representation.    
  The identification of the same success pattern endows the intentional explanation with 
three different but related explanatory powers – generalization, predictive and counterfactuality 
powers. Let’s assess them in detail.    
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Generalization, predictive and counterfactuality explanatory powers    
  Perhaps the generalization power is the most evident. The recognition of an intentional 
success pattern gives rise to a general explanation of different instances of the same success 
pattern in behavioural outputs triggered by different input stimuli. By contrast, non-intentional 
success explanations are capable of explaining why a specific behaviour achieved a given 
result, but not of providing a general explanation of why this behaviour originated by different 
input stimuli achieved the same result. This is a general and unified explanation that embraces 
all of these behavioural outputs. What makes the difference is that the positing of a 
representational state bridges across different input stimuli and hence give rises to intentional 
explanations of the form “organism O has the behaviour B because it represents R”. The 
representation plays a unification role that makes viable the generalization over different 
behaviours triggered by different stimuli throughout the organism’s history as well as present 
behavioural situations.   
  Suppose that an organism manifested a successful avoidance behaviour in different 
situations throughout its behavioural history, and that now it is also having an avoidance 
behaviour, and that what is common in all of these situations is the presence of a predator 
around. The pursued result is the avoidance of predators and hence there is a success pattern 
present in all of these cases. How do intentional and non-intentional success explanations 
explain the organism’s avoidance behaviour? In what the difference consists between the 
intentional success pattern explained by the intentional explanation and the non-intentional 
success pattern explained by the non-intentional success explanation? The non-intentional 
explanation consists in the specification of a distinct and independent causal chain of a given 
behavioural output and of the conditions under which this behaviour succeeds in avoiding 
predators. But it does not establish any connection between this behaviour and other avoidance 
behaviours triggered by different stimuli, since it does not establish any connection between 
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their respective causal chains. The non-intentional explanation treats them as completely 
independent chains.    
  By contrast, the intentional explanation consists in a general explanation of the 
organism’s behaviour in all situations: the organism represented the presence of the predator 
that triggered the avoidance behaviour which finally led to the successful behaviour of avoiding 
the predator. That is only possible because it abstracts from the specificities of the different 
stimuli that in each occasion triggered the behavioural output (e.g., a light array coming from 
certain direction, another light array with a different frequency, etc.) and instead unifies them 
by establishing what is common to all of them, namely, the presence of the predator. Hence, 
the intentional explanation is more powerful because it reaches a generality level that non-
intentional success explanations are simply not capable of reaching. There are only individual 
and independent non-intentional explanations of specific behaviours in specific situations; 
there is nothing capable of unifying them by appealing to something in common throughout 
these specific behaviours. By contrast, in the case of intentional explanations, the positing of 
the representation of the predator is precisely the unifying element that provides the intentional 
explanations with the generalization power.  
  The positing of representational states also provides intentional explanations with 
predictive power. The identification of the intentional success pattern gives rise to the 
prediction that the organism with the token representation will behave in the same way and 
with the same success conditions that it behaved in past situations in which the pattern was 
present.94 The representation is a predictive element that allows the intentional explanation to 
imply that the organism will have the same behaviour with the same success conditions, just 
                                                             
94 There is no guarantee that because the organism represents the presence of the predator, then it will always 
have an avoidance behaviour. The organism may fail to have it because of an external problem (e.g., there is 
something that prevents the escape) or an internal problem (e.g., biological malfunctioning). Nevertheless, what 
matters is that the tokening of the representation of the predator will trigger an avoidance behaviour. In this 
example, I am just assuming that it will occur because there is no relevant external or internal problem that 
prevents the avoidance behaviour.  
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as it did in the past, provided that the same intentional success pattern is present. By contrast, 
the non-intentional success explanation is deprived of this predictive power because it fails to 
identify the intentional success pattern that is present despite the variety of input stimuli. That 
is the case because the non-intentional success explanation lacks an element that bridges across 
distinct stimuli that triggers the behavioural outputs – different input stimuli gives rise to 
distinct causal chains. In the absence of this unifying element, the intentional success pattern 
is not identifiable and hence the non-intentional explanation is not endowed with predictive 
power.  
  The former example illustrates quite well the predictive power. An intentional 
explanation of the organism’s avoidance behaviour has the predictive power of establishing 
that the organism will escape whenever the intentional success pattern is present in the 
avoidance behaviour. The presence of this pattern entails that the organism represents the 
presence of the predator in the surrounding environment. The representational state provides 
the intentional explanation with such predictive power, it is the basis for the prediction that the 
representation of the predator will trigger the avoidance behaviour that will result in the 
escaping from the predator. By contrast, the non-intentional success explanation cannot make 
any prediction that the organism will have the same avoidance behaviour across different input 
stimuli because it fails to identify the pattern that bridges across these inputs. At best, it predicts 
what will happen in situations where the same stimulus input triggers the behavioural output 
(e.g., same position and orientation of the organism and predator, distance, etc.). What makes 
the difference is that in the case of the intentional explanation, future situations may involve 
very different input stimuli and still it predicts that the organism will have an avoidance 
behaviour provided that the intentional success pattern is present.    
  The difference between the predictive and generalization powers of intentional 
explanations lies in the distinct kinds of explananda. The predictive power has future 
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behavioural situations as explananda; the explanation consists in how the organism will behave 
in instances of a certain behavioural situation in the future. The generalization power has past 
and present behavioural situations as explananda; the explanation consists of a unified and 
general explanation of how the organism behaved in the past and behaves in the present in 
certain behavioural situations. In the case of the generalization power, the representation give 
rise to a general explanation of how the organism behaved in the past and behaves in the 
present, while in the case of the predictive power, the representation is an element that gives 
rise to an explanation of how the organism will behave in the future.    
  Finally, the last distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations is the 
counterfactuality power. The identification of the intentional success pattern via the positing 
of the representational state allows the intentional explanation to explain what would have 
happened in counterfactual scenarios, provided that the intentional success pattern is present in 
the organism’s behaviour. Suppose that in some past situation there was a predator in the 
surrounding environment and the organism had an avoidance behaviour. Now consider 
counterfactual scenarios in which things are different. For instance, the organism or the 
predator are in different positions or orientations; the surrounding environment has different 
weather or lighting, etc. What would then have happened in these counterfactual scenarios? 
According to the intentional explanation, the organism would have an avoidance behaviour 
because it represents the presence of the predator. What happens is that in these counterfactual 
situations, the behavioural outputs that pursue the avoidance of predators are triggered by 
different input stimuli, but the positing of the representational state allows the identification of 
the intentional success pattern despite such stimuli multiplicity. By contrast, the non-
intentional success explanation would not be able to explain what would have then happened 
because these counterfactual scenarios involve behavioural outputs that are triggered by 
distinct input stimuli and hence by distinct causal chains. The non-intentional explanation lacks 
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the unifying element that would allow it to bridge over the variety of stimuli that triggered the 
causal chains that would lead to the successful behavioural outputs. Once again, the unifying 
element in the intentional explanation is the representational state.95  
  But what is the difference between the counterfactuality power of intentional 
explanations and the predictive and generalization powers? As previously noted, the 
fundamental distinction between the predictive and generalization powers is that the predictive 
power has as its explananda certain future behavioural situations, while the generalization 
power has as its explananda certain past and present behavioural situations. Hence, these 
explananda have in common that they are situations in the actual world, differing only on the 
temporal instances in which they occur. By contrast, the explananda of the counterfactuality 
power is not actual behavioural situations, but counterfactual behavioural situations.     
  At this point the following objection arises against my argument that the identification 
of the intentional success pattern endows the intentional explanation with predictive and 
counterfactual explanatory powers: non-intentional explanations support the prediction of what 
will happen in future scenarios and what would have happened in counterfactual scenarios. 
They are based on natural laws that give support to predictions and counterfactual assessments. 
Consider the natural law of the universal gravitation. Based on this, you can infer that because 
of gravity, if I had dropped the apple that is now in my hand, it would have fallen and reached 
the floor. Similarly, if the apple will be dropped, then it will fall. Hence, why is there no non-
intentional explanation of counterfactual or future behavioural situations?  
  That is all true. However, once again the touchstone lies in the fact that the positing of 
the representational state allows the identification of the same success pattern throughout the 
organism’s behavioural outputs, despite the variety of input stimuli which triggered it. The 
                                                             
95 As previously showed in the third chapter, the counterfactual robustness argument also defends that 
counterfactuality power is a distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations. Cf. STERELNY, 1995.  
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fundamental explanatory difference lies in the fact that the non-intentional success explanation 
is capable of explaining future and counterfactual scenarios that involve the same stimulus 
input. So, the non-intentional explanation is capable of explaining what will happen if the same 
stimulus occurs (“if the same stimulus will happen, the organism will have an avoidance 
behaviour”) and what would have happened if the same stimulus would have occurred (“if the 
same stimulus would have occurred, the organism would have an avoidance behaviour”). By 
contrast, the intentional explanation is able to predict what will happen and to establish what 
would have happened in scenarios in which a variety of input stimuli will (or would have 
occurred) precisely because it is capable of bridging across these distinct stimuli in virtue of 
the identification of the same success pattern throughout all of these scenarios. The positing of 
the representational state is what makes it possible for the intentional explanation to identify 
the same success pattern and hence to bridge across these distinct stimuli. In sum, the 
intentional explanation has more powerful counterfactual and predictive explanatory powers 
because the amount of counterfactual and future scenarios that it is capable of explaining is 
much bigger than the amount of counterfactual and future scenarios that non-intentional 
explanations are capable of explaining.   
 
Representational systems  
  So far, so good. I have defended that the presence of a success pattern on the behaviour 
of a given organism is a minimal condition for it to be an intentional system. However, the 
mere presence of a success pattern is not enough for minimal intentionality because there are 
intentional and non-intentional success patterns. The fundamental distinction between them is 
that the intentional one bridges across a variety of input stimuli while the non-intentional one 
fails to do that – the behavioural output is always triggered by the same type of stimulus. This 
is a variation of the constancy mechanism condition because it is applied for the recognition of 
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the same success pattern, despite the multiplicity of input stimuli. Based on this constancy 
mechanism condition, it becomes clear that success patterns present in the behavioural output 
of several very simple organisms are not intentional, while the success pattern of other 
organisms are intentional. Let’s consider some illustrative cases.    
  Consider the osmolarity example again. The hypothalamus produces the antidiuretic 
hormone to lower the osmolarity of the human blood when it goes above a certain level. It is 
clear that there is a success pattern present here since the hypothalamus has a pursued result – 
to keep the osmolarity at a certain level – and produces the antidiuretic hormone to reach that 
result – there will be success whenever this result is achieved. Furthermore, the kidney uses 
the hormone as a proxy for the high osmolarity to lower the osmolarity in the blood. 
Nevertheless, the mere presence of such success pattern is not enough for the conclusion that 
the hypothalamus is an intentional system. This is the case because the production of the 
antidiuretic hormone by the proper functioning hypothalamus is only triggered by the same 
kind of stimulus – high osmolarity.96 The hypothalamus does not bridge across a variety of 
stimuli in the production of the antidiuretic hormone in order to achieve the biological goal of 
keeping the osmolarity at a certain level. Thus, the success pattern present in the osmolarity 
example is not intentional.   
 I have introduced the distinction between intentional and non-intentional success 
patterns by contrasting intentional systems that are able to bridge across a variety of input 
stimuli and non-intentional systems that fail to do that. Let’s illustrate the tropistic systems 
with the paramecium case. Whenever light is present, the paramecium goes in the opposite 
direction. Its behavioural output is always triggered by the same kind of stimulus, light. Its 
success pattern is constituted by the paramecium’s biological goal that is achieved by escaping 
                                                             
96 The specification that high osmolarity is the only type of stimulus that triggers the production of the hormone 
in the proper functioning hypothalamus is required because, when malfunctioning, the hypothalamus produces 
the hormone even when the osmolarity is not high and so will be triggered by other stimuli.   
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from light. But it is not an intentional success pattern since the non-intentional explanation has 
the same explanatory power as the intentional explanation precisely because the behavioural 
output does not bridge across a variety of input stimuli. Rather, it is only triggered by the same 
light stimulus. For the same line of reasoning, the anaerobic bacterium is not an intentional 
system. There is a clear success pattern in its behavioural output constituted by the biological 
goal of reaching oxygen-free water (oxygenated water is fatal to it) via the use of internal 
magnetesomes (the direction of the geomagnetic field coincides with the direction of the 
bottom of the ocean that is oxygen-free). However, the bacterium’s behaviour is only triggered 
by one kind of stimulus – the prevailing magnetic field – and so does not bridge across a variety 
of stimuli to produce the behaviour of moving to the oxygen-free water. In sum, both paramecia 
and bacteria are not intentional because they fail to satisfy the constancy mechanism condition. 
  What about organisms that satisfy the success pattern and constancy mechanism 
conditions and hence are intentional according to the dual proposal? There are plenty of cases. 
Let’s start with the less simple case and then pass to the simpler one. Vervet monkeys in Kenya 
have a complex signalling system. As Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler (SEYFARTH et al., 1980) 
present in their classic paper, vervet monkeys give acoustically different alarm calls to at least 
three different predators: leopards, martial eagles and pythons. The alarm signals are produced 
by the speaker monkey to signal to other monkeys the presence of predators, so they can have 
specific avoidance behaviours that vary from signal to signal. Let’s concentrate on eagle 
alarms. When monkeys are on the ground, eagle alarms cause them to look up and/or run into 
trees in order to avoid the eagle’s stoops. When in the trees, eagle alarms cause them to evoke 
looking ups and/or running out of the tree. The authors conclude that these distinct responses 
to the alarms suggest that “each alarm call effectively represented, or signified, a different class 
of external danger” (SEYFARTH et al., p. 802), that is, the eagle’s presence. These responses 
also occur in the absence of alarms, but because the other monkeys actually see the predator. 
181 
 
So, according to the dual proposal, do vervet monkeys represent the presence of eagles? There 
is a clear success pattern constituted by the alarming call and the subsequent avoidance 
behaviour. The relevant state also bridges across different proximal stimuli to represent the 
same external feature – the eagle. It is perspicuous that the monkey tokens this state and 
prompts the avoidance behaviour at different times, positions, distances, and angles, which 
implies the employment of a constancy mechanism in the production of the state and so that it 
bridges across a variety of proximal stimuli. For instance, difference in environmental light in 
virtue of the different sun positions in the sky. The same line of reasoning shows that vervet 
monkeys also represent leopards and pythons.97   
  Even though vervet monkeys are not as complex organisms as chimps or baboons, they 
are still complex. It may appear then that the dual proposal is too restrictive – it does not treat 
certain states as representations when they clearly are. So, let’s show that the dual proposal 
treats even simple organisms like certain insects as intentional. Honeybees perform waggle 
dances whose properties correlate with the distance from the hive of some sources of nectar. 
They dance in order to show other honeybees the direction of the source of nectar.98 Does the 
honeybee represent the source of nectar? Once again, the waggle dance and the triggering of 
the foraging behaviour have a success pattern – to gather nutrients – and there is the use of the 
waggle dance as a proxy for nectar. It is also clear that the honeybee represents the same source 
of nectar despite the variety of proximal stimuli. Because the flowers where the honeybee gets 
nectar are likely to change every few days when they are in bloom, the honeybee evolved the 
capacity to learn colours and shapes accurately. For instance, despite the change of colour or 
                                                             
97 There is strong evidence that the vervet monkeys perceptually categorizes the represented predators: “By 
giving alarm calls to some species but not to others, and by giving acoustically distinct alarms to different 
predators, vervet monkeys effectively categorize other species. More than 1000 species of mammals, birds and 
reptiles were seen regularly by the monkeys without eliciting alarm calls” (SEYFARTH et al., 1980, p. 803).  
98 Karl von Frisch is famous for his discovery of the honeybees’ communication system (VON FRISCH, 1967). I 
have collected the following information on the cognitive capacities of honeybees from Mandyam Srinivasan’s 
paper “Honey Bees as Model for Vision, Perception and Cognition” (SRINIVASAN, 2010). 
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shape of a given flower, the honeybee can still represent it as a source of nectar. They “possess 
color constancy, which is the ability to determine the true color of an object […] independently 
of the spectrum of the illumination under which it is viewed” (SRINIVASAN, 2010, p. 279). 
Such capacity enables the honeybee to accurately identify the colour of the flower whether it 
is in the sun or under the shade of tree. The honeybee employs a constancy mechanism in the 
production of the representational state of the location of nectar, otherwise it would not 
represent the same flower as a source of nectar despite variations of colour and shape.99 So, 
honeybees are intentional systems.   
  Here it may be objected that it is not the case that the honeybee satisfies the constancy 
mechanism condition. I have argued that the honeybees satisfy this condition, in opposition to 
the hypothalamus in the osmolarity example. But here it could be objected that there is a variety 
of proximal stimuli in both the honeybee and hypothalamus cases. The reason is that the 
production of the antidiuretic hormone by the hypothalamus is triggered by a variety of (high) 
osmolarity levels in the blood, just like the honeybee representation of the flower is triggered 
by a variety of colours and shapes. Hence, why say that only the honeybee employs the 
constancy mechanism? The fundamental distinction is that the production of the antidiuretic 
hormone by the hypothalamus is triggered by different degrees of the same kind of stimulus 
(different levels of osmolarity in the blood, but always above a certain level), while the 
honeybee’s representation is triggered by different kinds of stimuli – different colours and 
shapes of the flower. It is not that the honeybee’s representation is triggered by just different 
degrees of a given colour or shape, but that it is triggered by different colours and shapes. It is 
because of this distinction that the honeybee employs the constancy mechanism, but not the 
hypothalamus. 
                                                             
99 More evidence that honeybees employ constancy mechanisms is that they can represent the same external 





Input and output explanatory powers   
  I have proposed that it is a minimal condition for a state to represent an external feature 
that it bridges across a variety of proximal stimuli coming from the feature. Does this bridging 
condition also apply to the behavioural output? That is, is it a condition for intentionality that 
the organism should produce a variety of behavioural outputs to achieve the pursued result for 
it to be intentional? I think that no such minimal condition is required. Provided that the 
organism produces the behavioural output to achieve its pursued result, it is not required that 
the organism should produce a variety of behavioural outputs in order for it to be intentional. 
So, room is open for the organism to be intentional even if it always has the same behavioural 
output triggered by the tokening of the supposed representational state.   
  But isn’t there an analogous explanatory argument in favour of this requirement? Let 
me explain. I have defended the requirement that intentional success patterns bridge across a 
variety of input stimuli by appealing to the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional 
explanations. Intentional success patterns should have a variety of input stimuli because 
otherwise there would be no room for the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional 
explanations, i.e., counterfactuality, predictive and generality powers. So why not appeal to the 
analogous explanatory argument according to which intentional success patterns should bridge 
across a variety of behavioural outputs because otherwise there would be no room for the 
distinctive explanatory powers of intentional explanation? It could be argued that the bridging 
across a variety of input stimuli by the intentional success pattern is not enough to keep room 
open for the distinctive explanatory powers of intentional explanations – it is also required that 
the intentional success pattern also bridges across a variety of behavioural outputs. What is 
wrong with this argument? I think that the requirement that the intentional success pattern 
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bridges across a variety of input stimuli is enough to explain why intentional explanations have 
predictive, generality and counterfactual powers. The contrast with the requirement that the 
intentional success pattern should also bridge across a variety of behavioural outputs is clear. 
Let me show why.   
  The positing of the relevant internal state as representational is justified because 
otherwise the recognition of the same success pattern as being present despite the variety of 
input stimuli would not be possible. Notice that the positing of the internal state is the unifying 
element for the recognition of the presence of the same success pattern despite the distinct input 
stimuli. In the absence of this state playing this unifying role, the recognition of the same 
success pattern would not be possible. By contrast, the positing of the internal state as 
representational is not required for the recognition that the same pattern is present despite the 
variety of behavioural outputs. This is the case because no matter how different the behavioural 
outputs are, one can still recognise the presence of the same success pattern simply because 
they all are pursuing the same result. After all, they are produced by the organism in order to 
achieve the organism’s pursued result. So, the pursuit of the same result is the unifying element 
for the recognition of the presence of the same success pattern despite the variety of behavioural 
outputs. But if that is the case, it follows that the positing of the internal state as a representation 
would make no explanatory difference for one to recognise the presence of the same success 
pattern despite the variety of behavioural outputs. That is, such positing would not play the 
unifying role required to recognise the same success pattern. Rather, the fact that the 
behavioural outputs pursue the same result is the one that plays this unifying role. Hence, the 
requirement that the representational state should bridge across a variety of behavioural outputs 
would deliver no explanatory purchase.  
  But how would one still know that the distinct behavioural outputs pursue the same 
result? Notice that this problem also applies to cases in which the internal state bridge across a 
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variety of input stimuli but not across a variety of behavioural outputs – it always triggers the 
same behavioural output. Even in these cases, it may be not clear which result the organism 
pursues via the production of the same behavioural output. The only way to determine what is 
the pursued result of the behavioural output(s) of a given representational state is by proposing 
a criterion that specifies the pursued results of representational states. For instance, according 
to teleosemantics the pursued result is the biological function of the representational state. The 
problem of the specification of the pursued result of distinct behavioural outputs is just an 
instance of the general problem of the specification of the pursued result of a representational 
state, whether it triggers a variety of behavioural outputs to achieve this result or whether it 
triggers always the same behavioural output. But if what determines the pursued result of the 
representational state is the adopted criterion (e.g., the biological function of the 
representational state), then it does not matter whether the state triggers a variety of behavioural 
outputs or not. The conclusion is that the requirement that the representational state should 
bridge across a variety of behavioural outputs is not a minimal condition for intentionality.   
  I have developed the dual proposal for minimal conditions for intentionality constituted 
by the success pattern and the constancy mechanism conditions. According to the first, it is a 
minimal condition for a given state to be representational that (i) a success pattern is present in 
the behavioural output triggered by the internal state; and (ii) the system use the state as a proxy 
for the presence of the relevant external condition. According to the constancy mechanism 
condition, the distinction between an intentional and nonintentional success pattern is that the 
internal state bridges across a variety of input stimuli coming from the relevant external feature. 
In both cases, the defence was based on the explanatory powers given rise to respectively by 
the presence of the success pattern in the behavioural output and by the bridging across a variety 
of input stimuli by the representation. But what is the relation between these two explanatory 
powers? What distinguishes one from the other? On the one hand, if there is no relevant 
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distinction among them, the establishment of one of them is superfluous. On the other hand, if 
there is a relevant distinction, there is always the threat that they are incompatible.   
  Let’s call “success explanatory power” the explanatory power given rise to by the 
presence of the success pattern on the behavioural output and “constancy explanatory power” 
the explanatory power given rise to by the internal state’s bridging across a variety of proximal 
stimuli coming from the relevant external feature. The fundamental distinction between the 
success and the constancy explanatory powers is that the first originates at the output process 
that is triggered by the tokening of the representation, while the second originates at the input 
process that causes the tokening of the representation. That is, the success explanatory power 
comes from the input side while the constancy explanatory power comes from the output side. 
Let me explain. The presence of the success pattern is required in the behavioural output 
triggered by the representational state. There is a success pattern provided that the internal state 
pursues a given result by triggering a behavioural output to achieve it. Hence, the presence of 
the success pattern gives rise to an explanatory power that is generated by a constraint on the 
relevant behavioural output process. Namely, the behavioural output that is triggered by the 
tokening of the internal state. In sum, the success explanatory power is an output explanatory 
power. On the other side, the employment of the constancy mechanism is a requirement that 
the internal state should be able to still represent the same external feature despite the variety 
of stimuli coming from it. So, whatever the explanatory power given rise to by the bridging 
across a variety of input stimuli, it originates with a constraint on the input process that triggers 
the tokening of the internal state. In sum, the constancy minimal condition is an input 
explanatory power. This is the reason that the dual proposal is not ad hoc or arbitrary. It is not 
a proposal developed only to neutralize the objection of liberality or a proposal that arises from 
an arbitrary conjunction of two minimal conditions that give rise to two different and unrelated 
explanatory powers. Rather, it is a proposal that naturally arises from the verification that the 
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constancy mechanism condition originates from a constraint on the input process that triggers 
the tokening of the internal state and that the success pattern condition originates from a 
constraint on the output process that is triggered by the tokening of the internal state.   
  What about the similarities? Remember that the explanatory power given rise to by the 
presence of the success pattern is the power of explaining success. It specifies the external 
feature under which the behavioural output triggered by the internal state achieves the pursued 
goal – the presence of the feature guarantees the success of the behavioural output. The positing 
of a result pursued by the internal state also gives rise to the generality, predictive and 
counterfactual explanatory powers, just as the explanatory power given rise to by the 
employment of the constancy mechanism. The positing of the pursued result allows the 
recognition that the same success pattern is present despite the variety of behavioural outputs. 
This recognition gives rise to the generality power because it provides a general and unified 
explanation of different behavioural outputs, produced in different instances, pursuing the same 
result. The explanation bridges across different behavioural outputs by recognising the 
presence of the same success pattern in these different situations. The positing of the external 
result pursued by the internal state also gives rise to predictive and counterfactuality powers. It 
provides an explanation with these explanatory powers because it affords the recognition that, 
despite the production of different behavioural outputs in future (or counterfactual) situations, 
the organism will (or would) pursue the same result.  
  The success pattern condition does not require that the organism should be able to 
produce a variety of behavioural outputs to achieve the pursued result. As long as the organism 
has a success pattern in its behavioural output and uses the internal state as a proxy for the 
presence of the relevant external condition, the success pattern condition is satisfied. So, room 
is open for the internal state to always trigger the same behavioural output and still satisfy the 
success pattern condition. In these cases, the presence of the success pattern would not give 
188 
 
rise to the generality, predictive and counterfactuality powers since there would be no variety 
of behavioural outputs. After all, if an organism always produces the same behaviour triggered 
by the internal state in response to the external feature, then the positing of the external result 
pursued by this state does not make any difference for an explanation of general cases or for 
what will or would happen. So, there is only the unique explanation that the organism can 
produce only one behavioural output to achieve the relevant result. Nevertheless, such positing 
would still give rise to the explanatory power of explaining success. That is, the explanation 
specifies the external condition under which the behavioural output triggered by the internal 
state succeeds in achieving the pursued result.100 The conclusion is that the explanatory power 
of the success pattern condition is guaranteed both in situations where there is a variety of 
behavioural outputs as well as when the behavioural output is uniform.      
 
Minimal distance and the indeterminacy objection  
  The dual proposal here developed assumes the constancy mechanism condition as a 
minimal condition for intentionality. However, in the third chapter I assessed and rejected the 
constancy mechanism proposal for the limits of intentionality. Both proposals assume that it is 
a minimal condition for intentionality that the system should employ a constancy mechanism 
in the production of the state in order to bridge across a variety of input stimuli and still 
represent the same external feature. However, the constancy mechanism condition required in 
the dual proposal is a variation of the constancy mechanism proposal, since it is here applied 
to distinguish non-intentional from intentional success patterns. That is, it is applied to 
recognise the presence of the same success pattern in situations where there are a variety of 
                                                             
100 Notice that the fact that the success pattern may be present in the behavioural output of organisms without 
a variety of behavioural outputs is another reason for the requirement of the constancy mechanism condition. 
In cases of uniformity of the behavioural output to achieve the pursued result, the satisfaction of the success 




proximal stimuli. By contrast, there is no such application in the constancy mechanism 
proposal. This proposal is not committed to any success pattern. Indeed, Sterelny and Burge, 
the main proponents of the constancy mechanism proposal, firmly reject the appeal to success 
patterns to draw the limits of intentionality (cf. BURGE, 2010, pp. 292-308; STERELNY, 
1995). 
  In the third chapter I developed a general objection to the constancy mechanism 
proposal – the indeterminacy objection. It maintains that since the distinction between proximal 
and distal features comes in degree, and that there is no non-arbitrary way of drawing a line to 
strictly divide proximal from distal features, the following problem arises for the constancy 
mechanism condition: what is the minimal distance from the organism’s sensory apparatus that 
the stimulus should be for the internal state to be genuinely intentional? Note that for a state to 
bridge across proximal stimuli in order to represent the same external feature, some distance 
between the organism and the represented external feature is required. Otherwise there would 
be no distance based on which the constancy mechanism would keep the state representing the 
same external feature despite the variety of proximal stimuli. But what is the extent of this 
minimal distance?  
 I concluded that the extent of this minimal distance is indeterminate in light of the 
constancy mechanism proposal, since it does not provide a non-arbitrary criterion to determine 
it. But things change when this problem is considered in light of the dual proposal that holds 
the constancy mechanism condition together with the success pattern condition. The success 
pattern condition gives rise to a straightforward and non-arbitrary criterion to solve this 
problem. It is perspicuous that the presence of the success pattern in the behavioural output 
presupposes that the organism pursues a given result towards a certain feature of the external 
environment (e.g., an organism that tries to escape from predators). Evidently, there is a certain 
distance between this external feature and the organism’s sensory apparatus. But if the distance 
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is so short that it precludes the presence of the success pattern on the behavioural output 
triggered by the state, then it follows that this state is not intentional. So, how to establish how 
short this distance may be?   
  This is the criterion: the minimal distance is the one that does not preclude the presence 
of the success pattern on the behavioural output triggered by the internal state. Provided that 
this criterion is satisfied and so the presence of the success pattern in the behavioural output is 
not precluded, it does not matter how short the distance is. For instance, suppose that a stimulus 
chain triggers the tokening of the internal state in a certain organism – s¹ is the most proximal 
stimulus in the chain, s² is the second most proximal, s³ is the third one etc. Evidently, the 
internal state cannot represent s¹ because there is no distance between the sensory apparatus 
and the stimulus. May it represent s²? It is plainly possible, provided that this short distance 
keeps room open for the presence of the success pattern on the organism’s behavioural output. 
If that is indeed the case on concrete cases is a further question that depends on the specific 
features of each concrete case. Finally, notice that even though the distance to s² is short, at this 
stimulus level the employment of the constancy mechanism still gives rise to the 
counterfactuality, generality and predictive explanatory powers and hence to a relevant 
explanatory power.  
  Here it is necessary to make an observation on the counterfactual robustness argument 
for the constancy mechanism proposal. In the previous chapter, I have rejected it by appealing 
to the fact that at the second most proximal stimulus level the group of counterfactual situations 
would be so small that it would not give rise to a relevant counterfactual explanatory power. In 
the end, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that it is indeterminate what is the first 
stimulus in the causal chain for which the positing of the state as representing this first stimulus 
gives rise to a robust explanation. The indeterminacy objection threatens the counterfactual 
robustness argument because this argument fails to notice that the employment of the constancy 
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mechanism gives rise not only to the counterfactuality explanatory power, but also to the 
generality and predictive powers. So, even at the second most proximal stimulus level the 
employment of the constancy mechanism gives rise to a relevant explanatory power constituted 
by these three explanatory powers. The conclusion is that the dual proposal is immune to the 
indeterminacy objection because it claims that the employment of the constancy mechanism 
gives rise to these three explanatory powers.  
  It should be highlighted that, as previously argued, the presence of the success pattern 
in the organism’s behavioural output gives rise to an explanatory power of the intentional 
explanation. The above criterion that the minimal distance is the one that keeps room open for 
the presence of the success pattern guarantees this explanatory power. After all, if the distance 
is so short that it precludes the presence of the success pattern, there is no place for this 
explanatory power to arise. As previously shown, the success explanatory power and the 
constancy mechanism explanatory power are perfectly compatible and complementary. This 
criterion for the minimal distance makes sure that the fulfilment of one condition – the 
constancy mechanism condition – does not preclude the fulfilment of the other condition – the 
success pattern condition.      
  Here the following objection may arise. If this criterion opens the possibility for the 
minimal distance to be the second proximal stimulus to solve the minimal distance problem, 
why can’t the proponents of the constancy mechanism proposal claim that the second proximal 
stimulus is the minimal distance? If the criterion defended here works well for the dual 
proposal, why it can’t also work for the constancy mechanism proposal? What is problematic 
is not the adoption of this or that criterion to determinate the minimal distance, but rather how 
this criterion is principled justified in accordance with the constancy mechanism proposal to 
avoid arbitrariness. It is hard to conceive how it can be done since this proposal is solely 
constituted by the constancy mechanism condition, which implies that the justification of this 
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criterion would have to be solely based on this condition. Otherwise, the justification would be 
plainly ad hoc. If the stimuli variety given rise by the second proximal stimulus criterion 
constitutes the “sufficient variation” (STERELNY, 1995, pp. 261-2) for intentionality, what is 
the principled justification for it in light of the very constancy mechanism condition?  
  By contrast, the dual proposal is constituted by the constancy mechanism and success 
pattern conditions. It claims that the explanatory power given rise to by the satisfaction of both 
conditions constitutes the distinctive explanatory power of representational states. The criterion 
defended here that the minimal distance is the one that does not preclude the presence of the 
success pattern in the behavioural output is based on the explanatory power given rise to by 
these conditions. It may turn out that this criterion may be satisfied by the second proximal 
stimulus in some concrete cases, but here this minimal distance is justified. It is not arbitrary. 
Together with the explanatory power given rise to by the satisfaction of the success pattern 
condition, even the explanatory power of small varieties given rise to by the minimal distance 
of the second proximal stimulus justifies the positing of the representation. The non-intentional 
explanation would lack such explanatory power. This explanatory justification, however, is not 
allowed for the proponent of the constancy mechanism proposal. For them, the only relevant 
explanatory power is the one given rise to by the varieties of proximal stimuli in virtue of the 
employment of the constancy mechanism. That is the reason the constancy mechanism 
condition cannot stand by itself. United with the success pattern condition it stands, divided it 
falls.   
  But why can’t proponents of the constancy mechanism proposal also say that the 
explanatory power given rise by the second most proximal stimulus distance is enough for the 
positing of the representational state to be explanatorily justified? Notice that they require 
sufficient variation for intentionality. They could then argue that the explanatory power given 
rise by the second most proximal stimulus distance is enough variation. Maybe such variation 
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is enough for the explanatory power of the resulting intentional explanation to trump the 
explanatory power of non-intentional explanations. However, such a move is problematic. In 
the dual proposal’s case, it is easy to show that the explanatory power given rise to by the 
second most proximal stimulus distance is enough variation since it appeals to the explanatory 
power given rise to by both the constancy mechanism and the success pattern conditions. By 
contrast, the constancy mechanism proposal can appeal only to the explanatory power given 
rise to by the employment of the constancy mechanism. But why does it constitute enough 
variation? This is not clear at all. The conclusion is that until some convincing justification is 
provided, the constancy mechanism proposal is flawed in light of the indeterminacy objection. 
  Let’s finish this section with a summary of the dual proposal for the minimal conditions 
for intentionality. I started the investigation for the explanatory power of representational states 
with the success pattern condition by arguing that the presence of the success pattern gives rise 
to the success explanatory power. However, this condition is not enough for intentionality 
because the resulting theory would be too liberal. The non-intentional explanation would have 
the same success explanatory power by specifying the causal chain and the result pursued by 
the relevant state without positing any representational state. Thus, I have argued that another 
minimal condition is required to distinguish intentional from non-intentional success patterns 
– the constancy mechanism condition. The distinction is that the positing of the representational 
state provides the intentional explanation with generality, predictive and counterfactuality 
powers because the representational state bridges across a variety of proximal stimuli and still 
represents the same external feature. After that, I showed that the success pattern and the 
constancy mechanism explanatory powers are compatible and complementary because the first 
is an output explanatory power and the second is an input explanatory power, which shows that 
the dual proposal is not ad hoc or arbitrary. Finally, I showed that the minimal distance problem 
that threatens the constancy mechanism proposal rejected in the previous chapter does not 
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threaten the dual proposal. The reason is that the latter proposal gives rise to the criterion that 
the minimal distance is the one that does not preclude the presence of the success pattern on 
the behaviour triggered by the representation.   
  In sum, the dual proposal maintains that the explanatory power of intentional 
explanations is constituted by the success and constancy explanatory powers. The satisfaction 
of the success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions guarantees that the positing of the 
relevant representation plays the distinctive explanatory role of representational states. But is 
the dual proposal compatible with the intuitive conception of representation? If so, what is the 
degree of such compatibility? Let’s move to the intuitive side of the debate on the problem of 
demarcation.  
 
4.4 Is the dual proposal intuitive?  
  In the last chapter and in the previous sections of this chapter, I made an extensive 
investigation focused on the explanatory role played by representational states in intentional 
explanations of behaviour. I assessed and rejected the causal independence proposal developed 
by Fodor and Beckerman (section 3.4) and the constancy mechanism proposal developed by 
Kim Sterelny and Tyler Burge (section 3.5). After that, in this chapter, I developed the dual 
proposal that establishes that the positing of a representational state by an intentional 
explanation is explanatorily justified only if it satisfies the success pattern condition and the 
constancy mechanism condition. I have also showed that the causal independence and the 
constancy mechanism proposals violate highly entrenched intuitive principles in our intuitive 
conception of representation. Now let’s focus on the intuitiveness of the dual proposal.   
  Is the dual proposal defensible in light of the intuitive conception of representation or 
is it so counter-intuitive that it should be ruled out? Finally, how should we balance, in the 
context of mutual adjustments, the explanatory power of positing a given representational state 
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established by the dual proposal with the counter-intuitive aspects of this proposal? In this final 
section, I claim that the dual proposal is compatible with the intuitive conception of 
representation to an acceptable extent by arguing that it is fully compatible with highly 
entrenched intuitive principles. Beyond this, the limits of intentionality become blurry and it 
turns to be a pragmatic choice to accept or reject the intentional status of a given state. 
However, such blurriness is not problematic, especially for naturalist theories of representation 
like teleosemantics. I will start the intuitive assessment of the dual proposal by recapitulating 
the intuitive principles that I defended in the last chapter as highly entrenched in our intuitive 
conception of representation.   
  First, there is the autonomy principle. Intentional systems are autonomous: the forces 
responsible for their behavioural outputs originate within the systems, not outside. They are 
self-moving systems. So, it is required for intentionality that the system’s behavioural output 
is not (wholly) caused by forces that originate outside the system. Second, there is the 
complexity principle. Systems without a certain cognitive complexity are not genuinely 
intentional; it is implausible to claim that very simple systems like viruses or unicellular 
organisms are intentional because they lack the minimal cognitive complexity required for 
intentionality. The third and last intuitive principle is the activity principle. It requires that, for 
a given system to be intentional, it should have some active role, i.e., it cannot be wholly 
passive. A system is not intentional in cases when the internal state is automatically triggered 
by the presence of the relevant external feature and the state always triggers the behavioural 
output. The passivity arises from the fact that the behavioural output is automatically activated 
by the relevant specific stimuli. Thus, the activity principle rules out passive systems as genuine 
intentional systems.  
  Let’s start with the complexity principle. Is it compatible with the success pattern and 
constancy mechanism conditions established by the dual proposal? As I have previously argued 
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in the last chapter, the requirement that a system should employ a constancy mechanism in the 
production of representational states implies that the system should have a certain level of 
cognitive complexity. After all, the capacity to employ this mechanism makes the relevant 
system more complex than it would be in the absence of such capacity. Very simple systems 
(paramecia, hypothalami, etc.) are ruled out as representational systems, in opposition to 
systems that employ constancy mechanisms (honeybees, vervet monkeys etc.). On the other 
hand, the success pattern condition seems to be incompatible with the complexity principle, 
since systems as simple as hypothalami satisfy this requirement. However, what is relevant 
here is not whether, in isolation, the success pattern condition is compatible with the intuitive 
conception of representation. What matters is whether the global picture of intentionality 
delivered by the dual proposal is compatible with this intuitive conception. Since this proposal 
is also constituted by the constancy mechanism condition, it follows that the dual proposal 
requires a certain complexity from the relevant system for it to be intentional.  
 What about the autonomy principle? The success pattern condition establishes that it is 
a minimal condition for intentionality that the system has a success pattern in the behavioural 
output triggered by the representational state, and that the system uses it as a proxy for the 
presence of the relevant external feature in the production of the behavioural output. This 
condition rules out automaton systems. After all, if the behavioural output is fully generated 
by forces originating outside of the system, it follows that there is no use of the state as a proxy 
for the presence of the external feature and hence that the success pattern condition is not 
satisfied. On the other hand, as I have shown in the last chapter, the satisfaction of the constancy 
mechanism by a given system entails that it is autonomous. The employment of the constancy 
mechanism requires a selection process of picking from all input stimuli just the ones that 
correlate with the external feature, and such a selection process is an internal force that affects 
the resulting behavioural output. In conclusion, the success pattern and constancy mechanism 
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conditions are both compatible with the autonomy principle.   
  Now consider an autonomous system that has a certain cognitive complexity and the 
forces responsible for its behaviour are internal. So, it respects the autonomy and complexity 
principles. Nevertheless, the system is deprived of any active role. The relevant state is 
automatically triggered by the presence of the external feature and this state always triggers the 
behavioural output. That is, the behaviour is automatically activated by this specific stimulus. 
Now, contrast again tropistic systems with systems that satisfy the constancy mechanism 
condition. As previously shown, the employment of the constancy mechanism does not 
guarantee that the system plays some relevant active role. However, the satisfaction of the 
success pattern condition requires an active role from the system. To use the state as a proxy 
for the presence of the external feature in the production of the behavioural output is an active 
role played by the system. After all, to use something (the state) as a guide for producing 
something else (the behaviour) is an activity – it is not possible for a passive system to use 
anything at all.101     
  The general picture is that the satisfaction of the constancy mechanism condition 
guarantees that the organism respects the complexity principle; the satisfaction of the success 
pattern condition guarantees that the organism respects the activity principle; finally, the 
satisfaction of the constancy mechanism or the success pattern conditions guarantees that the 
organism respects the autonomy principle.   
  As argued in the last chapter, I think that these three principles are the most entrenched 
in our intuitive conception of representation. Since the dual proposal respects them, it seems 
that it is compatible with the intuitive conception of representation. But what about other 
principles? This is not an exhaustive list of intuitive principles of representationality. Evidently, 
                                                             
101 I have claimed that the satisfaction of the success pattern condition does not require that the system is able 
to produce several behavioural outputs. But how can a system that produces the same behaviour have some 
active role? Once again, because the system uses the internal state to achieve a given result by producing this 
behaviour. The use of the state makes the system active even though it always produces the same behaviour.     
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it is possible to consider another supposed intuitive principle that is incompatible with the dual 
proposal because it rules out as representational certain states that satisfy both the success 
pattern and the constancy mechanism conditions. Let’s suppose for the sake of the argument 
that there is indeed such intuitive principle. So, should we immediately get rid of the dual 
proposal? I don’t think so.   
  The dual proposal is supported on the one hand by the explanatory power given rise to 
by the success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions, and on the other hand by its 
compatibility with the complexity, autonomy and activity intuitive principles. In order for such 
an intuitive principle to justify the rejection of the dual proposal, it should override the 
explanatory and intuitive reasons that support the dual proposal. That is, it should be a very 
entrenched and very intuitive principle to have such radical consequence. It is not plausible to 
suppose that there is an intuitive principle or set of intuitive principles so strong.  
  But now suppose that the dual proposal treats certain states as representational, even 
though it is counter-intuitive, in relevant aspects, to claim that they are genuine representational 
states. It is very plausible to suppose that there are such cases. Once again, this is not a reason 
strong enough to justify the rejection of the dual proposal. However, it represents a more 
serious problem for this proposal because it is more plausible to suppose that there are indeed 
such cases. So, is some further reason required for the dual proposal to still stand as a viable 
proposal to demarcate the limits of intentionality?  
 I think that this is the point on the development of the debate on the limits of 
intentionality in which we have reached the real borderline cases between primitive 
representational and non-representational states. There will always be a stage of this debate in 
which we will find some candidates for representational states that, even though they satisfy 
the explanatory and intuitive requirements established by the dual proposal, it still looks really 
counter-intuitive to consider them as genuine representations. This is where the limits of 
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intentionality become blurry. Nevertheless, this is not problematic for the dual proposal.  
  Every minimally viable demarcation proposal will face cases in which the limits of 
intentionality that it draws becomes blurry. There will always be good and incompatible 
reasons for accepting, as well for rejecting, the representational status of candidates for 
representational states considering the very criterion established by the proposal. That is, there 
will be a good reason for claiming that a given state is representational, but also a good reason 
for claiming that is it not. This is the case because it is highly implausible for a demarcation 
proposal to draw fully strict limits of intentionality. That is, it is implausible that there is any 
proposal that demarcates a strict limit for intentionality such that (i) there are no good and 
incompatible reasons for accepting and rejecting the representational status of a given 
candidate state; and (ii) this proposal is still minimally viable in light of explanatory and 
intuitive considerations. Evidently, you can always develop a fully strict proposal for the limits 
of intentionality with no limiting cases. However, the price of such strictness is the loss of 
minimal explanatory or intuitive viability.102 So, how to decide the representational status of 
these limiting cases?   
  I think that at this point it turns out to be just a pragmatic choice of accepting or rejecting 
the intentionality of limiting cases. You can either decide that a given state is not 
representational because it does not look intuitively representational or you can decide that it 
is representational because what matters is that it comes with enough explanatory purchase. 
The choice between these decisions is pragmatic, it varies in different contexts. This is 
precisely what happens in limiting cases.   
  Finally, the blurriness at this stage of the limits of intentionality drawn by the dual 
                                                             
102 Consider the proposal that the only minimal condition for intentionality is that the candidate is an internal 
state of my organism. It is strict because for every possible candidate you can decide whether it is 
representational or not by just verifying whether or not it is in my organism. But this proposal is indefensible 
from both explanatory and intuitive perspectives. Even the more plausible proposal that the only 
representations are human internal states is not fully strict because there are still limiting cases. For instance, 
are some foetuses’ internal states of representations given that it is contentious whether foetuses are humans?  
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proposal is not problematic for teleosemantics and other naturalist theories of mental 
representations because what threatens their viability in the debate on the limits of 
intentionality is the objection of liberalism. They are attacked because they treat certain states 
as representations when they are clearly not representational. However, as I argued in the last 
section, the constancy mechanism condition neutralizes this objection by establishing an 
explanatory requirement that makes the dual proposal much more restrictive. Notice that the 
objection of liberality is based on cases in which the naturalist theories treats certain states as 
representations when they are clearly not representational. But at the stage at which the limits 
of intentionality drawn by the dual proposal becomes blurry, the relevant candidates are not 
either clearly representational or not. So, the objection of liberality does not even arise.  
 
Conclusion 
  The dual proposal has certain similarities with Schulte’s demarcation proposal 
(SCHULTE, 2015). Schulte proposes the adoption of the constancy mechanism condition by 
teleosemantics to neutralize the objection of liberality. However, the proposals are 
fundamentally distinct. First, they diverge on the resulting demarcation of the limits of 
intentionality. Schulte’s proposal is committed to the thesis that it is the biological function 
that determines the organism’s pursued result, while the dual proposal remains neutral on that 
issue. The dual proposal just requires the existence of some pursued result, no matter whether 
it is functionally determined or not. Second and most important: the justifications of both 
proposals are fundamentally distinct. Schulte justifies his proposal by appealing to the 
counterfactual robustness argument. That argument, however, is flawed as previously 
demonstrated in the third chapter. The justification of the dual proposal is based on the method 
of reflective equilibrium which consist in mutual adjustments between explanatory and 
intuitive constraints. The explanatory justification of the success pattern condition is that its 
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satisfaction guarantees the explanation of success. By contrast, the satisfaction of the constancy 
mechanism condition distinguishes intentional and non-intentional success patterns. Its 
explanatory justification is that the employment of the constancy mechanism gives rise to 
generality, predictive and counterfactual explanatory powers by allowing one to recognise the 
presence of the same success pattern despite the variety of input stimuli. The fundamental 
distinction between the success and constancy explanatory powers is that the former originates 
at the output process triggered by the tokening of the representation, while the latter originates 
at the input process that causes the tokening of the representation.  
 In this chapter, I developed the dual proposal for the minimal conditions for 
intentionality constituted by the success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions. I have 
argued that the distinctive explanatory power of intentional explanations is constituted by the 
success pattern and the constancy explanatory powers. In the final section, I showed that the 
dual proposal is compatible with the intuitive conception of representation by arguing that it 
respects three highly entrenched intuitive principles – the complexity, autonomy, and activity 
principles. Thus, the conjunction of the success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions 
is justified in light of both explanatory and intuitive requirements. I take this to be the optimal 
state in the revisionary process of the method of reflective equilibrium. The success pattern and 
the constancy mechanism conditions should be revised no more. Therefore, the dual proposal 
draws the appropriate demarcation of the limits of intentionality and hence solves the problem 
of demarcation. 
  
 The dual proposal. A given state represents an external feature only if it satisfies     
  two minimal conditions for intentionality. (I) the success pattern condition – there is a 
 success pattern in the system’s behavioural output and the system uses the  
  state as a proxy for the presence of the external feature in the production of such   
202 
 
  behavioural output; (II) the constancy mechanism condition – the state still represents 
 the external feature despite the variety of proximal stimuli that reach the system’s   




















CHAPTER 5.  THE CONTENT PROBLEM:  
IN DEFENCE OF PRODUCER-BASED TELEOSEMANTICS 
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5.2 Functional indeterminacy (I): the concertina problem  
5.3 A defence of producer-based teleosemantics 
5.4 Functional indeterminacy (II): the distality problem    
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 The topic of this fifth and final chapter is the content problem: provided that a given 
state is representational, what determines its content, i.e., what it is about? In virtue of what is 
the content of a given representational state C rather than C’? The teleosemantic basic 
framework claims that the biological function of the representational state determines its 
content. However, this is just the starting point of the debate on the teleosemantic approach to 
content. Several functional indeterminacy problems threaten its viability in determining 
content in terms of the representational state’s biological function. As a result, the basic 
teleosemantic framework may be developed in several conflicting ways. Consumer-based and 
producer-based teleosemantics are the main teleosemantic approaches to representational 
content. They deliver different content assignments for the same representational state in 
paradigmatic indeterminacy cases. My goal in this chapter is to develop a variation of producer-
based teleosemantics to determine content and thus to solve these functional indeterminacy 
problems.  
  In the first section, I introduce the consumer-based and producer-based teleosemantics 
and how they deliver distinct representational contents. After that, I introduce the functional 
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indeterminacy problems and why they are problematic for teleosemantics. In the second 
section, I assess the first functional indeterminacy problem – the concertina problem – and 
propose the lower-level thesis to solve it. This thesis is compatible with both consumer-based 
and producer-based teleosemantics, i.e., both approaches may adopt it to determine content. 
However, such solution is challenged by a problem that threats to render content relative – the 
relativity problem. I reject Papineau’s consumer-based response to the relativity problem and 
propose my own producer-based response to it and argue that it solves this problem. I take this 
to constitute an argument for producer-based teleosemantics. In the third section, I develop an 
argument for producer-based teleosemantics based on the plausibility of malfunctioning 
statuses of detection systems and I defend this approach from the objection that it fails to keep 
the room open for enough misrepresentation cases. In the fourth section, I propose a solution 
for the second functional indeterminacy problem – the distality problem – that is especially 
problematic for the producer-based approach. Finally, in the last section I defend producer-
based teleosemantics from one final objection – the source of error objection.    
 
5.1 Producer-based x consumer-based teleosemantics  
  In the second chapter, I introduced the basic teleosemantic framework according to 
which the content of the representational state is determined by its biological function. That is, 
the representation’s truth-conditions are derived from its biological success conditions. Since 
the aetiological conception of function is assumed here, the biological function is the effect for 
which the trait was selected. However, this basic framework is just the starting point of the 
teleosemantic approach to content. How to properly develop it is a very contentious matter. 
Several teleosemanticists have proposed different ways of developing it in order to address the 
content problem. The various teleological theories may be classified into two different 
approaches according to how they develop this basic framework: the consumer-based and the 
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producer-based teleosemantics. However, this is not clear-cut. Rather, there are intermediate 
cases – teleosemantic theories that stay in the middle between these two approaches (e.g., 
AGAR, 1993). Let’s introduce consumer-based and producer-based teleosemantics by showing 
how they deliver distinct contents in the classic example of the frog’s representation of the fly. 
 A normal frog will snap its tongue at anything suitably small-dark-moving thing 
regardless of whether it is a fly or not. In the frog’s natural habitat, the small-dark-moving 
things are mostly nutritious flies and so normally the frog will catch a nutritious fly. But the 
frog cannot discriminate between flies and other small-dark-moving things, it simply responds 
to anything small-dark-moving which passes its retina by darting its tongue out.103 So, what is 
being represented by the frog? What is the function of the frog’s visual system – to token the 
representational state when there is a small-dark-moving thing, fly or food?104 It is not clear 
what is actually represented by the frog. It is indeterminate whether it is properly representing 
or misrepresenting when it detects a SDMT that is not a nutritious fly and vice versa. How to 
give an account of this case? It depends on how the basic teleosemantic framework is 
developed.  
  The first formulation of this framework is the consumer-based teleosemantics that was 
introduced in the second chapter.105 It claims that content is determined by the biological 
function of the system that consumes the representational state. Consider the representational 
state R that triggers the behavioural output B. The content of R is the external condition C that 
should be the case for B to succeed in achieving the effect that the system which produced B 
was selected to achieve. That is, it is the biological function of the system that uses the 
                                                             
103 For the original source of the frog’s example, cf. LEETVIN et al., 1959. The appeal to the frog’s example to 
illustrate teleosemantics was made famous by Jerry Fodor, cf. FODOR, 1990. Sometimes the preferred example 
is the prey-catching toad – frogs and toads have very similar visual systems. For a very empirically detailed 
presentation of the toad’s system, cf. NEANDER, 2006. 
104 “Small-dark-moving things” is just an umbrella term to cover all the properties of the fly to which the frog’s 
visual system is sensitive. From now on, I will use the abbreviation “SDMT”.  
105 Cf. PAPINEAU, 1998, 2003, 2016; MILLIKAN, 1989b; 2004; 2007; PRICE, 1998, 2001. 
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representational state that determines content. The represented external condition is the one 
required for the behavioural output produced by the consumer system to perform its function. 
So, in the case of the frog’s representational state, its content is frog’s food or nutrients. The 
reason is that the external condition required for the consumer system (the motor and digestive 
systems that catch and digest the fly) to have its adaptive effect (the digestion of the nutrients) 
is that the represented object is nutritive. If the represented object is not nutritious, then this is 
a misrepresentation since the state is representing the presence of a nutritive object. After all, 
the caught and digested object should be nutritious for there to be increase of fitness. In sum, 
the state represents the adaptive properties of the represented object.  
  However, consumer-based teleosemantics is rejected by several teleosemanticists who 
develop the basic teleosemantic framework into the opposite direction. They claim that content 
should be determined not via the selected effect of the consumer system, but via the selected 
effect of the producer system. That is, it is the biological function of the producer system that 
determines content. This is the producer-based teleosemantics (also called “informational 
teleosemantics”).106 The selected effect that constitutes the producer’s function is the detection 
or tracking of a given external condition. Such detection consists in the tokening of the 
representational state whenever this external condition obtains.107 It is this selected effect that 
determines the external condition that constitutes content – the one that the producer system 
was selected to discriminate. The function of the producer system is to be causally sensitive to 
this external condition. That is, the producer system was selected to have the capacity to 
discriminate a certain external condition and it is this selected effect that determines content. 
The producer’s function is the selected effect of tokening the representational state in response 
                                                             
106 Cf. DRETSKE, 1986, 1988, 1995; NEANDER, 1995, 2013, 2017; JACOB, 1997; SCHULTE, 2012. 
107 That Is the reason that the detection of an external condition is a genuine effect of the producer system. For 
the system to detect C is just for it to token the representation whenever C obtains. But it is perspicuous that to 
do something in response to another thing is a genuine effect of the system. If the system was selected to have 
such response, it has what Neander calls a “response function” (NEANDER, 2017, p. 125-47). 
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to the presence of the external condition that the producer was selected to discriminate. The 
state represents the properties of the object that the producer system has the function to 
discriminate.108  
 Let’s apply the producer-based approach to the frog’s example. The selected effect of 
the frog’s visual system is its capacity of discriminating certain external condition – the 
presence of a SDMT. Its function is to token the representation whenever these visual 
properties are present. The content of the frog’s representational state is SDMT because the 
adaptive effect of the visual system is to token the representational state whenever there is the 
presence of SMDTs. The reason is that the visual system that produces the representation was 
not selected to discriminate nutritive properties. In fact, it has no capacity of discriminating 
nutritive properties at all. Rather, it was designed to discriminate SDMTs, these are the 
properties to which it is sensitive. It was via the detection of SDMTs that the motor and 
digestive systems were able to catch and digest nutritive flies because in the frog’s historical 
environment there was a strong correlation between SMDTs and nutritive flies. There is 
malfunction when the producer system fails to fulfil the effect for which it was selected – the 
discriminatory capacity of tokening the representation whenever certain external condition is 
present. There are two situations in which it may happen – when the system tokens the 
representation but the external condition does not obtain (misrepresentation) or when it fails to 
token the representation even though the condition obtains (ignorance). In both cases, the 
producer system is malfunctioning.109   
  There is a very contentious debate between producer-based and consumer-based 
teleosemantics. Their fundamental distinction arises when considering minority cases in which 
                                                             
108 Producer-based teleosemantics is also called “informational teleosemantics” because its core thesis may be 
characterized in terms of the notion of information. "The fundamental idea is that a system, S, represents a 
property, F, if and only if S has the function of indicating (providing information about) the F of a certain domain 
of objects." (DRETSKE, 1995, p. 2). 
109 Does producer-based teleosemantics really succeed in keeping the door open for malfunctioning and so for 
misrepresentation? This is a common objection that I assess in the third section. 
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these rival approaches deliver different truth values to the relevant representational state. They 
usually deliver the same truth value to the representation, but there are minority cases in which 
the representational state is true according to one approach and false according to the other or 
vice versa. These are the situations in which the external condition that is represented according 
to the consumer-based approach is not satisfied but the external condition that is represented 
according to the producer-based approach is satisfied or vice versa.   
  Suppose that some scientist fools the frog by placing a small-black-moving pellet in 
front of it and as a result the frog catches and digests the pellet. The problem that arises is 
whether the frog misrepresents the pellet or not. According to the consumer-based 
teleosemantics, the state represents the nutritive properties of the object and given that the 
small-black-moving pellet is not nutritive, it follows that this is a misrepresentation. By 
contrast, the producer-based teleosemantics claims that the state represents the sensitive 
properties of the object – blackness, smallness and movingness – and so it follows that the state 
accurately represents reality since the pellet is in fact a SDMT. This is a case in which the 
relevant object is a SDMT but is not nutritive and as a result the representation is true according 
to producer-based teleosemantics but false according to consumer-based teleosemantics. The 
same thing happens in case the scientist places a nutritive pellet that is not a SDMT in front of 
the frog. As a result, the representation is false according to producer-based teleosemantics 
(e.g., in virtue of an internal defect, the visual system tokens the representation even though 
there is no SDMT around), but true according to consumer-based teleosemantics. So, how to 
decide between these two conflicting and rival approaches? How to assess the debate between 
them to decide which one is the right teleosemantic theory?    
   The minority cases in which producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics 
deliver distinct truth-values to the representational state illustrate quite well the fundamental 
disagreement between them. But what is the source of disagreement? Some philosophers claim 
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that the distinction between producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics arises from 
how they respond to functional indeterminacy problems – different responses give rise to 
producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics. So, Neander claims that these approaches 
arise from different responses to the concertina problem. She establishes a functional 
indeterminacy case which threats the viability of the teleosemantic core thesis that biological 
function determines representational content (NEANDER, 1995, pp. 124-30).   
  However, here I will develop a different assessment of the debate between producer-
based and consumer-based teleosemantics. They arise not from responses to functional 
indeterminacy cases, but from the establishment of different criteria to specify the biological 
function that determines content. Producer-based teleosemantics proposes the criterion that it 
is the producer system’s function that determines representational content, while consumer-
based teleosemantics proposes the criterion that it is the consumer system’s function that 
determines content. These distinct producer-based and consumer-based criteria are the source 
of the fundamental disagreement between these approaches. Producer-based and consumer-
based are both threatened by the concertina problem and other functional indeterminacy 
problems, however their fundamental divergence is not originated from different responses to 
these problems. But before showing why this the right approach to assess the debate between 
producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics, let me introduce what functional 
indeterminacy problems are and why they are fundamentally problematic for teleosemantics.   
 Functional indeterminacy cases are the ones in which it seems that there are equally 
strong reasons to describe the function of a given trait in different and conflicting ways. As a 
result, there is an indeterminacy in the function of the trait and hence in the malfunctioning or 
proper functioning status of the trait. That is, it is indeterminate if the relevant trait is proper 
functioning or not and so there are conflicting judgements on its proper functioning status. 
Since the teleosemantic basic framework claims that biological function determines content, 
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functional indeterminacy entails content indeterminacy. If truth-conditions are derived from 
biological success conditions, then indeterminacy of biological success conditions entails 
indeterminacy of truth-conditions. The function of a given trait is the effect for which it was 
selected, and so functional indeterminacy consists in the indeterminacy of the trait’s selected 
effect. That is, it is indeterminate which effect was the selected one. Functional indeterminacy 
is just selected effect indeterminacy. These are cases in which among the effects of a given 
trait, there are reasons to determine that a given effect was the selected one while there are 
other equally strong reasons to determine that another effect was the selected one.  
  Functional indeterminacy cases are problematic for teleosemantics because there is 
content indeterminacy when it is indeterminate which effect of the representational state is the 
selected effect that determines content. Suppose that a given representational state has two 
effects, E and E*, and it is indeterminate which one is the selected effect that determines content 
because there are strong reasons to hold that E or E* is the selected effect. It is thereby 
indeterminate what its truth conditions are. That is, it is indeterminate which situations the 
representation is true and which situations it is false. There are specific situations in which E 
is achieved but not E*, so it is indeterminate in these situations the representation’s truth value. 
The representation is true whether E is the effect that determines its content, but it is false 
whether E* is the effect that determines its content. Hence, the problem that functional 
indeterminacy cases gives rise to teleosemantics is precisely how to determine that this effect 
but not that effect was selected and so that the former but not the latter effect determines 
content.110  
 Neander claims that producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics originate from 
different responses to functional indeterminacy cases. They arise from the establishment of two 
                                                             
110 The problem of functional indeterminacy for teleosemantics was developed by Fred Dretske and Jerry Fodor, 
cf. DRETKSE 1986; FODOR, 1990.  
211 
 
criteria that specify different selected effects of the representational state and as a result deliver 
different functions and contents. Producer-based teleosemantics claims that it is the function 
of the producer system that determines the function of the representation – the latter is derived 
from the producer’s function. Consumer-based teleosemantics claims that it is the function of 
the consumer system that determines the function of the representation – the latter is derived 
from the consumer’s function. According to Neander, the establishment of these criteria in 
order to solve functional indeterminacy problems give rise to producer-based and consumer-
based teleosemantics. However, this is not the case.     
  The starting point of the disagreement between producer-based and consumer-based 
teleosemantics is not the disagreement on what is the selected effect of the representational 
state in order to determine its function and hence its content. Rather, the disagreement arises 
because they focus on the function of different systems to determine content. According to the 
producer-based approach, it is the function of the producer system that determines content; 
according to the consumer-based one, it is the function of the consumer system that determines 
content. That is the fundamental disagreement between these two approaches and the reason 
that Neander’s assessment of the debate between them is inadequate. It is not that these 
approaches deliver different content in virtue of their disagreement on what is the function of 
the representation in functional indeterminacy cases. The above fundamental disagreement 
would still stand even if there were no functional indeterminacy cases on the function of the 
representation, of the consumer or producer system, or of any other biological trait. Producer-
based and consumer-based teleosemantics disagree from the very start, even before functional 
indeterminacy cases arise to put into question their viabilities.   
  Note that I am not denying that there is a disagreement between producer-based and 
consumer-based teleosemantics on what is the function of the representational state and hence 
on the delivered contents. Rather, I am arguing that such disagreement is just a by-product of 
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the above fundamental disagreement. Both teleosemantic approaches assume that it is the 
function of the representational state that determines content and that the function of 
representational state is derived from some system of the organism. However, they disagree on 
which is the relevant system. Producer-based teleosemantics claims that the function of the 
representational state is derived from the producer system’s function, while consumer-based 
teleosemantics claims that it is derived from the producer system’s function. So, the 
disagreement between consumer-based and producer-based teleosemantics on the function of 
the representational state is merely derived from their fundamental disagreement on the 
relevant system whose function determines the representational state’s function and content. 
 But if the fundamental disagreement between producer-based and consumer-based 
teleosemantics is not originated from different responses to functional indeterminacy problems, 
what is the role of these problems on the debate between these teleosemantics approaches?  
Functional indeterminacy threats to render indeterminate the content delivered by both 
producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics by threating to render indeterminate the 
functions of the consumer and producer systems. The indeterminacy of the selected effect of 
the producer or consumer systems entails content indeterminacy. My strategy in respect of this 
debate will consist in taking as starting point the functional indeterminacy problems that 
threatens both producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics in order to assess whether 
they are doomed or not by these problems. I will try to show that producer-based teleosemantics 
has the resources to develop solutions to these problems which will constitute arguments in 
favour of producer-based teleosemantics in detriment of consumer-based teleosemantics. The 
strategy will be to use the functional indeterminacy problems that threaten both teleosemantic 
approaches as a common ground in order to show that producer-based teleosemantics should 
be favoured in light of its success in solving these problems.  
 But what are the concrete cases of functional indeterminacy that threatens producer-
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based and consumer-based teleosemantics by threating to render content indeterminate? That 
is, the cases in which there are equally strong reasons to claim that this or that effect determines 
the function of the producer or consumer systems? As it happens, there are several sources of 
functional indeterminacy that give rise to different functional indeterminacy problems. 
“Functional indeterminacy problem” is just an umbrella term to cover all these specific 
problems. However, it is not my goal here to assess all of them. In this chapter, I assess two 
functional indeterminacy problems. In the next section, I assess the concertina problem and in 
the fourth section, I assess the distality problem. I argue that producer-based teleosemantics 
solves these problems and this constitute a reason in favour of this approach.111 I also develop 
a general defence of producer-based teleosemantics in the third section. Finally, in the last 
section I assess and reject a final objection to this approach – the source of error objection. 
 
5.2 Functional indeterminacy (I): the concertina problem  
  Antelopes are mammals that live at lower ground. Suppose that a trait in this population 
altered the structure of the haemoglobin which caused higher oxygen uptake which finally 
allowed antelopes to survive at higher ground. That was adaptive because the antelopes were 
forced to move to higher ground. Now suppose that as a result this trait was selected by natural 
selection. The problem that arises is what was the effect of the trait in virtue of which it was 
selected? The altered haemoglobin’s structure? The higher oxygen’s uptake? The survival at 
higher grounds? All effects, actually. For all of them were done and were adaptive. Indeed, 
these effects were not achieved independently, but it was by achieving one effect that the others 
were achieved. The antelope’s trait (IV) contributed to survive and reproduction; by ® (III) 
                                                             
111 Jerry Fodor is famous for developing a functional indeterminacy problem for teleosemantics according to 
which biological function cannot determine representational content because natural selection is extensional 
while content is intensional (FODOR, 1990). I will not assess this problem here, but I think that Elliott Sobber’s 
solution based on the distinction between selection-for and selection-of a trait solves it. Cf. SOBER, 1984, 2008, 
2010.   
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allowing the antelope to survive at higher ground; by ® (II) increasing oxygen uptake; by ® 
(I) altering the hemoglobin’s structure. As this sequence shows, the trait does one thing by 
doing another.  
  The lower description (I) describes what the antelope’s trait effectively does, and the 
higher levels (II) and (III) explain why doing that was adaptive. The trait alters the structure of 
the haemoglobin and it is adaptive because it increases the antelope’s oxygen uptake and hence 
allows the antelope to survive at higher ground. Notice that as we move up the diagram from 
the most fundamental level to higher levels, we are moving to descriptions of functions of 
larger and larger systems. To alter the haemoglobin’s structure is something that the trait does 
in a more or less independent way, but to increase oxygen uptake and to move the antelope to 
higher ground demand the help of other traits – the respiratory and the motor systems. But in 
which level of the sequence lies the right description of the biological function of the antelope’s 
trait? That is, which one is the appropriate functional assignment? That is the concertina 
problem (DRETSKE, 1986; NEANDER, 1995). This is a general problem for the aetiological 
conception of biological function – there is a concertina of selected effects that a given system 
should have and it is indeterminate which selected effect constitutes its biological function. So, 
the problem is to specify which effect among the concertina of effects of the trait constitutes 
its biological function.112    
  It is easy to show why the concertina problem threatens the viability of teleosemantics. 
Let’s show it by appealing to the frog’s example again. The frog’s representational state 
triggers the frog’s behaviour of snapping its tongue, catching the fly and finally digesting it. 
So, what is the function of the frog’s visual system that produces the representational state? 
                                                             
112 Dretske was presumably the first to formulate the concertina problem (DRETSKE, 1986). However, Neander 
was the first to explicitly formulates the concertina problem as arising from a distinct source of functional 
indeterminacy from other sources and so to show that it is a distinctive functional indeterminacy problem 
(NEANDER, 1995). This problem is also called “the problem of the complex causal role” (NEANDER, 2012). 
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Once again, there are several adaptive effects here. The frog’s visual system (IV) contributed 
to gene replication; by ® (III) helping to feed the frog; by ® (II) helping the frog to catch flies; 
by ® (I) detecting SDMTs (flies? food?). So, has the frog’s visual system the function of 
detecting SDMTs, flies or food? There are equally strong reasons to describe the function of 
the visual system as to detect SDMTs, frogs or food. That is, the function seems to be 
adequately described in these different and conflicting ways. All effects were achieved and 
were adaptive, it was by doing one thing that the others were done. In the same vein, the 
consumer system has a concertina of effects and it is indeterminate which one constitutes its 
function – to catch and digest SDMTs, flies or food? The result is that for both producer-based 
and consumer-based teleosemantics it is indeterminate what the content of the representational 
state is – SDMT, fly or food? Solving the concertina problem is a demanding task for the 
teleosemanticist – i.e., determining the producer and consumer systems’ functions and hence 
determining the content of the representational state.   
 I think that the first step to solve the concertina problem is to provide a functional 
analysis of the organism to which the trait pertains. Robert Cummins, inspired by the 
conceptual analysis of an organism by biologists, proposes the following functional analysis 
(CUMMINS, 1975). In physiology, the frog’s organism is decomposed into the major 
physiological systems (circulatory, digestive, nervous, etc.) and the contribution made by each 
system is specified. Then, each system is decomposed into its parts (e.g., the digestive system 
into the mouth, stomach, etc.) and it is specified the contribution made by each part to the 
system of which it is a component. These parts, by turn, are then decomposed into their parts 
(the mouth in the tongue, saliva glands, etc.) and again the contribution made by each part is 
specified. This decomposition process will continue down to the level of individual cells and 
their sub-cellular components, with the specification of the causal contribution of each 
decomposed part.   
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  The functional analysis illustrates the fact that the effects of a trait depends not on the 
trait alone, but also on other traits of the physiological system as well as on other physiological 
systems. For instance, the digestion of the fly is a joint effect of the frog’s motor and digestive 
systems. The contribution of the motor system to the whole consumer system is to catch the 
fly, while the contribution of the digestive system is to digest the fly. However, the functional 
analysis alone doesn't specify the effect which constitutes the function of the trait among its 
concertina of effects.    
 The second step to solve the concertina problem consists in the proposal of a criterion 
to specify in which level of the analysis the trait’s function should be determined. Here I will 
defend the lower-level thesis – the function of a biological trait is its specific or direct effect. I 
think that Neander proposed a good strategy to support this thesis by switching the focus from 
proper functioning to malfunctioning cases in order to show that the function of a trait is its 
most specific or direct effect (NEANDER, 1995). Let’s focus on the plausibility of 
malfunctioning statements: what is the right criterion to determine when a trait is 
malfunctioning or not?   
 Consider the antelope’s trait again. It contributes to fitness by allowing the antelope to 
survive at higher grounds by increasing oxygen uptake and finally by altering the 
haemoglobin’s structure. They are all effects of the trait and their fulfilments imply the proper 
functioning status of the trait. But which one’s absence is responsible for its malfunctioning? 
Suppose that the motor system fails to move the antelope to the higher ground and as result 
there is no contribution to gene replication in virtue of an internal defect of the motor system. 
In this case, it is wrong to claim that the antelope’s trait is malfunctioning because the effect 
of moving the antelope to the higher ground was not fulfilled, after all this failure was caused 
by an internal defect of the motor system. The trait has no responsibility for this failure at all.  
 This case illustrates the fact that most of the effects of a trait depend not only on the 
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proper functioning of the trait, but also on the proper functioning of other traits. The movement 
of the antelope to the higher ground is a joint result of the relevant trait and the motor and 
respiratory systems. The function of a trait is the effect for which it is directly responsible, i.e., 
the effect whose fulfilment depends on the trait alone. If the trait fails to have this specific 
effect, then it is malfunctioning. So, the criterion to determine the function of a trait lies on the 
effect for which it is directly responsible. The trait is malfunctioning if and only if it fails to 
have its direct effect and the trait is properly functioning if and only if it succeeds in having its 
direct effect.   
  The third step to solve the concertina problem consists in the specification of the trait’s 
specific or direct effect that constitutes its biological function. But how to specify it? The trait’s 
direct effect is the effect that appears in the lowest level of the functional analysis in which the 
trait appears as an unanalysed component (NEANDER, 1995, pp. 129-30). The nature of the 
unanalysed component is explained in this way. Consider the functional analysis of an 
organism O in which in the first stage O is decomposed into the parts Oa, Ob ... On; in the 
second stage Oa is decomposed into the parts Oa1, Oa2 ... Oan and that in the third stage Oa1 
is decomposed into the parts Oa1a, Oa1b ... Oa1n. Note that Oa1 appears as an unanalysed 
component in the second stage but not in the third stage. In the third stage, Oa1 is analysed into 
the parts Oa1a, Oa1b... while in the second stage Oa1 is one of the unanalysed components 
(along with Oa2, Oa3...) that constitute the parts of the functional analysis of Oa.   
 The function of the frog's visual system is its direct effect, namely, the effect that 
appears at the lowest level in which the visual system as a whole appears as an unanalysed 
component in the functional analysis. That level is the functional analysis of the frog's sensory 
system, a physiological system which is decomposed into the visual system, olfaction system, 
auditory system, etc. As showed by the effects sequence, the visual system has a concertina of 
effects, but some effects are in higher levels than others. In this level of the functional analysis, 
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the effect of detecting the object (the SDMT or fly or food) is in the lowest level of the effect's 
diagram, while the effect of catching the fly and digesting it are in higher levels. It is via this 
detection that the visual system helps the frog to catch the fly and digest it. Thus, the function 
of the frog’s visual system is to detect the object. That is the specific effect of the system, the 
only effect for which it is directly responsible. In the same vein, the function of the frog’s motor 
system is to catch the object, not digest it, because this is its direct effect.  
  In sum, to determine the effect that constitutes the function of a given trait among a 
concertina of effects, three steps are required. The first is to provide a functional analysis of 
the organism in which it is a component. The second step – the lower-level thesis – is to identify 
the trait’s function with the trait’s direct effect. The third and final step is to specify the trait’s 
direct effect as the trait’s effect that appears at the lowest level of the functional analysis in 
which the trait appears as an unanalysed component. The function of the trait is this direct 
effect.  
  So far, so good. But at this point arises this problem: is it the function of the frog’s 
visual system to detect SDMTs, flies or food? That is, among the visual system’s concertina of 
effects, which one is its direct effect? Neander argues that it is to detect SDMTs because “it is 
by detecting small dark moving things that the frog detects frog-food and flies” (NEANDER, 
1995, p. 130). However, this argument is problematic. The visual system does not detect one 
thing by detecting another thing. This is not the case because the system just detects one thing 
and what is at issue is precisely how to appropriately describe what it is its function to detect. 
That is, the question is to specify which one is the right detection assignment – SDMT, food or 
fly? These are not successive detection effects, but alternative descriptions of the same 
detection effect. That is the fundamental reason that Neander’s argument is flawed.  
  It is certainly the case that the frog catches and digests nutritive flies via the detection 
of SDMTs simply because in the frog’s historic environment there is a strong correlation 
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between SDMTs and nutritive flies – the great majority of SDMTs are nutritive flies. However, 
it is not the case that the visual system detects flies or food via the detection of SDMTs. It 
either detects one thing or detects another. So, it is required a further reason for the conclusion 
that the direct effect of the visual system is to detect SDMTs – not flies or food. The lower-
level thesis does not rule out that the direct effect of the frog’s visual system is to detect flies 
or food. It leaves open whether the visual system’s function is to token the representational 
state in response to the presence of SDMTs, flies or food. So, how to determine the detection 
function of the visual system?   
  In this chapter, I develop a variation of the producer-based teleosemantics according to 
which the function of the frog’s visual system is to detect SDMTs, the function of the motor 
system is to catch SDMTs and the content of the representational state is SDMT. I develop a 
defence of the producer-based approach that appeals to the lower-level thesis but since this 
thesis does not imply this approach – it is also compatible with consumer-based teleosemantics 
– further arguments are required in favour of producer-based teleosemantics. The first 
argument is developed in what remains of this section. The lower-level thesis is compatible 
with both producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics, but there is a problem that 
threatens the viability of the adoption of this thesis by both approaches – the relativity problem. 
It threatens to render content relative. I then assess and reject a consumer-based solution for 
this problem developed by David Papineau and after that I propose my own producer-based 
solution for the relativity problem. I take the solution of this problem to constitute an argument 
for producer-based teleosemantics to the detriment of consumer-based teleosemantics. Let’s 
start by showing how producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics are compatible with 
the lower-level thesis – both may appeal to it in order to determine function and 




The relativity problem.  
  Producer-based teleosemantics gives priority to the lowest level of the effects sequence 
and claims that the function of the producer system is the detection of a given external feature 
– the one that the producer system was selected to be sensitive to. In the case of the frog, the 
function of the visual system is to detect SDMTs because it was designed to have the capacity 
of discriminating SDMTs. This is the stimulus that triggers the frog’s catching behaviour. It has 
no capacity for discriminating nutritive properties and hence it is not its function to detect food. 
According to producer-based teleosemantics, it is the producer’s function to discriminate 
certain external feature that determines content. Applying the lower-level thesis to this 
producer-based approach, it follows that the visual system’s function is to detect SDMTs and 
hence that the content of the frog’s representational state is SDMT, not fly or food.  
  By contrast, according to consumer-based teleosemantics it is the function of the 
consumer system that determines the content of the representational state – the content is the 
external condition that should be the case for the consumer system to perform its function. 
Papineau has proposed a variation of the consumer-based teleosemantics that assumes the 
lower-level thesis in order to determine the function of the consumer system (PAPINEAU, 
2003, 2016). His idea is to apply the lower-level thesis to determine the function of the 
consumer system and hence to fix content. The consumer system has a concertina of selected 
effects: to catch the fly, to swallow it to the stomach, to digest it, etc. However, only the first 
one is its direct effect, so the consumer system has the function of catching the fly. Notice that 
according to consumer-based teleosemantics, it cannot be the function of the consumer system 
to catch SDMTs because what contributes to fitness is the catching of flies, not SDMTs. The 
consumer system should catch that object that is required for it to contribute to fitness – flies, 
not SDMTs. So, the representational content is that external condition that should be the case 
for the consumer system to achieve this direct effect, namely, the presence of the fly. Hence, 
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the content of the representational state is fly, not SDMT.    
  Unfortunately, there is a problem that threats the application of the lower-level thesis 
by both consumer-based and producer-based teleosemantics – the relativity problem. The 
application of the lower-level thesis to the case of the frog unwarrantedly assumes that the 
frog's representational state is part of the visual system. But it is plainly arbitrary to assume it 
without some previous justification (PAPINEAU, 2003). Why not assume that the frog's 
representation is part of the digestive system? After all, it is the digestive system that digests 
the fly. Why not assume that the frog's representation is part of the circulatory system? After 
all, it is the circulatory system which circulates the nutrients of the fly. It seems that there is no 
principled way of maintaining that the frog's representation is part of a given physiological 
system rather than another. The problem for the lower-level thesis is that each physiological 
system has a function of its own, and so the function of the frog's representation is relative to 
the system that the representation is being viewed as part of. So, the relativist conclusion that 
the function of the representation is indeterminate once more.  
 In light of the relativity problem, it could be argued that there is no full-blown functional 
indeterminacy here. Rather, there is mere relativity of functional assignment. It is not possible 
to assign function to a mental representation in absolute terms, regardless of which 
physiological system the representation is being considered as a component. The function of 
the representation is relative to which system it is being viewed as a component and there is no 
fact of the matter of the function of the representation in absolute terms. So, the function of the 
frog’s representation is relative to different physiological systems: to detect SDMT (relatively 
to the visual system); to detect flies (relatively to the motor system); to detect stomach filler 
(relatively to the stomach system); to detect food (relatively to the digestive system); etc.113 
The problem with this position is that the content of the representational state cannot be relative 
                                                             
113 Papineau once embraced this relativist position, cf. PAPINEAU, 2003. 
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to the physiological system because a relative content cannot play any role in the explanation 
of the behaviour of the organism. So, there is no explanatory relevance of attributing relative 
contents to mental representations. Content cannot be relative for the representational state to 
play a role in the explanation of behaviour.  
  So, the establishment of a criterion to determine of which physiological system the 
frog’s representational state is a component is required to avoid the relativist conclusion. The 
producer system is the physiological system which produces the representation – the frog’s 
visual system. The consumer systems are the physiological systems which use or consume the 
representation, i.e., the systems which historically used or consumed the representation in order 
to fulfill their own functions. In the case of the frog, the motor system is a consumer system 
inasmuch as it uses the representation to catch the fly; the digestive system is a consumer 
system inasmuch as it uses the representation of digest the fly, etc. Of which system is the 
representational state a component?  
 
Papineau’s solution  
  Papineau has recently rejected his former relativist position and proposed that the frog’s 
state is part of the prey-catching system and so that its content is fly (PAPINEAU, 2016, p. 106-
7). Let’s assess his argument in detail. It claims that the representational state is properly seen 
as a component of the prey-catching system – the visuomotor system that governs head-turning 
and tongue-snapping – not of any other system. Consider the larger prey-stomaching system, 
constituted by the prey-catching and the prey-swallowing systems. When analysed, there is no 
requirement of bringing in the representational state. That is the case because the prey-
stomaching system fulfils its function as long as its constituting prey-catching and prey-
swallowing systems fulfil their functions – no matter how they do that. So, there is no 
requirement of bringing in the representational state when analysing the prey-stomaching 
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system. It is only when the prey-catching system is analysed that the representational state 
appears – this system fulfils its function as long as it head-turns and snaps the tongue in the 
direction in which there is in fact the fly. So, the proper functioning of the prey-catching system 
requires that the representational state tracks the external condition in which there is in fact a 
fly. The representational state lies between the visual system that produced it and the motor 
system that governs the head-turning and tongue-snapping. So, the conclusion is that the 
representation is specifically a component in the prey-catching system, its function is to detect 
the presence of the fly in a certain direction.  
 What is problematic with this argument? It fails to show that the representational state 
is a component in the prey-catching system; that this is the system where it appears when 
properly analysed. The problem is that the argument fails to show that the representational state 
is part of the prey-catching system in opposition with the prey-stomaching or the prey-digesting 
systems. The reason appealed to by the argument to show that the representation is part of the 
prey-catching system also implies that it is part of the prey-stomaching and prey-digesting 
systems. My point is not that the representation is not a component of any physiological system. 
Evidently, it is. Rather, my point is that the argument fails to show that the representation 
appears between the visual system and the motor system but that it does not appear between 
the visual system and the prey-stomaching or between the visual system and the prey-digestive 
system. Let me show this in detail.    
 It is obvious that in the functional analysis the representation appears as soon as the 
visual system appears, precisely because the latter produces the former. So, the representation 
appears between the visual system (the producer system) and some consumer system. However, 
the above argument fails to specify which one is this consumer system. Is it the motor system 
and as a result the representation is a component in the prey-catching system? Or is it the motor-
swallowing system and as a result the representation is a component in the larger prey-
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stomaching system? Or is the relevant consumer system the one constituted by the motor 
system and the whole digestive system and thus the representation is a component in the prey-
digesting system? They are all systems that consume the representation.  
  Papineau’s argument claims that the representation appears only when the prey-
catching system is analysed because it fulfils its function as long as its components fulfil their 
functions and such fulfilment requires that the representation tracks the presence of a fly that 
will result in the motor system catching the fly. But this is also the case with the prey-
stomaching and prey-digestive systems. The motor-swallowing system and the motor-digestive 
system also consume the representation. If that is the case, why does only the fulfilment of the 
function of the components of the prey-catching system requires the tracking of the external 
condition and not the fulfilment of the components of the prey-stomaching and prey-digesting 
systems? Papineau seems to presuppose that this is the case because the functional analysis 
reveals that the motor system is a component of the prey-stomaching system, while the 
stomaching system is not a component of the prey-catching system. But this fact does not entail 
that the representation is a component in the prey-catching system in contrast to the prey-
stomaching system. It is equally plausible that the representation stands between the visual 
system and the motor system as well as between the visual system and the larger motor-
swallowing system. In both cases, the system fulfils its function as long as the visual system 
and the relevant consumer system fulfils their functions. The prey-catching fulfils its function 
as long as the visual system and the motor system fulfil their functions and the prey-stomaching 
system fulfils its function as long as the visual system and the motor and swallowing systems 
fulfil their functions. In all these cases, the system fulfils its function as long as the visual 
system and the relevant consumer system fulfils their functions. The relevant consumer system 
is equally conceivable as the motor system or the motor-swallowing system.  
  Finally, Papineau’s argument presupposes that the functional analysis and the lower-
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level thesis entails that it is the function of the motor system to catch flies, so let’s assume for 
the sake of the argument that its function is in fact to catch flies. Just like the motor system 
fulfils its direct function as long as it catches the fly, the motor-swallowing system fulfils its 
direct function as long as it catches and swallows the fly. The representational state appears in 
both functional analysis – the one in which the representational state stands between the visual 
and the motor system as well as in the one in which the representational state stands between 
the visual and the motor-swallowing system.   
  It could be replied that the appropriate functional analysis reveals that the 
representational state stands between the visual system and the motor system (not the motor-
swallowing system) because when analysed the motor-swallowing system is decomposed into 
the motor and swallowing systems. The problem with this response is that it does not entail 
that the representational state should appear between the visual system and the motor system 
rather than another consumer system. It could be replied that the appropriate functional analysis 
reveals that the representational state appears as an unanalysed component at the level in which 
it stands between the visual system and the motor-swallowing system. It is arbitrary to choose 
one functional analysis rather than another in the absence of some principled criterion. The 
conclusion is that the argument fails to determine which one is the consumer system of the 
representation and so fails to determine which system the representation is a component of – 
the prey-catching system, or the prey-stomaching system, or the prey-digesting system, etc.  
  The lesson to be taken is that it is hard to conceive of a non-arbitrary and principled 
criterion that succeeds in showing that the representational state lies between the visual system 
and the motor system but not between the visual system and some larger consumer system like 
the prey-stomaching system. But if there is no available criterion to determine which one is the 
specific consumer system of the representational state, content cannot be determined by the 
function of the consumer system as proposed by consumer-based teleosemantics. As a result, 
226 
 
content indeterminacy arises once again. That is, it is hard to adopt the functional analysis and 
the lower-level thesis to determine the function of the consumer system and then to determine 
content in terms of the consumer’s function precisely because it is hard to determine which one 
is the relevant consumer system and so which function determines content. It is more promising 
to apply the functional analysis and the lower-level thesis to producer-based teleosemantics 
according to which the function of the producer system determines content – in the case of the 
frog, the visual system – precisely because the producer system is fully specified. In what 
follows, I develop this strategy.  
 
The producer-consumer solution   
  There are different candidates for the criterion to determine to which system the 
representational state is a component. The first one is the producer criterion: the 
representational state is part of whatever physiological system which produced this 
representation. Since the frog's representation is produced by the visual system (not by the 
digestive system, or by the circulatory system...), it follows from the producer criterion that the 
frog's representation is part of the visual system (not of the digestive system, or of the 
circulatory system...). That is the criterion implicitly assumed by Neander (NEANDER, 1995). 
The second candidate is the consumer criterion: the representational state is part of whatever 
physiological system that consumes it. Since the frog's representation is not consumed by the 
visual system, it follows from the consumer criterion that the frog's representation is not part 
of the visual system, but part of the motor system, digestive system and other consumer 
systems. Finally, from the conjunction of the producer criterion and the consumer criterion 
arises the third candidate, the producer-consumer criterion: the representational state is part of 
whatever physiological system which produces or consumes it. Since the frog's representation 
is produced by the visual system and is consumed by the motor system, the digestive system 
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and other consumer systems, it follows that the representation is part of the visual system, the 
motor system, the digestive system, etc. Here I will defend the producer-consumer criterion. 
My strategy is to develop an argument to show that producer-based teleosemantics has the 
resources to solve the relativity problem by providing a justification for the producer-consumer 
criterion. It shows that despite the variety of consumer and producer systems of which the 
representation is a component, its content is the same relative to all of these systems. I take 
such a solution to constitute an argument in favour of this producer-based approach.  
  The lower-level thesis shows that the function of the frog’s motor and digestive systems 
are respectively to catch and digest the relevant object since these are their direct effects. But 
this thesis leaves open which object it is their functions to catch and digest – fly, food or SDMT? 
It doesn’t matter to the function of the motor system whether the represented object is nutritious 
or not as long as it catches the detected object – the motor system performs its function when 
it catches a fly as well when it catches a SDMT which is not a fly. It also doesn’t matter to the 
function of the digestive system whether the caught object is a fly or not as long as it digests 
the object – the digestive system performs its function when it digests a nutritious fly or 
something else. In the same vein, it doesn’t matter to the function of the circulatory system 
whether the digested object is nutritious or not as long as it circulates the digested object 
through the bloodstream – the circulatory system performs its function when circulates a 
nutritious stuff as well as a non-nutritious one. These are the functions of the first three 
physiological systems which consume the representation. They are proper functioning 
provided that they respectively catch, digest and circulate the detected object. It is not their 
fault or responsibility if the producer system fails to detect whatever it is supposed to detect. 
Rather, it is a fault of the producer system.  
  What about the producer system, the visual system? The lower-level thesis shows that 
its function is the detection, not to help the catching of the fly or the feeding of the frog, because 
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this is its direct effect. But is its function to detect flies, food or SDMTs? The application of the 
lower-level thesis to the producer-based teleosemantics shows that the function of the producer 
system is to detect the external condition that it was selected to discriminate, and the frog’s 
visual system was selected to discriminate SDMTs. On the one hand, it has no capacity to 
discriminate nutritive things that are not SDMTs, only SDMTs. On the other hand, it doesn’t 
matter to the frog’s visual system whether the detected object is a fly or not as long as it is a 
SDMT – it performs its function when it detects a fly as well as other SDMTs. So, the function 
of the visual system is to detect SDMTs and the content of the representational state is SDMT 
when the representation is viewed as part of the visual system.  
  But what precisely is the content of the frog’s representation relative to each one of the 
consumer systems? Let’s start with the motor system. An alternative is to claim that if the frog’s 
representation is part of the motor system, the content of the frog’s representation is fly. But 
this assignment surely doesn’t follow from the lower-level thesis that the function of a trait is 
its direct effect. The direct effect of the motor system is to catch the represented object, i.e., to 
catch that object which is represented by the frog’s representation as being in a certain position. 
The motor system is not malfunctioning if it catches the object that the representational state 
dictates it to catch, no matter whether this object is a fly or not. Rather, it is by having its direct 
effect of catching the object that the representation dictates it to catch that the motor system 
usually catches the fly. So, the content of the frog’s representation is not fly when the 
representation is viewed as part of the motor system. For the same reason, it is not food.   
 But if the content of the frog’s representation relatively to the motor system is neither 
fly nor food, what is its content? It is SDMT. What happens is that the motor system inherits 
from the visual system the content of the representation. The function of the motor system is 
simply to catch the object that the representation dictates it to catch and it doesn’t matter to its 
proper functioning the nature of the object as long as it is caught. Based solely on this fact, 
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there is no determinate content. But since the object is presented by the visual system to the 
motor system as a SDMT, the motor system represents the object as a SDMT that should be 
caught. The visual system produces the representation that there is a SDMT in a certain position 
and dictates to the motor system that this SDMT should be caught. Then, the frog snaps the 
tongue in that direction and catches the object. It is through this dictation that the motor system 
inherits the content of the representation from the visual system.   
  A primitive representational state like the frog’s one is a pushmi-pullyu representation, 
it states that a certain state of affairs is the case and dictates what the consumer of the 
representation should do.114 That is, the pushmi-pullyu representation simultaneously describes 
the world and dictates what the organism should do in this world, i.e., to trigger a certain 
behaviour. The descriptive aspect of the frog’s representation is the statement that there is a 
SDMT in a certain position and its imperative aspect is the dictation to the motor system to 
perform its function towards this SDMT, resulting in its capture when properly functioning. It 
is through the imperative aspect of the frog’s representation that the motor system inherits the 
representational content from the visual system. Such inheritance cannot be done through the 
descriptive aspect because if there were no imperative aspect, there would be no catching 
behaviour by the motor system. Indeed, there would be no behaviour at all.  
  By the same line of reasoning, the content of the representation is SDMT when 
conceived as part of the digestive system. The function of the digestive system is simply to 
digest the captured object, but since this object is presented by the visual system as a SDMT, 
it follows that the digestive system represents the object as a SDMT that should be digested. 
The digestive system inherits the content of the representation from the visual system and this 
inheritance occurs through the imperative aspect of the representation, in the sense that the 
                                                             
114 In primitive representations, the imperative and the descriptive aspect come together in an inseparable way, 




representation dictates the digestive system to perform its function towards the SDMT, 
resulting in the digestion of it. Generalizing this line of reasoning to all consumer systems of 
the frog’s representation, they represent the object as a SDMT because the producer system 
presents this object to them as a SDMT. All consumer systems inherit the content from the 
producer system and this inheritance occurs through the imperative aspect of the representation, 
in the sense that the representation dictates each consumer system to perform its function 
towards the SDMT. Thus, the content of the frog’s representation is SDMT relatively to all 
consumer systems – motor, digestive, circulatory systems, etc.   
  But of which physiological systems is the representational state a part? It is certainly 
part of the producer system because that is the system which produced it. It is plausible to claim 
that a representation is part of the system which produced it, after all the representation 
wouldn’t exist at all in the absence of the producer system or when the producer system is 
malfunctioning. However, that is not the only system to which it pertains. Since the consumer 
systems use the representation in order to perform their own functions, the representation is 
part of these systems too. The effects of the representation reach all consumer systems and so 
it is part of these systems. They use the representation insofar as they need the represented 
object to perform their functions and when they do it, the object is presented to them in a certain 
way. Hence, the consumer-producer criterion is the right criterion to determinate of which 
physiological systems a given representational state is a component.  
  The content of the frog’s representation is SDMT in all cases, when the representation 
is viewed as part of the producer system as well as when viewed as part of any consumer 
system. Since the representation is part of the producer and consumer systems and that the 
content of the representation is SDMT relatively to all of these systems, the conclusion is that 
the content of the representation is SDMT in absolute terms, no matter in relation of which 
physiological system it is being viewed as a component. Thus, there is no relativity of 
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functional assignment to the frog’s representation and the relativist conclusion is fully avoided.   
 At this point the following objection to this proposal could be raised. It is highly 
implausible that a given representational state is part of the whole organism. But this is a 
consequence of the consumer-producer criterion. That is, if the representational state is part of 
every physiological system that produces or consumes it, then it follows that the representation 
is part of the whole organism – not of some physiological systems – precisely because every 
physiological system can be viewed as either producing (the visual system) or consuming (all 
others) the representational state. For instance, the frog’s respiratory and nervous systems 
consume the representational state as long as it receives nutrients via the bloodstream. Actually, 
this line of reasoning ultimately leads to the result that every physiological system consumes 
the frog’s representational state and as a consequence of the producer-consumer criterion, the 
representation is part of all these systems. How implausible or undesirable is this consequence?  
  This is indeed a consequence of the consumer-producer criterion. However, this initial 
implausibility fades away when it is realized that to say that the representation is part of the 
circulatory, respiratory and further systems is just to say that the total consumer system of the 
representation includes the respiratory and further systems. In the end, all physiological 
systems consume the representational state since all systems consume the digested nutrients in 
one way or another and hence the representational state is also part of all systems. Evidently, 
we usually just talk about the most immediate systems that use the representational state as the 
consumer systems – e.g., the motor and digestive systems. But this is just because they are the 
first systems to effectively consume the representational state. Here it could be objected that it 
is counter-intuitive to claim that the representation is part of all systems that consume them – 
it is much more intuitive that it is part just of the most immediate system that consume it, 
namely, the motor system. However, once again the problem is how to establish a principled 
and non-arbitrary criterion that implies that the representation is just part of the most immediate 
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system in contrast with the less immediate ones.     
 Another objection is that there is no guarantee that the content of the representation is 
the same along the inheritance process from the producer to the consumer system. How to 
guarantee that this is the case in order to save the consumer-producer criterion? First of all, it 
is required to specify the ways through which content could be changed along this inheritance 
process. The first one is the partition of content. For instance, the partition of content relatively 
to the digestive system results in the representational state not having SDMT as its content 
anymore, but just small-moving thing. However, no partition is possible here because as 
previously noted, the content of simple representations is not partitionable. It is in an indivisible 
package. So, it is not possible to select some properties which appear on it while excluding 
others. The second way through which it is possible to change the representational content 
along the inheritance process is through the creation of a wholly new content, not an operation 
in the inherited content. But in this case, the result would be that in fact a wholly new 
representational state would be created and so the system responsible for this process would be 
a producer system. But it was previously assumed that the route of the inheritance process is 
from a producer to a consumer system. So, neither process is a viable way of changing the 
content. This objection is flawed.  
  I think that the lesson to be drawn from the relativity problem is that the frog’s 
representation is part of all physiological systems which consumed or produced it, not part 
solely of the producer system or solely of the consumer systems. A major threat for this position 
is the risk that the content of the representation changes from system to system – relatively to 
a given system it has a given content, while relatively to another system it has another content. 
In this case, the content would be relative again. But the above argument shows that the content 
of the frog’s representation is the same for all physiological systems of which it is part, namely, 
SDMT. So, this threat is inert.  
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 It is not a surprise at all that the content of the representation is the same relatively to 
the producer and consumer systems when you look for this conclusion in light of the fact that 
there is a cooperation between the producer system of a representation and its consumer system. 
The producer and the consumer systems were designed by evolutionary selection to cooperate 
with each other in such a way that what the producer system does in the end will help the 
consumer systems and vice versa. The fulfilment of the producer’s function helps the consumer 
systems to perform their functions and vice versa. The case of the frog illustrates this 
cooperation quite well. In the majority of cases, when the visual system performs its function 
of detecting SDMTs, it will detect a fly and so the result will be the capture of the fly by the 
motor system, the digestion of the fly by the digestive system, etc. That is, the fulfilment of the 
visual system’s function helps the fulfilment of the functions of the motor system, digestive 
system and of the other consumers. On the other hand, when the consumers perform their 
functions, the nutrients are transported to the visual system which helps it to detect SDMTs in 
future occasions. The fulfilment of the functions of the consumer systems helps the visual 
system to perform its function. So, there is a strong cooperation between the producer and 
consumer systems.   
  But by saying that in light of the consumer-producer cooperation it is not a surprise that 
the content of the frog’s representation is the same relatively to the consumer and producer 
systems, I am not providing an argument for this thesis. I think that this cooperation provides 
an indication of it, but not an argument at all. This is an indication because it is prima facie 
intuitive that in order to have a cooperation between the producers and consumers of the 
representation, the representation must have the same content relatively to these systems. 
Nonetheless, someone could argue that this is not a necessary condition for such cooperation. 
The producer-consumer cooperation doesn’t presuppose that the frog’s representation has the 
same content relatively to the producer and consumer systems in cases where the different 
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contents are co-extensional (e.g., nutritious flies and SDMTs were historically co-extensional 
in the frog’s natural environment). That is the reason that an argument based on the producer-
consumer cooperation fails to show that the representation has the same content relative to the 
consumer and producer systems.  
 A final objection to my proposal is that it is ad hoc, stating that I have maintained that 
the content of the frog’s representation is the same relative to the consumer and producer 
systems just to avoid the relativist conclusion. However, this objection is flawed not just 
because of the fact that there is a cooperation of consumer and producer systems which shows 
that it is plausible to think in these terms, but mainly because there is an independent argument 
for the consumer-producer criterion: the content of the representational state is the same 
relatively to the consumer and producer systems because the consumer systems inherit the 
content of the representation from the producer system through the imperative aspect of the 
representation. If this argument is cogent, as I have tried to show, then this solution to the 
relativity problem is not ad hoc or arbitrary.  
  The assumption of the lower-level thesis to determine content in light of the concertina 
problem is compatible with both consumer-based and producer-based teleosemantics. 
However, the relativity problem is genuinely problematic for the consumer-based approach 
because it fails to provide a solution for this problem and, as previously argued, it is hard to 
conceive such solution. By contrast, producer-based teleosemantics has the resources to solve 
the relativity problem by providing a justification for the producer-consumer criterion that 
blocks the relativity threat. The consumer systems defer to the producer system and since there 
is only one producer system, there is no threat of relativity of content. But several systems 
consume the representation, and this is problematic for the consumer-based approach – which 
determines content in terms of the consumer system’s function – because that gives rise to the 
relativity of content threat. So, my conclusion is that the solution of the relativity problem 
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constitutes an argument for the producer-based teleosemantics and a challenge for the 
consumer-based teleosemantics. This is my first reason for the adoption of the producer-based 
teleosemantics. In the next sections, I develop a general defence of this approach and defend it 
from several objections.   
 
5.3 A defence of producer-based teleosemantics  
  The lower-level thesis is compatible with both producer-based and consumer-based 
teleosemantics. It may be assumed by both teleosemantic approaches to determine function, 
but it does not imply either. Rather, it implies that the producer system’s direct effect is the 
detection of some external condition, but it leaves open which condition is that. So, which of 
the competing rival descriptions is the appropriate one – the detection of SDMTS, flies or food? 
How should it be decided?     
  Consider the following line of reasoning. The direct effect of the frog’s visual system 
is to detect SDMTs but not flies or food because the detection of nutritive flies is dependent on 
the external correlation between SDMTs and nutritive flies, while the detection of SDMTs 
depends only on the discriminatory capacities of the visual system. That is, the direct effect of 
the visual system is the detection of SDMTs, not the detection of nutritive flies. The reason is 
that the latter depends on the correlation between SDMTs and nutritive flies, while the former 
is not dependent on this correlation but only on the visual system’s discriminatory capacity – 
it can discriminate only SDTMs. Assuming the lower-level thesis, the conclusion is that the 
function of the producer system is to detect the properties that it has the capacity of 
discriminating – SDMTs. How plausible is this argument?   
  I think that it suggests and constitutes a good evidence for producer-based 
teleosemantics in contrast with consumer-based teleosemantics. However, it strikes me that a 
stronger argument is required for producer-based teleosemantics, one that goes beyond the 
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level of mere evidence or suggestion. That is my goal in this section. Here I propose an 
argument for producer-based teleosemantics based on the assignment of malfunction statuses 
to detection systems. While developing it, I assess the objection that producer-based 
teleosemantics fails to keep room open for enough misrepresentation cases. In the next two 
sections, I assess two threats to the viability of teleosemantics to give an account of 
representational content. In the next section, I assess another functional indeterminacy problem 
that is especially problematic for producer-based teleosemantics – the distality problem. In the 
final section, I assess the last objection – the source of error objection. The conclusion is that 
both threats fail to show that the producer-based approach is not viable.   
  Producer-based teleosemantics claims that the producer system is malfunctioning when 
it fails to detect the external condition that it was selected to discriminate. A common objection 
is that such approach fails to keep the room open for misrepresentation cases. That is, producer-
based teleosemantics rules out the possibility of the producer system producing false 
representations – cases in which the representational state is tokened but the relevant external 
condition does not obtain. This is certainly not the case, but it is important to assess this 
objection because it gives rise to a problem that threatens the viability of producer-based 
teleosemantics – does it keep the room open for enough misrepresentation? After all, if it is too 
restrictive in allowing misrepresentation, then it is not a viable account of representational 
content.   
  The function of the producer system is to token the representational state in response to 
the presence of some external condition of which the producer system was designed to 
discriminate – the content is that external condition. That is the core thesis of producer-based 
teleosemantics. The possibility of malfunction is hence guaranteed because a system that was 
selected to have the discriminatory capacity of detecting a certain external condition may fail 
to do that. That is, sometimes it fails to fulfil its function of tokening the representational state 
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whenever the external condition obtains. There are two situations in which there is 
malfunctioning. First, the producer tokens the representation, but the external condition does 
not obtain – the representation is false and hence there is misrepresentation. The second 
malfunctioning case is when the producer does not token the representation even though the 
external condition obtains – this is just ignorance (or false negative), the external condition is 
the case but the representation is absent. So, the conclusion is that producer-based 
teleosemantics does not rule out misrepresentation.  
  But how exactly can the producer system fail to detect the external condition that it was 
selected to discriminate and so end up malfunctioning? For instance, how can the frog’s visual 
system fail to fulfil its function of detecting SDMTs? In order to answer this question, two 
things are required. First, we need to keep in mind the distinction between misrepresentation 
and ignorance cases since they are not always caused by the same factors. Second, we need to 
make a distinction between two factors responsible for malfunction – internal factors (i.e., 
something that occurred inside the organism) and external factors (i.e., something that occurred 
outside the organism). After that, I will finish this section by developing an argument to show 
the plausibility of malfunctioning assignments delivered by producer-based teleosemantics in 
contrast with the ones delivered by consumer-based teleosemantics.     
   The standard objection to producer-based teleosemantics is that it fails to leave room 
for the possibility of misrepresentation cases, not ignorance ones. But in order to have a general 
picture of malfunctioning cases, it is important to explain how producer-based teleosemantics 
keeps the room open not only to misrepresentation cases, but also to ignorance cases. Let us 
start with ignorance cases. So, in virtue of what may the frog’s visual system fail to token the 
representational state despite the presence of the SDMT? Here there are internal and external 
factors. The most obvious cases of ignorance malfunction due to internal factors are internal 
defects. For instance, in virtue of some pathology the visual system fails to token the 
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representation despite the presence of the SDMT. The most obvious cases of ignorance 
malfunction due to external factors are inappropriate environmental light. For instance, the 
system fails to token the representation despite the presence of the SDMT simply because it is 
embedded in a dark environment. As a result, there is no shadow on the frog’s retina or the 
shadow fails to satisfy the parameters of SDMTs shadows – in both cases, there is no tokening 
of the representation. This is an external factor because what originates the ignorance – 
inappropriate light – is something originated outside the frog’s organism.115  
  Let us turn to error malfunctions – where the visual system tokens the representation, 
but the external condition does not obtain. Once again, there are internal and external factors. 
An internal defect like a neurological damage can lead the visual system to misrepresent the 
presence of the SDMT. What about the external factors? There are various cases. I will consider 
two. Consider a machine placed in front of the frog that emits a light ray which goes directly 
to its retina. It creates a shadow which satisfies the parameters of the SDMT shadow and so it 
triggers the tokening of the representation. Since the state is representing a SDMT when there 
is no SDMT around, this is a misrepresentation case. This is an external factor for 
misrepresentation because its origin is something that occurs outside the organism – the light 
ray coming from the machine. The second case is a surgical intervention. Suppose that the 
scientist opens the frog’s brain and places an electrode in the right place, resulting in the 
tokening of the representational state even though there is no SDMT (NEANDER, 2013). This 
misrepresentation case is caused by an external factor precisely because it is the scientist’s 
surgical intervention that triggers the tokening of the representation despite the absence of any 
SDMT. Generalizing, anything outside the organism that causes the tokening of the 
representation despite the absence of the SDMT constitutes an external factor for 
                                                             
115 Here I am presupposing the biological need of catching SDMTs in the relevant ignorance situations. Sleeping, 
mating and other situations in which it is conspicuous that there is no such biological need are hence promptly 
ruled out.  
239 
 
misrepresentation.     
  So far, so good. There are internal and external factors for both misrepresentation and 
ignorance cases. Producer-based teleosemantics hence does not entail that there are only 
internal factors for malfunctioning cases. There are external as well as internal factors for the 
producer system to not fulfil its function of detecting the external condition which it was 
selected to discriminate. The conclusion is that it is a condition for proper functioning that the 
producer system is embedded in the right environment.   
  But here there is a fundamental divergence between proponents of producer-based and 
consumer-based teleosemantics. The latter claims that the absence of the external correlation 
between what the producer is capable of discriminating and what is evolutionarily beneficial 
for the organism is a genuine external factor for the producer system’s malfunction. By contrast, 
proponents of producer-based teleosemantics deny that such correlation is an external factor 
for malfunctioning. So, consumer-based teleosemantics claims that the holding of the external 
correlation between SDMTs and nutritive flies is a required external condition for the visual 
system’s proper functioning while producer-based teleosemantics denies that. Some people 
might worry that the producer-based approach does not allow external factors to lead to 
malfunction but as we have seen, this is a mistake. Actually, both approaches agree that the 
malfunctioning of the producer system may be in virtue of internal as well as external factors. 
The great debate between them is whether it is a genuine external factor for malfunction the 
absence of the relevant external correlation in the environment (e.g., SDMTs and nutritive 
flies). There is a fundamental clash of intuitions here. How should we assess this debate?  
  Here it could be argued that the system cannot malfunction in virtue of the absence of 
the relevant correlation because this is something fully independent of whatever the system 
does. That is, it has nothing to do with how the system works. However, this argument is flawed 
from the very start since both teleosemantic approaches agree that a system may malfunction 
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in virtue of external factors which are also fully independent from the system (e.g., 
inappropriate environmental light). In what follows, I will develop an argument for producer-
based teleosemantics based on the plausibility of malfunctioning assignments to detection 
systems. This issue plays a crucial role in the assessment of this debate.   
  It is plausible to claim that the malfunctioning status of the system depends on the 
surrounding environment, that external conditions are required for its proper functioning. Such 
plausibility becomes even stronger when this thesis is contrasted with the opposite thesis that 
proper functioning is just internal proper functioning – which entails that external features play 
no role in the proper functioning of the system. However, producer-based teleosemantics does 
not imply this latter thesis. As previously showed, according to it there are external and internal 
factors in virtue of which a given system may malfunction. But it becomes very implausible to 
claim that even the producer system with perfect inner proper working under perfect 
environmental conditions will be malfunctioning if the relevant external correlation simply 
ceases to hold.   
  What leads some philosophers to maintain that the malfunctioning status of the system 
depends on external features is the idea that some external factors are required for the proper 
functioning of the system. I completely agree with this line of reasoning, but what I am arguing 
here is that the holding of the relevant external correlation is not among these external factors. 
The correlation partially explains why a given trait was selected by evolution. The system was 
selected to detect certain external condition because it is correlated with some other external 
condition that is beneficial for the system, but this fact doesn’t imply that the system was 
selected to detect this latter condition. That is, the frog’s visual system was selected to detect 
SDMTs because they are correlated with nutritive flies, but this fact doesn’t imply that the 
visual system was selected to detect nutritive flies. The function of the system has to do with 
how the system internally works and with certain internal and external conditions that are 
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causally related to its inner working. It has nothing to do with external features to which the 
system’s inner working has no causal relation like external correlations. That is, the proper 
function of the visual system depends on how it internally works and with internal conditions 
(e.g., no neurological damage) and external conditions (e.g., appropriate environmental light) 
that are causally related to its inner working. The proper function of the visual system is not 
dependent on the correlation between SDMTs and nutritive flies to which the system’s inner 
working has no causal relation. Notice that environmental light is causally related to how the 
system internally works. Inappropriate light may not trigger the representational state even 
though the represented external condition obtains (ignorance cases) or it may trigger the 
representational state despite the absence of the represented external condition 
(misrepresentation cases).   
  When one realises that the external correlation has no causal relation with how the 
producer system internally works and that several external conditions are required for the 
system’s internal proper operation, it becomes very implausible to claim that the absence of the 
correlation is an external factor for the system’s malfunctioning. The realisation of these two 
things leads to the implausibility of the thesis that the absence of the correlation is an external 
factor for malfunction. On one hand, there is no causal relation between the external correlation 
and the system’s internal operation – it makes no difference for the tokening of the 
representation. On the other hand, several external conditions are required for the proper 
internal operation of the system. The force of the intuition that the absence of the external 
correlation is responsible for the malfunctioning of the system lies on the plausibility of the 
idea that the system may malfunction in virtue of external factors. But this intuition is 
undermined once we recognise that several external factors can be responsible for such 
malfunctioning. It is implausible to claim that such a weak relation as the external correlation 
between certain properties in the environment (e.g., SDMTs and nutritive flies) lies among the 
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external factors responsible for the malfunctioning of the system. By contrast, the plausibility 
of the claim that some external features are responsible for such a malfunction arises once one 
realises that these external features are causally related to how the system internally works. The 
relevant external correlation is a very weak relation to be solely responsible for the 
malfunctioning of the system in contrast with causal relations.  
  In sum, the realisation that there are various external factors which lead to malfunction 
that are causally related to how the system inner works supresses the plausibility of claiming 
that the absence of the correlation is among the genuine external factors for malfunction. The 
producer system cannot malfunction simply in virtue of the absence of the external correlation 
in the surrounding environment. That said, let’s move on and assess the distality problem.  
 
5.4 Functional indeterminacy (II): the distality problem     
  The core thesis of producer-based teleosemantics is that the content of the 
representational state is the external condition for which its producer system was selected to 
discriminate. The producer detects a given distal feature through a causal chain constituted of 
proximal features – the distal feature causes the proximal ones which ultimately causes the 
tokening of the representational states. That is, there is a causal chain that that starts with the 
distal feature, has the proximal features as intermediate causal links and ends with the tokening 
of the representational state. The question that arises for producer-based teleosemantics is the 
following. In virtue of what was the producer system selected to discriminate the distal feature 
but not the proximal one? Since the producer system discriminates the distal feature via the 
discrimination of the proximal features, why is its function to discriminate the distal feature 
but not the proximal ones? The threat is that it is indeterminate whether the function of the 
producer system is to detect proximal or external features and hence that the content delivered 
by producer-based teleosemantics is indeterminate. This is the distality problem (also called 
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“the problem of distal content”) that is the subject matter of this section.116  
  The distality problem asks why representation R represents the distal feature C but not 
the proximal feature Q (or vice versa) when Q is a more proximal feature in the causal chain 
that starts with the presence of C and triggers the tokening of R. That is, which item in the 
causal chain of proximal and distal features that triggers the tokening of R is the one that 
determines its content? This problem arises for every producer system in which there is such 
causal chain. Let’s illustrate it with the case of the frog. Let’s assume, in light of the debates of 
the previous sections, that producer-based teleosemantics is the appropriate teleosemantic 
approach and so that the function of the frog’s visual system is to detect SDMTs. There is the 
following causal chain responsible for the triggering of the frog’s representational state R:  
SDMT → pattern of light → shadow on the frog’s retina → tokening of R 
That is, the presence of the SDMT causes a certain pattern of light that causes the shadow on 
the retina that causes the tokening of the representation. For instance, is the function of the 
visual system to discriminate SDMTs or appropriate shadows on the retina? It is through the 
discrimination of the appropriate shadows on the retina that the frog’s visual system 
discriminates SDMTs, so why not say that its function is to discriminate such shadows? It is 
also indeterminate whether the representation has the proximal content shadow on the retina 
or the distal content SDMT. In the latter case the function of the visual system is to detect a 
certain object in the environment, while in the first case its function is to detect the appropriate 
shadow on the retina. The truth-conditions of the distal content representation is that a certain 
external condition obtains in the environment – the presence of the SDMT – while the truth-
conditions of the proximal content representation is the presence of an appropriate shadow on 
the frog’s retina.   
                                                             
116 Fred Dretske was the first to formulate the distality problem for teleosemantics (DRETSKE 1986). Based on it, 
Ruth Millikan objected that producer-based teleosemantics entails that “all representations must only be of 
proximal stimuli” (MILLIKAN, 2001, p. 118). 
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 The distality problem is a functional indeterminacy problem that threatens producer-
based teleosemantics because it seems that there are equally strong reasons to describe in 
conflicting ways the function of the frog’s visual system. Is its function to detect the proximal 
stimulus (the shadow on the retina) or the distal stimulus (the presence of the SDMT)? Given 
that the visual system discriminates the distal feature by discriminating the proximal ones, why 
give priority to one feature over the others? Finally, its proper functioning status is 
indeterminate. Consider again the machine that emits the light ray which causes the shadow on 
the frog’s retina and triggers the tokening of the representation. In this case, the visual system 
is proper functioning provided that its function is to detect shadows on the retina, but it is 
malfunctioning provided that its function is to detect SDMTs.   
  The relation between the presence of the SDMT and the shadow on the retina is a causal 
one. The first causes the later, it is not a mere correlation like the one that holds between SDMTs 
and nutritive flies. The distality problem is a “horizonal problem” since it asks for the 
specification of which item in the causal chain that triggers the representation is the one that 
determines content: SDMT, pattern of light or shadow on the retina? By contrast, “vertical 
problems” ask for the specification of which description determines content among the 
competing descriptions of the same item in the causal chain. Which description of the item in 
the causal chain constituted by the fly determines content – SDMT or nutritive fly? Note that 
“shadow on the retina” and “SDMT” concern different items in the causal chain, while 
“SDMT” and “nutritive fly” are competing descriptions of the same item, namely, the one 
constituted by the fly. The distality problem asks to locate content among the horizontal axis, 
not in the vertical axis.117 That is the reason that the distality problem is a distinctive functional 
indeterminacy problem. Its solution requires a principled criterion to establish that the 
                                                             
117 Here I am following Kim Sterelny and Peter Godfrey-Smith in characterizing the distality problem as a 
“horizontal problem” in contrast with “vertical problems”. Cf. STERELNY, 1990; GODFREY-SMITH, 1989. 
245 
 
representational content is constituted by the distal feature but not the proximal one or vice 
versa. That is, the task is to develop a principled criterion that excludes the proximal features 
but includes the distal feature in the delivered representational content.    
   In this section, I will defend that the function of the visual system is to detect SDMTs, 
not appropriate shadows in the retina or patterns of light, and so that the content of the frog’s 
representation is SDMT. In what follows, I will develop a principled criterion which entails that 
the function of the producer is to discriminate only the distal feature.118   
  Let’s start this investigation by excluding two functional assignments located in the 
extreme links of the relevant causal chain that are easily ruled out by producer-based 
teleosemantics. The first one lies in its extreme start and gives rise to an overly distal content. 
Why isn’t the function of the producer system to discriminate the light rays before they are 
reflected on the SDMT? After all, these light rays are the ones that start the causal chain that 
ultimately creates the shadow on the retina.119 This functional assignment gives rise to this 
overly distal content: the representational state represents the light arrays before they reach the 
SDMT. This functional assignment is easily ruled out simply because the visual system cannot 
discriminate such light rays. One easily verifies it by just considering the scenario in which 
such light rays are present but there is no SDMT around – the representational state would not 
be tokened and so there would be no discrimination (NEANDER, 2017, p. 223). So, it cannot 
be the function of the visual system to detect such overly distant light rays. 
  The second functional assignment lies in the opposite side of the causal chain – the 
extreme end – and gives rise to an overly proximal content. The shadow on the frog’s retina 
triggers a range of retinal firings and neural signs that ultimately token the representational 
                                                             
118 I have presented the distality problem as a problem for producer-based teleosemantics since this is the theory 
that I am developing here and because it is “particularly problematic” for producer-based teleosemantics 
(RYDER, 2009, p. 263). But this is a general problem for teleosemantics and also to causal theories of content 
that try to determine content in terms of the causal relations of the representational state.  
119 This objection was originally developed by Carolyn Price to Neander’s producer-based teleosemantic theory, 
cf. NEANDER, 2017, p. 281. 
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system. So why isn’t the visual system’s function to detect such retinal firings or neural signals? 
The result would be the assignment of this overly proximal content: the representational state 
represents such retinal firings and neural signs. How to rule out such functional assignment? 
  Neander has defended the following criterion to rule out neural signals and retinal 
firings as candidates for detection function to the visual system. She claims that “these are 
already eliminated, because they are part of the response [i.e. detection] involved in the relevant 
response function [i.e., detection function]” (NEANDER, 2017, p. 222). That is, the neural 
signals and retinal firings constitute the very detection process that is the function of the 
producer system to fulfil – to token the representational state in response to the presence of the 
relevant external condition. Since the representational state cannot represent elements in the 
detection process responsible for its very tokening, it follows that it cannot be the function of 
the producer system to detect retinal firing or neural signs and so that they are not constitutive 
of the representational content.   
  However, there is a fundamental problem with this criterion that threats its success in 
ruling out that the function of the visual system is to detect retinal firings or neural signs. In 
the centre of this criterion lies the assumption that the detection process is constituted by retinal 
firings, neural signals, etc. But this is not mandatory. The room is still open for the assumption 
that the detection process encompasses neural signs and other elements but excludes retinal 
firings. It seems that it is arbitrary to assume that both retinal firings and neural signals are 
constitutive of the detection process. After all, maybe it is constituted by neural signals and 
other internal elements because its function is precisely to detect retinal firings. Why not? Here 
there is the risk of presupposing that retinal firings are constitutive of the detection process just 
to rule out the assignment that the function of the visual system is to detect retinal firings. 
Unless some principled justification is available to include both retinal firings and neural 
signals among the items that constitute the detection process, it is arbitrary to simply assume 
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that this is the case. The conclusion is that in the absence of such justification, this criterion 
fails to rule out retinal firings as a candidate for what is the function of the system to detect. 
Rather, it keeps the door open for it.  
  But I think that there is a way of saving this criterion by providing the following 
justification for the claim that both retinal firings and neural signs are constitutive of the 
detection process, and so for ruling them out of what is the function of the visual system to 
detect. This is a consequence of the lower-level thesis and the functional analysis previously 
proposed to specify the producer system’s function. Let’s show it in detail. The lower-level 
thesis claims that the function of the producer system is its direct effect and that the functional 
analysis is required precisely to specify which one is the system’s direct effect. Accordingly, 
the direct effect of the producer system is the effect that appears in the lowest level of the 
functional analysis of the organism in which the producer system appears as an unanalysed 
component. However, what happens is that such neural signals and retinal firings are 
themselves components of the relevant producer system in the case of the frog – the visual 
system. They appear in the functional analysis only at the level in which the visual system is 
itself analysed. Retinal firings and neural signals are unequivocally components of the visual 
system. At the level in which the visual system is an unanalysed component, they do not appear 
at all. Hence, it cannot be its direct effect to detect neural signals or retinal firings and so they 
cannot be what is the function of the visual system to detect.   
  The conclusion is that it is not the function of the producer system to detect either overly 
distal features like the light rays before they are reflected from the SDM, or overly proximal 
features like retinal firings or neural signals. Its function is to detect something between these 
extremes – the SDMT, the light pattern before it reaches the retina or the shadow on the retina. 




The distality principle  
 What is required is a distality principle that shows that the function of the producer 
system is to discriminate the distal feature, not the proximal ones. While proper functioning, 
the producer system discriminates distal feature C via the discrimination of the proximal feature 
Q. Why does the producer system have the function of discriminating distal feature C rather 
than proximal feature Q? It is perspicuous that the producer system was designed to detect both 
C and Q, after all the detection of C is achieved via the detection of Q. So, the question is not 
whether when proper functioning the system detects C or Q, after all it detects both features. 
Rather, the question is whether the system was selected for the detection of C or Q. That is, is 
it the function of the producer system to detect the distal or proximal feature?  
  The principle that I will defend here was previously mentioned in the assessment of the 
constancy mechanism proposal for the limits of intentionality in the third chapter. The function 
of the producer system is to discriminate the distal but not the proximal feature because there 
is a variety of proximal stimuli coming from the same distal feature that triggers the tokening 
of the representational state. That is, the producer system was selected to have the capacity of 
bridging across different proximal stimuli coming from the same distal feature in order to detect 
the distal feature. So, the producer system discriminates the distal feature via different stimuli 
routes – not only via the same proximal stimulus.  
 
DISTALITY PRINCIPLE: the producer system has the function of detecting distal 
feature C but not proximal stimulus Q in the causal chain that triggers the tokening of 
representational state R because there is a multiplicity of intermediate proximal stimuli 
that triggers the tokening of R in response to the presence of C.120 
                                                             
120 Fred Dretske was the first to formulate this principle, cf. DRETSKE, 1981, p. 163; 1986. Kim Sterelny, Peter 





Such multiplicity of stimuli routes responsible for the triggering of the representational state 
rules out that the function of the producer system is to detect the intermediate features between 
the sensory apparatus and the distal feature. The reason is that there is no single intermediate 
feature that is present in all causal chains. Sometimes the token of the representational state is 
triggered by proximal stimulus Q1, while other times it is triggered by Q2, or Q3 ... or Qn. The 
only external feature that is present in all these causal chains is precisely the external feature C 
and hence the producer system may detect the presence of C without always detecting the 
presence of any specific proximal stimulus Qn. Evidently, such detection will always be via the 
detection of some proximal stimulus, but which one is the present proximal stimuli varies from 
situation to situation. The presence of C is the only normal cause that triggers the tokening of 
the representational state understood as the causal link that is always present in the causal chain 
in biological normal situations (DRETSKE, 1986, p. 168-9). So, the conclusion that the 
function of the visual system is to detect C.  
  It is arbitrary to assume that a given organism which is capable of detecting the distal 
feature only via a single proximal stimulus has the function of detecting the distal feature but 
not this proximal stimulus. However, things change when the organism is capable of detecting 
the distal feature via more than one stimulus route. In this case, there is a principled reason to 
claim that the organism was designed to detect the distal feature, not any individual proximal 
stimulus – the distal feature is the only item present in all distinct causal chains that trigger the 
tokening of the representational state. Suppose that R is triggered by two distinct stimuli routes 
coming from distal feature C – via Q1 or via Q2. Q1 is sufficient to trigger R and so is Q2. Thus, 
it is arbitrary to claim that the function of the producer system is to detect Q1 because it would 
be equally plausible that its function is to detect Q2 – why privilege one stimuli route rather 
than the other? The only non-arbitrary functional assignment is that the function of the producer 
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system is to detect C because it is the only external feature that is present in both stimuli routes. 
Hence, the conclusion is that R represents C, not Q1 or Q2.   
  Let’s illustrate this distality principle. The frog’s visual system has the function of 
detecting the SDMT by tokening the representational state but not the shadow on the retina or 
the light pattern. That is the case because it is capable of detecting SDMTs via a variety of light 
patterns and shadows on the retina that that triggers the tokening of the representational state. 
So, the content of the representation is SDMT. The tokening of the representation is triggered 
by a multiplicity of retinal stimulation patterns and light patterns in different circumstances.121   
 Here an elucidation is necessary. Does this distality principle amount to the requirement 
that producer systems should employ constancy mechanisms in the production of 
representational states in order for the representations to have distal contents? No. What 
happens is that the employment of the constancy mechanism is just a special case of the 
satisfaction of the above distality principle – it is not the only way in which the producer system 
may satisfy the distality principle. That is, it is just one among other ways of implementing the 
many-one mapping function from the multiplicity of proximal stimuli to the tokening of the 
representational state. Let me explain why. As I have been using “constancy mechanism”, the 
employment of the constancy mechanism occurs only in the production of representational 
states within a single-sense modality. That is, constancy mechanisms are employed only in the 
production of single sensory representational states – visual representations, auditory 
representations, etc. Notice that the previous examples of the employment of constancy 
mechanism resulted in the production of single sensory visual representations – the honeybee’s, 
vervet monkey’s and the frog’s visual representational states. However, the implementation of 
the many-one mapping function required for the satisfaction of the distality principle is also 
                                                             
121 It is interesting to note that the visual system of the toad, an organism that has a very similar visual system 
with that of the frog, exhibit size constancy. It can detect the same distal object despite the size distinction of 
retinal images that are produced on the retina. The retinal image size varies with the distance that the object is 
from the retina. The toad detects the real size of objects, not the size of retinal images. Cf. EWERT, 1980, p. 74. 
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achievable by producer systems equipped with two or more sense modalities that produce 
multimodal representational states (DRETSKE, 1986, p. 131). For instance, you may represent 
the presence of a dog either via the visual sense when you see the dog or via the auditory sense 
when you hear it barking. So, in order to highlight this difference, I will use “constancy 
mechanism” just to refer to the specific implementation of this general model by a single-sense 
representational state.  
  It is not surprising why I have appealed only to constancy mechanisms in the debate on 
the minimal conditions for intentionality. After all, multimodal representations have a far more 
complex intentionality than single-modal representational states and hence are not within the 
scope of the debate on the limits of intentionality – it is very implausible to cast doubt on the 
intentional status of systems that produce multimodal sensory states. The producer system 
should be sufficiently complex to produce representations via two or more sense modalities. 
 I think that this shows that the distality principle is not only fully compatible with the 
theory of mental representation that has been developed in this thesis but is also motivated by 
it. This theory defends the dual proposal for the limits of intentionality according to which the 
employment of the constancy mechanism in the production of the primitive states is a minimal 
condition for intentionality. It follows that the primitive sensory states considered by this theory 
as genuinely intentional satisfy the distality principle. This constitutes a reason for the 
principled character of the distality principle in light of the theory of mental representation 
developed in this thesis. The distality principle is not an ad hoc or arbitrary criterion proposed 
only to give a response to the distality problem.   
 
The disjunction objection  
  So far, so good. But the distality principle is chased by the following threat (DRETSKE, 
1986). It is not true that the distal feature is the only external feature that is present throughout 
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all stimuli routes that trigger the tokening of the representation. The disjunction objection 
consists in claiming that there is a proximal item that is also always present and thus constitutes 
a normal cause for the triggering of the representation. Namely, the disjunction of all proximal 
stimuli that triggers the representational state, {Q1 v Q2 v … v Qn}. Such a disjunctive proximal 
feature is always present in the causal chain just like distal feature C. They are both equally 
normal causes for the tokening of the state. Hence, it is arbitrary to claim that it is the function 
of the producer system to detect C but not the disjunctive proximal feature {Q1 v Q2 v … v Qn} 
and so that that the representational state represents only C. No matter how many stimuli routes 
the producer system may have access in order to respond to the distal feature, there will still be 
the possibility of describing its function as the detection of the disjunction of the proximal 
stimuli that trigger the representation.   
  This is a very serious objection to the viability of the distality principle solution to the 
distality problem. How to assess it? What is the reason that the function of the producer system 
is to detect C but not the disjunction of proximal stimuli {Q1 v Q2 v … v Qn}? It is of no help 
to claim that its function is to detect C because {Q1 v Q2 v … v Qn} is a disjunctive feature, 
arguing that producer systems could not have been selected to detect disjunctive features. It is 
ad hoc to just stipulate that.122 In what follows, I will develop a response to the disjunction 
objection that takes a different route.  
  The producer system has the function of detecting the distal feature but not the proximal 
disjunctive feature because the detection of the latter is just a means to achieve the detection of 
the distal feature. That is, the adaptive effect for which the producer system was selected is the 
detection of the distal feature. The detection of the proximal disjunctive feature is just a means 
                                                             
122 Dretske defended that the only way to guarantee that the state represents the distal but not the disjunctive 
proximal feature is to require from the organism the capacity of some form of associative learning (DRETSKE, 
1986, pp. 170-1). But I will not assess Dretske’s response to the disjunction objection here – it strikes me as 
unmotivated since it is restricted to representations of organisms capable of associative learning. Here I will 
develop a solution to this problem that is not restricted to organisms with such associative learning capacity. 
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to achieve this end. It strikes me that this is the right intuition that should give rise to the 
response to the disjunction objection, but how to justify it? If there is no available justification, 
this response is arbitrary.   
  That is the case in virtue of the disjunctive character of this proximal feature. The only 
proximal feature present in all stimuli chains responsible for the tokening of the state is 
disjunctive precisely because there are different means to detect the distal feature for which the 
system was selected to detect. Sometimes the detection of C is via Q1, other times via Q2, etc. 
But why should one accept such a conclusion? The argument for it arises from the assessment 
of alternative evolutionary environments for the organism. The organism was designed in the 
original environment to respond to C via the detection of disjunctive proximal feature {Q1 v Q2 
v Q3}. Now suppose that the organism has evolved in an alternative environment that is very 
similar to the original one. The only difference is that Q3 is absent and that another proximal 
stimulus Q4 is present, such that now the detection of Q4 is also a means for the detection of C. 
But the detection of Q3 is no longer a means to detect C, in this alternative environment it is 
the detection of the disjunctive proximal environment {Q1 v Q2 v Q4} that leads to the detection 
of C, not {Q1 v Q2 v Q3}. Finally, suppose that Q3 and Q4 are very similar proximal stimuli (e.g., 
two retina images with different but very similar sizes). What would have happened in this 
alternative environment? How would the organism have evolved?    
  It is perspicuous that evolution would have selected the producer system to be causally 
sensitive not to {Q1 v Q2 v Q3} as it happened in the original scenario, but to {Q1 v Q2 v Q4}. 
Why is that the case? Just like in the original scenario {Q1 v Q2 v Q3} is the disjunctive proximal 
feature that is a means to achieve the adaptive effect of detecting C, in the alternative scenario 
it is the detection of {Q1 v Q2 v Q4} that leads to the adaptive effect of detecting C. Notice that 
it could not be the function of the producer system to detect the disjunctive proximal feature 
{Q1 v Q2 v Q3 v Q4}. The reason is that there are other alternative scenarios in which both Q3 
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and Q4 are absent and instead another proximal stimulus Qn is a means for the detection of C, 
such that in these other alternative scenarios it is the detection of {Q1 v Q2 v Qn} that leads to 
the detection of C. The conclusion is that there is no disjunctive proximal feature {Q1 v Q2 v ... 
v Qn} that is always present, throughout all actual and alternative evolutionary environments, 
in the stimuli chain responsible for the tokening of the representation. C is the only feature that 
is always present. So, there is no disjunctive proximal feature that constitutes a normal cause 
for the tokening of the representational state throughout all actual and alternative evolutionary 
environments. This fact shows that the disjunctive character of the disjunctive proximal feature 
is the reason that the detection of this feature is just a means for the detection of the adaptive 
distal feature C.   
  In sum, the assessment of alternative scenarios show that evolution would have selected 
the organism’s producer system in order to discriminate distinct disjunctive proximal features. 
The reason is that it changes from scenario to scenario which one is the relevant disjunctive 
proximal feature whose detection leads to the detection of the adaptive distal feature. Hence, it 
cannot be the function of the producer system to detect the disjunctive proximal feature in the 
original evolutionary environment. The distal feature is the only feature that is present in all 
these scenarios and so the conclusion is that it is the function of the producer system to detect 
the distal feature, not any disjunctive proximal feature. The representational state has a distal 
content, not a proximal one.   
  Let’s contrast my response to the disjunction objection and Neander’s solution for the 
distality problem. Neander rejects the above distality principle according to which the producer 
system has the function of detecting the distal feature, not the proximal ones, because there is 
a multiplicity of intermediate proximal stimuli that triggers the tokening of the representation. 
Instead, she proposes the following principle: “a sensory system is only adapted to respond to 
the more proximal items because doing so is the means by which it responds to the more distal 
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ones, and not vice versa” (NEANDER, 2013, p. 34). This principle is very different from the 
distality principle. However, it has a certain similarity with my response to the disjunction 
objection.  
  Neander’s principle strikes me as ad hoc because it is hard to conceive a principled 
argument based on the producer-based teleosemantics to justify this principle as a solution for 
the distality problem. However, things change when one’s preferred solution for the distality 
problem is the previously defended distality principle. As I have tried to show, the distality 
principle is not ad hoc or arbitrary. There is a fundamental argument for it which is based on 
the multiplicity of intermediate stimuli routes that trigger the tokening of the representation. 
Furthermore, there is a strong motivation for the distality principle based on the dual proposal 
for the limits of intentionality that I have defended in the fourth chapter. However, the distality 
principle is threaten by the disjunction objection – why is it the function of the producer system 
to detect the distal feature rather than the disjunctive proximal feature?   
  My strategy to give a response to this objection consists by arguing that the function of 
the producer system is to detect the distal feature because the detection of the disjunctive 
proximal feature is just a means for the detection of the adaptive distal feature. But how to 
justify it? This move is plainly justified as a response for the disjunction objection because it 
is in virtue of the disjunctive character of the relevant disjunctive proximal feature that the 
detection of this feature is just a means for the detection of the distal feature. The argument for 
it arises in the assessment of alternative evolutionary environments for the organism. Evolution 
would have selected the producer system to discriminate distinct disjunctive proximal features 
in alternative evolutionary scenarios. The reason is that it changes from scenario to scenario 
the relevant disjunctive proximal feature whose detection leads to the detection of the adaptive 
distal feature.   
  Finally, it is important to notice the contrast of plausibility between two claims. It is 
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more plausible to claim that the detection of the disjunctive proximal feature is a means to the 
detection of the distal feature (my response to the disjunction objection) than to claim that the 
detection of a non-disjunctive proximal feature in a specific stimuli chain is just a means to the 
detection of the distal feature (Neander’s claim). The reason for such contrast is the disjunctive 
character of the former proximal feature. Such disjunctiveness is what grounds the claim that 
the disjunctive proximal feature is just a means to the distal feature. That is the case because 
different stimuli routes lead to the same distal feature throughout alternative evolutionary 
scenarios. This is the fundamental difference. But since Neander, in her solution for the 
distality problem, does not appeal to the multiplicity of stimuli routes that give rise to the 
relevant disjunctive proximal feature, her principle lacks the required justification. As a result, 
it looks ad hoc.     
  Let’s finish this section by assessing an objection that Carolyn Price has developed to 
Neander’s solution for the distality problem that also applies to my response for the disjunction 
objection (PRICE, 2014, p. 590). My response to the disjunction objection implies that the 
function of the frog’s visual system is to detect SDMTs, not the disjunctive proximal feature 
constituted by the shadows on the retina that triggers the tokening of the representation. After 
all, the detection of shadows on the retina is just a means to achieve the adaptive detection of 
SDMTs. But here it could be objected that in the end such line of reasoning will lead to the 
claim that the frog’s visual system represents nutritive flies, not SDMTs. The reason is that the 
assessment of alternative evolutionary environments shows that evolutionary selection would 
have select the visual system that produces representations that track nutritive flies, not 
SDMTs. So, why couldn’t my own preferred producer-based function assignment be ruled out 
for the same reason that I have ruled out the assignment that the function of the producer system 
is to detect the disjunctive proximal feature? After all, the visual system was selected to 
discriminate SDMTs only because it was by this means that it was capable of discriminating 
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nutritive flies. Hence, the function of the visual system is to detect nutritive flies, not SDMTs.123 
 The problem with this objection is that it misses what is the issue behind the distality 
problem. As previously noted, the distality problem is a horizonal problem. The issue of the 
distality problem (and the disjunction objection) is not how to properly describe the distal 
feature that the visual system is supposed to detect – as a SDMT or as a nutritive fly. This is 
the issue of vertical problems. Rather, the issue of the distality problem is the specification of 
the item in the causal chain that the producer system has the function to detect. Is it the distal 
feature or some proximal feature? How to properly describe the distal feature is a further 
question. The distality problem does not ask what the appropriate description of the distal 
feature among the competing descriptions is – “SDMT”, “nutritive fly”, etc. Remember that in 
the beginning of the debate on the distality problem, I have assumed that the proper description 
of the distal feature is SDMT (not nutritive flies) in light of the arguments that I have developed 
for producer-based teleosemantics in the former sections of this chapter. But what is at issue is 
not this or that description of the distal feature. Rather, the issue is whether the function of the 
visual system is to detect the distal feature or some proximal feature in the first place.    
  However, now it could be replied that nothing prevents the opponent of producer-based 
teleosemantics to argue that Price’s objection should be withdrawn from the context of the 
debate on the distality problem in order to turn it into a general objection to producer-based 
teleosemantics. That is, the general objection that the producer system was selected for its 
capacity to discriminate the sensible properties of the relevant distal feature (e.g., SDMT) only 
because it was by that means that it was able to discriminate the evolutionary beneficial 
properties of the distal feature (e.g., nutrition).   
   It strikes me that this reason should only be applied to the vertical problem, not to the 
                                                             
123 Neander assesses Price’s objection in her last published book, but it is not clear at all that her response rebuts 
this objection, cf. NEANDER, 2017, p. 223. In what follows, I will take a different route.   
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horizontal ones. That is, it should only be applied for the specification of the item in the causal 
chain that is the function of the producer system to discriminate. But if one rejects this claim 
and really wants to turn Price’s objection into a general objection to producer-based 
teleosemantics, one should then consider the general picture of the debate between producer-
based and consumer-based teleosemantic approaches. It is not enough now to consider only the 
debate on the distality problem. As I have showed in the previous sections, there are strong 
arguments in favour of producer-based teleosemantics that should be considered when this 
global debate between producer-based and consumer-based teleosemantics arises. First, I have 
argued in the second section that producer-based teleosemantics render content determinate in 
light of the concertina and relativity problems, while there is no prospect of consumer-based 
teleosemantics rendering content determinate relatively to the relativity problem. Second, I 
have argued in the third section that producer-based teleosemantics delivers plausible 
malfunctioning assignments to detection systems, by contrast with consumer-based 
teleosemantics. In light of these strong reasons for producer-based teleosemantics, it is hard to 
argue that this global version of Price’s objection will make the balance leans towards the 
rejection of producer-based teleosemantics. Notice that the debate on the disjunction objection 
is a local issue that cannot by itself decide the general debate between producer and consumer-
based teleosemantics. In the big picture, there are strong reasons in favour of the former. So, 
my conclusion is that the balance leans in favour of producer-based teleosemantics, not against 
it.  
 
5.5 The source of error objection 
  In this final section, I will assess one last objection to producer-based teleosemantics. 
Consider a situation in which the producer, consumer and all other frog’s systems are properly 
functioning and in which the visual system detects a non-nutritive SDMT. As a result, there is 
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no increase of fitness. But how is it possible that there is no increase of fitness even though all 
systems of the organism are proper functioning? This is the source of error objection. Its 
assessment comes with an important lesson for teleosemantics.  
  This situation is perspicuously not problematic for consumer-based teleosemantics 
because it claims that the function of the representational state is to detect nutritive flies and 
that the function of the consumer systems is to catch and digest nutritive flies. So, it follows 
that in the above situation the consumer systems are malfunctioning since they failed to catch 
and digest nutritive flies and hence there is no incompatibility between the non-increasing of 
fitness in this situation and consumer-based teleosemantics. By contrast, this situation is 
problematic for producer-based teleosemantics. As previously argued, this approach claims that 
the function of the producer system is to detect SDMTs and that the function of the consumer 
systems is to catch and digest SDMTs. So, in the above situation even though the producer and 
consumer systems perform their functions of respectively detecting, catching and digesting 
SDMTs, there will be no increase of fitness because the relevant SDMT is not nutritive. The 
fact that, according to producer-based teleosemantics, there are cases in which all systems are 
proper functioning but still there is no increase of fitness seems to be incompatible with the 
aetiological conception of biological function and with the very spirit of teleosemantics. After 
all, if all systems are proper functioning but there is no increase of fitness, where is the source 
of error responsible for the nonincreasing of fitness? The organism is composed of a variety of 
systems, it is plausible to assume that there is increase of fitness provided that all systems are 
properly functioning. However, such assumption is wrong. In this final section, I assess the 
situation in which, according to producer-based teleosemantics, there is no increase of fitness 
despite the proper functioning of all systems, and I show why this is not problematic and hence 
that the source of error objection is flawed.124  
                                                             
124 This objection was proposed by Prof. Matthew Parrott in conversation.  
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  In this situation there is no increase of fitness even though all organism’s systems are 
properly functioning in virtue of some external feature of the surrounding environment. That 
is, in this situation the source of error lies in the environment. To guarantee the increase of 
fitness, it is not only required that the biological systems of the organism are proper 
functioning, but also that the organism is embedded in an appropriate environment. When the 
surrounding environment is inappropriate, there is no guarantee of the increasing of fitness. 
This is the lesson to be taken from this situation. Let’s illustrate it with two variations of this 
situation.  
  Suppose that the scientist fools the frog by placing a SDMT in front of it – a pellet. 
The frog’s consumer and producer systems are proper functioning and so the visual system will 
detect it, the motor system will catch it, the digestive system will digest it, etc. However, in the 
end there will be no increase of fitness because the pellet is non-nutritious. But if the frog’s 
consumer and producer systems are properly functioning, where is the source of error? It must 
lie somewhere. In this case, the source of error is the scientist fooling the frog. It is important 
to notice that evolution always operates in a specific environment, the favoured traits are 
always selected against a background environment. Since evolution is a selection process 
which operates throughout the history of the species, the relevant environment is the historical 
environment of the species. So, the species was not designed by evolution to function in any 
environment whatsoever, but to function in its historical environment. However, in this case 
the relevant environment is not the frog’s historical environment – the scientist changed it 
insofar as a pellet was placed in front of the frog. That is the reason that the error lies in the 
environment. If the background environment were the frog’s historical environment, there 
would be increase of fitness. The conclusion is that the fact that all systems are proper 
functioning is not a guarantee of increasing of fitness. Rather, it is guaranteed only when (1) 
the producer and consumer systems are proper functioning and (2) the surrounding 
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environment is the organism’s historical one. If one of these two conditions fail to obtain, there 
is no guarantee of increase of fitness.125   
  Now let’s consider a second variation of the situation in which the biological systems 
of the organism are properly functioning but there is no increase of fitness. Suppose that the 
frog’s consumer and producer systems are proper functioning but there is no perfect correlation 
in the frog’s historical environment between SDMTs and nutritious flies. That is, there are non-
nutritious SDMTs in this environment. Now let’s suppose that the following correlation holds: 
nine out of ten SDMTs are nutritious. Hence, in one out of ten cases in which the frog’s visual 
system detects a small-dark-moving thing, it is not detecting a nutritious fly and so there is no 
increase of fitness even though all frog’s systems are proper functioning. But if the relevant 
environment is the frog’s historical environment and the frog’s producer and consumer systems 
are proper functioning, where is the source of error? The fact is that assuming the producer-
based approach, in one out of ten cases there is no increase of fitness even though all systems 
are proper functioning and the relevant environment is the frog’s historical one.   
  Here the source of error lies again in the environment because this specific environment 
is inappropriate for the frog. There is no increase of fitness because in that specific 
environment, SDMTs are not nutritive flies. This second case gives rise to an important lesson 
for teleosemantics. There are a plenty of cases in which a trait is selected even though the 
relevant correlation is not perfect. What matters for evolutionary selection is that the bonus of 
having the trait is higher than the onus of having it. The selection of a trait by evolution is 
always a matter of the balance pending for its favouring, not for its disfavouring. In this second 
case, evolution selected the visual system because even though it will have the effect of 
detecting food in only nine out of ten cases, the bonus of having it (i.e., the obtainment of food 
                                                             
125 While presenting the functional indeterminacy problem, Dretske originally wondered whether the error lies 
in the external environment when the relevant correlation is broken. Cf. DRETSKE, 1986, pp. 166-8. 
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in nine out of ten cases) is higher than the onus of having it (i.e., the loss of energy in one of 
out of ten cases). Therefore, it is true that there is no increase of fitness in the specific occasion 
in which the visual system detects a non-nutritious thing, but it is also true that this trait is 
evolutionary beneficial when globally considered. That is, in this occasion the trait is not 
locally beneficial, but it is globally beneficial because there is a general increase of fitness. The 
lesson is that the increasing of fitness resulted of the performance of the function of a trait 
should be always considered globally, not locally.   
  The difference between these two cases is just that in the first one the relevant external 
feature is the scientist fooling the frog, while in the second case the relevant external feature is 
the imperfect correlation between SDMTs and nutritive flies in the frog’s historical 
environment. The fact that the biological systems of the organism are proper functioning and 
that the surrounding environment is the organism’s historic environment guarantees global 
increased fitness, not a local increase. The local increase of fitness requires a surrounding 
environment in which SDMTs are nutritive flies. The scientist intervention and the minority 
cases in which SDMTs are not nutritive flies (in virtue of imperfect correlation) are both cases 
in which there is no increasing of fitness because these local environments are inappropriate. 
It is a general feature of evolutionary selection that the designed organisms will probably be in 
inappropriate environments and as a result there will be no increasing of fitness even though 
the biological systems of the organisms are functioning properly. The conclusion is that the 
situation in which the organism’s systems are functioning properly but there is no increase of 
fitness is not problematic for producer-based teleosemantics. Rather, the situation is fully 







  I finish this chapter with a contrast between the theory of representational content here 
developed and the dual proposal for the minimal conditions for intentionality developed in the 
fourth chapter. The dual proposal is partly constituted by the success pattern condition which 
requires the presence of a success pattern in the behavioural output of the organism. This 
condition focus on the success conditions of the behavioural output produced by the consumer 
system to establish a minimal condition for intentionality. This condition is hence output-
oriented. Thus, the dual proposal for the minimal conditions for intentionality is (partially) 
output-oriented.126 By contrast, the producer-based teleosemantic theory developed in this 
chapter is input-oriented since it focuses on the function of the producer system in order to 
determine the content of the representational state. At this point it could be objected that there 
is an inconsistence (or incoherence) between my approach to representational content and my 
approach to the problem of demarcation – the former is output-oriented while the latter is input-
oriented. But should not a theory of mental representation be either input-oriented or output-
oriented? Is it possible for a theory to be input-oriented regarding representational content and 
output-oriented regarding minimal conditions for intentionality?   
  In fact, there is no inconsistency at all. It is plainly possible for a theory of mental 
representation to have these input-oriented and output-oriented approaches. The reason is that 
a theory of content is distinct from a theory of representational status. A theory of content is 
supposed to give an account of the content problem (“in virtue of what is a given state a 
representational state?”), while a theory of representational status is supposed to give an 
account of the representational status problem (“provided that a given state is representational, 
in virtue of what does it represents this state but not another state?”). Notice that the problem 
                                                             
126 The dual proposal is partially output-oriented as well because it is also constituted by the constancy 
mechanism condition which is input-oriented, as argued in the fourth chapter. However, in what follows I set 
side this input-oriented aspect of the dual proposal and focus on its output-oriented aspect. 
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of demarcation is a problem for the teleosemantic solution to the representational status 
problem, while producer-based teleosemantics is a teleosemantic solution to the content 
problem. There is no incoherence in assuming an input-oriented approach to the content 
problem – producer-based teleosemantics – and an output-oriented approach to the 
representational status problem – the dual proposal.  
 In this final chapter, I developed and defended the producer-based teleosemantic 
approach to representational content. The content of the representational state is determined by 
the function of the producer system, the effect for which the producer system was selected, not 
by the consumer system’s function. The producer system was selected to have the capacity to 
discriminate a certain external condition and it is this external condition that constitutes 
representational content. I assessed two functional indeterminacy problems that threaten the 
viability of producer-based teleosemantics – the concertina and distality problems – and I 
showed how to develop this approach in order to give an account of these problems and in 
doing so to determine content. I have also developed a general defence of producer-based 
teleosemantics based on the plausibility of malfunctioning assignments to detection systems. 
Finally, in this last section I have showed why the source of error objection does not establish 
a threat for the viability of this teleosemantic approach. My conclusion is that producer-based 











   In this thesis, I have developed and defended a teleological theory of mental 
representation. I tried to show that it succeeds in giving an account of primitive representational 
states, at least considering the previously assessed problems and objections. However, there 
are several problems and objections to teleosemantics that were not assessed. They are not in 
the scope of this thesis. For example, I have said nothing about the well-known swampman 
objection to teleosemantics.   
  Another issue is that in this thesis I have throughout assumed the aetiological 
conception of biological function without exploring the virtues of alternatives accounts of 
biological function. Presumably, it is not possible to give an account of all representational 
states based solely on the aetiological conception. Maybe it is required to appeal to other 
conceptions of biological function. That is, there is no unique conception of biological function 
based on which one can explain the nature of all representational states and so it is necessary 
to appeal to alternative accounts. It is my hope that the teleological theory defended here is 
plainly compatible with such a pluralist view in such a way that this theory may be expanded 
to embrace non-aetiological conceptions of biological functions.    
  Finally, it is not clear how this teleological theory would best be developed to give an 
account of more sophisticated representational states like conceptual and personal ones. This 
is probably the greatest challenge facing not only teleological theories, but naturalist theories 
of mental representation in general. It strikes me that the problem of how to expand these 
naturalist theories in order to give an account of more complex representational states should 
guide the next developments of naturalist theories in the years to come. Let us wait and see. 
  The teleological theory here developed is a powerful framework that provides a 
naturalist account of primitive mental representations. Even if it turns out that one cannot 
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develop teleosemantics to give an account of more sophisticated representational states, its 
value is still guaranteed in light of its account of primitive representations. This is by itself a 
great achievement.  
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